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Abstract 
This thesis examines, from the perspective of Jordanian financial analysts, the impact of 
selected components of the Jordanian Corporate Governance Code (JCGC) on the reliability of 
audit reports and the extent to which the JCGC contributes in narrowing the audit expectations 
gap. Thus this study focuses on those elements of the JCGC that relate to auditing and seeks to 
fill a gap in the existing literature regarding the determinants of changes in the audit 
expectation gap and the perceived reliability of the audit report, in the context of Jordan.  
Previous research in this area either considered a smaller range of variables or considered 
codes other than the JCGC. Moreover, Jordanian research has focused on studying the relative 
main effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables, and thus less attention 
has been placed on identifying interactive or configural relationships. Also the research 
methods used were incapable of identifying cause and effect relationships. Furthermore, given 
that the JCGC was only relatively recently implemented, on a “comply or explain” basis, the full 
impact of the code has, perhaps, not been fully reflected in prior research.  
This thesis investigates, experimentally, the main and interactive effects of four independent 
variables on two dependent variables. The independent variables are: (1) the external auditor’s 
independence, (2) the internal auditor’s effectiveness, (3) disclosure and transparency, and (4) 
corporate accountability. The dependent variables are (1) the perceived reliability of the audit 
report and (2) the perceived level of the audit expectation gap. In addition, this thesis 
investigates the extent to which Jordanian financial analysts possess self-insight as to the 
weight they place on the decision cues when evaluating the reliability of audit reports and 
when assessing the size of the audit expectation gap. By comparing financial analyst stated 
beliefs about the weights they placed on various factors, on one hand, to the weights revealed 
by the experiment, on the other, it is possible to gauge the accuracy of self-insight of the group.   
The study design is based on the agency theory and uses a mixed method approach. The study 
uses semi-structured interviews, concentrating on ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, aiming to 
investigate how institutional investors assess the selected elements of the JCGC in terms of 
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their effect on the perceived reliability of the audit report and the level of the audit expectation 
gap.  The study also uses a fully crossed 2 level factorial experiment based on the repeated 
measures technique, thus forming 16 possible combinations of the four independent variables 
(i.e. 16 scenarios). In the survey, each subject was requested to provide their assessment of the 
two dependent variables in each of the 16 scenarios. The interviews deliver an in-depth 
understanding of the investors’ perceptions regarding the selected elements of the JCGC and 
facilitate the interpretation of the study’s experimental results.  
It was predicted that the sophisticated investors may make decisions regarding the assessment 
of audits and auditors differently from unsophisticated investors. Therefore this study focused 
on financial analysts as an important type of sophisticated investor from the following types of 
institutional investors: banks, insurance companies, brokerage houses, investment companies 
and funds.   
An analysis of 47 completed surveys and ten interviews suggested that external auditors’ 
independence had the greatest effect on the perceived reliability of the audit report while, 
contrary to the existing literature,  corporate accountability had the greatest influence on the 
perceived level of the audit expectation gap. Several other significant interactions have been 
identified between the study variables. One-third of the overall effect size in relation to the 
perceived reliability of the audit report is attributed to interaction between the independent 
variables, whilst approximately one-quarter of the overall effect size in relation to the level of 
the audit expectation gap is attributed to interaction between the independent variables. This 
indicates that institutional investors configurally process decision making information when 
considering the influence of the selected elements of the Jordanian corporate governance 
code. This has policy implications for the Jordanian regulating bodies. 
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Chapter 1: Thesis Introduction 
  
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the research agenda for this thesis. It provides an overview of the 
study, including the study’s historical context, research problem and research questions, 
research objectives, research conclusions and contribution to the literature, research 
methodology and data collection methods, as well as structure of the remaining chapters of the 
thesis.   
 
1.2 Background and Overview of the Thesis  
The Jordanian corporate governance code draws on a number of local and international laws 
and codes, such as Jordan’s Securities Act and Companies' Law of 1997 and the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance 
(Corporate Governance Code in Jordan, 2009). The OECD principles of corporate governance 
were established by OECD Ministers in 1999, then revised and replaced in 2004. The OECD code 
became an “international benchmark” for developing countries worldwide (OECD, 2004, p. 3). 
The OECD defined corporate governance as: "Procedures and processes according to which an 
organization is directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities among the different participants in the organization – 
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such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders – and lays down the rules 
and procedures for decision-making" (OECD Glossary, 2007, P. 151). 
The Jordanian corporate governance code for shareholding companies listed on the Amman 
stock Exchange (ASE) was approved by the board of the commissioners of the Jordanian 
Securities Commission (JSC) on the 29th of July 2008 and became operational by the beginning 
of 20091 (Corporate Governance Code in Jordan, 2009). This Jordanian Corporate Governance 
Code (hereafter referred to as the JCGC), which regulates the activities of all Jordanian listed 
companies, is the subject of this study’s investigation.  
Audit committees are a cornerstone of corporate governance as they play a significant role in 
improving the quality and reliability of annual reporting. One way in which they accomplish this 
is by protecting external and internal auditors, starting from their nomination and continuously 
thereafter. Audit committees have the responsibility to discuss and resolve any conflict 
between auditors and management. The audit committee must ensure external auditor 
independence and internal audit effectiveness (Colbert, 2002). Colbert (2002) also stated that 
“under the International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) [ISA No. 260 Communications of audit 
matters with those charged with governance], external auditors have a responsibility to 
communicate certain matters, discovered during the financial statement audit, with those 
persons charged with governance of the entity. Similarly, the authoritative Practice Advisories 
(PA), issued by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), require internal auditors to share 
observations and recommendations with those charged with oversight responsibilities” (p.147), 
typically the governance body of the entity.  
This study investigates four primary independent variables derived from the JCGC, namely (a) 
external auditor independence, (b) internal auditor effectiveness, (c) disclosure and 
transparency levels and (d) corporate accountability (See Figure 1). These four variables are 
posited to influence the expert judgments of institutional investors as to (1) the perceived 
                                                          
1 See also Circular Number: 12/1/4659. Dated December 15, 2010. Issued by the Jordanian Securities Commission.  
Available on: http://www.jsc.gov.jo/Public/english.aspx?site_id=1&Lang=3&Page_Id=2550&Menu_ID2=257 
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reliability of the audit report and (2) the level of the audit expectation gap. This thesis reviews 
and analyzes the variables of the following model, whose variables are discussed in more detail 
in the literature review in Chapter Three:  
 













(A) The Reliability of the Audit Report
(B) The level of the Audit Expectation Gap 
 
Understanding the influence of these variables could be especially valuable for Jordan. There 
have been criticisms that low levels of disclosure, transparency, corporate accountability, 
external auditor independence and internal auditor effectiveness, have undermined confidence 
in the Jordanian capital market, compromised the integrity of financial reporting, and 
contributed to a widening of the audit expectation gap (Swaiti, 2006; Malkawi, 2008; Abdullatif, 
2006; Ameera, 2004; Al-Saudi, 2007).  
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The first independent variable (external auditor independence) is measured by assessing 
institutional investors' perceptions of how and why independence is crucial,  and reviewing 
related prior studies of (1) the role of well-structured audit committees in supporting and 
communicating with the external auditors, based on the JCGC and the ISA No. 260, (2) the 
impact of the processes of nominating, dismissing and setting audit remuneration by the audit 
committee, (3) audit partner rotation and (4) prohibiting the supply of Non-Audit Services 
(NAS). These four inputs are expected to enhance external auditor independence, both in fact 
and appearance, leading to reliable independent audit opinions and reporting about the 
company's ability to continue as a going concern.  
 
The second independent variable (internal auditor effectiveness) is measured by assessing 
institutional investors' perceptions of how and why some internal audit functions are more 
effective than others. This measurement was adopted after a review of prior related studies 
focusing on (1) the role of audit committees in nominating internal auditors, (2) the impact of 
providing internal audit reports to audit committees and executive managers, (3) the role of 
audit committees in reviewing internal audit reports, especially those related to violations 
detected by the internal auditor and (4) the role of audit committees in reviewing the external 
auditor’s assessment of the internal audit function. These measures, exercised by a well-
established audit committee, are expected to lead to enhanced internal auditor independence 
and effectiveness in detecting frauds and errors and preventing malpractices, thereby 
protecting the assets of the company. This should also lead to greater perceived reliability of 
the audit report and a reduction in the audit expectation gap. 
 
The reliability and the credibility of financial reports provided by a company, whether in the 
annual report or at any point during the year, depend on the quality, and the level, of disclosure 
and transparency. In regard to the third independent variable (disclosure and transparency), 
the JCGC has devoted a chapter to the topic of disclosure and transparency. This thesis explores 
institutional investors' perceptions of how and why JCGC disclosure and transparency 
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requirements for listed companies improve the quality of financial reporting and reduce the 
audit expectation gap. Prior research is examined to help guide this investigation. 
Accountability is defined as “The quality of being accountable; liability to give account of, and 
answer for, discharge of duties or conduct”, according to The Oxford English Dictionary. The 
fourth independent variable of this study involves corporate accountability. It refers to the 
ability of shareholders and stakeholders to hold the governing body of the company 
accountable to the laws, regulations and company's bylaws, based on their power and 
responsibilities.  This factor is measured by interviewing and exploring institutional investors' 
perceptions, and by reviewing the related previous studies of how and why the appropriately 
constituted responsibilities, duties and authorities stipulated in the JCGC align the actions of 
governance professionals with the interests of the company and shareholders. The relevant 
governance professionals here are the external auditors and other governance bodies involved 
with auditing, such as the executive management, members of the board of directors, the audit 
committees and the internal auditors, all of whom are accountable for their decisions and 
responsibilities towards the company and the shareholders. In addition to the literature review 
and investor interviews, the study surveys financial analyst perceptions of how different levels 
of corporate accountability influence the reliability of the audit report and reduce the audit 
expectation gap. 
Auditing has been defined as "being concerned with the verification of accounting data, with 
determining the accuracy and reliability accounting statements and reports" (Mautz, 1964, P.1). 
External auditors use their reports to communicate with the users of financial statements, such 
as investors, lenders and stakeholders. These parties assess investment and lending options 
based on the assurance provided by external auditors. Failure, by the external auditors, to give 
warning about the entity's viability, along with occurrences of corporate collapses and scandals, 
have raised the issue of the audit expectations gap; this gap partly exists because of the 
difference in perceptions and beliefs, between the users of the audit reports and the auditors, 
in regard to the auditors’ duties and responsibilities (Koh and Woo, 1998). 
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1.3 Reviewing the Jordanian Literature and the Contribution of the 
Thesis 
As this study is focused on corporate governance in Jordan and its impact on the audit 
expectation gap and reliability of audit reports, as perceived by the financial analysts, a brief 
overview of corporate governance in Jordan, and relevant auditing research, is necessary both 
as background and for the design of the study. The overview also highlights the audit problems 
existing prior to the establishment of the Jordanian corporate governance code, in order to 
assist in evaluating the perceptions of institutional investors, in the post JCGC adoption period, 
of the reliability of the audit report and the size of the audit expectations gap.  
 
1.3.1 Highlighting the Problems before the Establishment of the Jordanian Corporate 
Governance Code.  
Over the years, there have been criticisms of the level of disclosure released by listed 
companies in Jordan, the use of unqualified internal auditors coupled with weak internal 
control procedures, and the appointment of negligent and incompetent members of the board 
of directors. In some instances, there have been claims of malpractices conducted by the 
directors and the auditors (Malkawi, 2008). 
While the world had its headline-grabbing corporate collapses, Jordan also experienced its 
share of corporate scandals, creating the need for enhanced corporate governance. Following 
the Petra Bank bankruptcy in 1989, one of the most notorious scandals in Jordan’s history, 
Jordan faced a severe financial crisis, resulting in further corporate collapses and a decrease in 
the Jordanian Dinar (JD) exchange rate from USD 3.35 to USD 1.41 (Al-Awaqleh, 2008). Other 
examples of scandals in large companies include the case of the Phosphate Company and the 
case of the Magnesia Company, referred to the Attorney General after a loss JD130 million (Al-
Awaqleh, 2008) and involving legal actions, rescheduling and a compensation plan to protect 
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company employees (Awartani, 2011; Alrai, 2011; Zayadeen, 2011). Poor corporate governance 
practices were also associated with another scandal, involving four Jordanian banks, in which 
facilities amounting to millions of Jordanian Dinars were extended to individuals without 
getting the necessary approvals (Malkawi, 2008). In another corporate scandal, one billion US 
Dollars in loans, provided to an IT company, went astray (The Economist, 2003).   
Insufficient accountability impairs entities' compliance with laws and regulations, which 
consequently leads to inadequate disclosure and a lack of transparent information, and 
weakens Jordanian entities' compliance with the best practices of corporate governance 
(Malkawi, 2008). Jordanian entities' compliance with the best practices of corporate 
governance is questionable. In July 2009, the governor of the Jordanian Central Bank o (CBJ) 
dissolved the board of directors of the Jordanian Capital Bank. The CBJ’s officers discovered 
some administrative mismanagement and irregularities contradicted corporate governance 
best practices (Reuters, 2009).   
The auditor is considered the most capable party to assess whether the company is managed 
according to good corporate governance practices. A working paper, presented by Al-Basheer 
(2003) to the 5th Scientific Conference of the Jordanian Association of Certified Public 
Accountants (JACPA), about the role of the auditors in the light of the corporate governance 
environment in Jordan, pointed out that audit committees play a vital role in maintaining the 
soundness of the financial reporting system since their primary functions are examining the 
reports of auditors and their conformity with ISAs, and reviewing the comprehensiveness of the 
scope of audits. Audit committees should also ensure top management responsiveness to the 
observations of both external and internal auditors, facilitate the work of auditors and remove 
any obstacles facing auditors. 
Audit committees in Jordan are mostly formed to meet the requirements and conditions of the 
laws rather than for their essential role in maintaining the soundness of the financial reporting 
system (Swaiti, 2006; Abdullatif, 2006; Al-Farah, 2001; Al-Khadash and Al-Sartawi, 2010). The 
literature showed that audit committees did not possess the basic requirements to carry out 
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their responsibilities effectively, did not have sufficient influence to reinforce the independence 
of external auditors, and did not effectively play their role in appointing, dismissing, and 
determining the fees of external auditors. These findings are supported by the results of the 
World Bank’s assessment of the corporate governance environment in Jordan (World Bank: 
Corporate Governance Assessment, 2004). The literature attributed these problems to (1) 
insufficient legislation, (2) a lack of requirements for audit committee members to be 
independent, and (3) a lack of requirements specifying the minimum financial/accounting 
qualifications and experience that an audit committee member should hold. 
Al-Basheer (2003) pointed out that greater fairness and balance in setting audit fees, taking into 
account the heavy responsibilities required by shareholders and legislators, will facilitate 
greater audit effectiveness due to motivated auditors, ensure the company's compliance with 
the corporate governance code, and support external auditors in expressing their independent 
opinions about the entity's long-term viability. 
Auditing plays a key role in corporate governance. The Jordanian Association of Certified Public 
Accountants (JACPA) adopted the International Standards on Auditing (ISA) in 1990. Under ISA 
No. 570, the external auditor is responsible for evaluating whether the company is a going 
concern and giving early warning, to the public and users of the audit report, of any impending 
corporate collapse. Failure to give such early warning has raised the issue of the audit 
expectations gap in Jordan, where there is a discrepancy between what auditors are perceived 
to have done and what a group of financial statement users believes they should have done.  
Al-Awaqleh (2008) investigated the evaluation of the going concern assumption by the 
Jordanian external auditors, revealing that Jordan also has experienced the problem of 
unqualified audit opinions in the auditor's annual reports followed by unexpected corporate 
failures and collapses. The study reached these findings by conducting a pilot study on 160 
audit reports related to 32 failed shareholding entities. Examples of listed companies in Jordan 
which had clean audit reports in the six months prior to their receivership or liquidation include 
The Jordanian Candy and Chocolate Factories, in 2001; The Jordanian Clothing Industrial 
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Company, in 2003; The Developed Medication Industrial Company, in 2003; The Mineral 
Investment Company, in 2003; The Ala Aldeen Industrial Company, in 2001; The Al-Kawthar 
Company for Investment, in 2001. 
The external auditor's reports are the medium of communication between auditors and 
investors. Users of financial statements, such as investors, lenders and stakeholders, look to the 
assurance provided by the auditors as an input to their investment decisions. Therefore, an 
external auditors' forthright judgment regarding client viability is valued by investors (Jones, 
1996; Epstein and Geiger, 1994; O'Reilly, 2009;  Citron, Taffler, & Jinn-Yang 2008).  
In Jordan, investors analyze the contents of the audit report as they evaluate the alternative 
investment options based, in part, on the assurance provided by the external auditors. Market 
share prices in Jordan are also influenced by the released audited financial statements 
(Saaydah, 1998; Zureigat, 2006; Zureigat, 2010; Al-Awaqleh, 2008). The importance of the 
auditor's opinion in Jordan means that Jordanian laws and the regulatory bodies of the 
Jordanian capital market and the Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accountants (JACPA) 
should reinforce the external auditor's independence.  This independence should be in both 
fact and appearance, in order to ensure that auditors can express, clearly and unambiguously, 
their independent opinion.  
The failures to provide adequate warning were attributed, by Jordanian literature, to the 
external auditor’s lack of  independence, which has been compromised by (1) Inadequate audit 
fees, (2) Providing significant non-audit services, (3) Unlimited audit partner tenure, (4) Lack of 
support from audit committees to both external and internal auditors, (5) Insufficient laws and 
regulations, (6) Social and personal relationship between the auditors and the board of 
directors and the management and (7) Management pressure on the auditors and weak 
corporate accountability  (Swaiti, 2006; Malkawi, 2008; Abdullatif, 2006; Dahmash, 1989; 
Matar, 1995; Matar, 2000; Momany, 1994; Al-Awaqleh, 2008; Hamdan, 1996; Abu-Tapanjeh, 
2006;  Al-Saudi, 2007; World Bank: Accounting and Auditing, 2004; Bani-Ahmad, 2000; Al-
Basheer 2003; Malhas, 1992). 
   24 
 
An audit committee should also ensure the soundness of the internal control procedures in 
detecting and preventing errors, frauds and malpractices (Cadbury Report, 1992; Braiotta, 
2004). Audit committees are responsible for supporting the internal auditors and reinforcing 
their effectiveness (Allison, 1994). Audit committee support to the internal audit could be 
achieved by the nomination of the internal auditors, evaluating the requirements and the 
budget of the internal audit department, ensuring that the internal auditors have a direct 
reporting relationship and communication with the audit committee as an independent body 
(in addition to any reporting to company management), hold meetings with the internal 
auditors without the presence of the company management and by reviewing the external 
auditor's assessment of the internal audit function (Pickett, 2010; Goodwin, 2003; Qin, 2007; 
Goodwin & Yeo, 2001).  
Thnaibat and Shunnaq (2010) investigated the role of the external auditors, in Jordan, in 
evaluating the internal audit function according to the International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 
No. 610. The study revealed that there were statistically significant differences between the 
internal and the external auditors' perceptions in regard to the implementation of the ISA No. 
610. The study explained this, pointing out that internal auditors in Jordan are still doing their 
job in a traditional manner, focusing mainly on the accuracy of the accounts. The study also 
revealed that the internal auditors’ independence and their organizational position were crucial 
factors affecting the external auditor's reliance on and evaluation of the internal audit function 
in Jordan. The study recommended that internal auditors should report to the audit committee 
to maintain their independence and effectiveness.  
This variance of perceptions between external and internal auditors in the evaluation of the 
internal audit function in Jordan highlights the audit committee's vital role as a liaison between 
the external and the internal auditors, the company management, and the board of directors. 
This thesis, through in-depth interviews, aims to evaluate how and why the communication 
between the audit committees and the external and the internal auditors, as stated by the 
JCGC, lead to strengthening auditor independence and effectiveness.   
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The Jordanian Company Law (1997) specifies that shareholders appoint the external auditors. 
Prior to the JCGC, it was management, normally with the collaboration of the board of 
directors, who appointed external auditors and determined their remuneration. Malkawi (2008) 
criticized that situation, arguing that it undermined the independence of the external auditors.   
The selection of the external auditors in Jordan prior to the release of the JCGC was influenced 
by the auditors’ personal relationships with the board of directors, the company management 
and the audit committee members (Al-Saudi, 2007; Khsharmh, 2003; Ameera, 2004; Abdullatif, 
2003). Malkawi (2008) suggests that comprehensive legislation to ensure audit partner 
rotation, disciplinary systems, an ethical code of conduct for external auditors and prohibit non-
audit services for audit clients, could mitigate problems in auditor independence. 
Jordanian companies are often described as family-owned businesses (MENA Corporate 
Governance Workshop, 2003; Zureigat, 2011b; Al-Adeli, 1993; Abed et al, 2012; Matar, 1994). 
Abu-Tapanjeh (2006) revealed that a number of shareholding companies in Jordan are owned 
by members of a family, and prefer to elect their family and relatives to be members of both of 
the board of directors and executives in the company. This ownership characteristic in 
Jordanian shareholding companies has created obstacles for implementing corporate 
governance best practices. With family relationships determining appointments to positions in 
both the board of directors and high in the executive management, decision makers often lack 
the flexibility and objectivity to fulfill their jobs and oversee the company's activities effectively 
(Sharar 2006). Moreover, family-owned businesses in Jordan sometimes do not use 
competence as a criterion for appointing external auditors; rather, personal relationships might 
be the most influential criterion (Zureigat, 2011b).  
On the 29th of July 2008, the board of the commissioners of the Jordanian Securities 
Commission (JSC) issued and approved the Jordanian Corporate Governance Code (JCGC) for 
the publicly traded companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) which has come into 
effect as of the first of January 2009. The JCGC was established to develop the investment and 
economic climate, including the national capital market and its regulatory and organizational 
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framework. Corporate governance best practices became a tool to attract foreign and local 
investment alike. They enhance confidence in the capital market since they reflect the level of 
fairness, disclosure, transparency and accountability of the listed corporations and identify the 
measures that should be taken to limit corruption (Corporate Governance Code in Jordan, 
2009). 
The Jordanian corporate governance code was established to help build a clear framework to 
regulate the roles of the shareholders and safeguard the rights of all stakeholders. The code 
states that the duty of the board of directors and the company management is to establish 
adequate, and effective, internal control procedures to detect and prevent errors and frauds. It 
also specifies the role of shareholders and the audit committees in nominating the external 
auditors of the company and ensuring their independence. It also states the roles of the audit 
committee in nominating and communicating with the internal and the external auditors, 
evaluating their performance and removing unnecessary barriers in the way of external 
auditors. 
According to the JCGC, Jordanian listed companies should disclose accurate, clear and timely 
information to shareholders and investors; this includes dealings with company insiders and 
their relatives as well as related party transactions. The JCGC has prohibited any person from 
simultaneously holding the position of chairperson of the board of directors and any executive 
position in the same entity, and it has also prohibited simultaneous membership by any person 
in more than five boards of directors of different listed companies. This measure aimed at 
limiting the opportunistic behavior of the managers of some closely-held corporations and 
ensuring accountability in corporate governance of the companies listed at Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE). 
The main research objective of this thesis is to investigate (1) the impact of the Jordanian 
corporate governance code (JCGC), in the post implementation environment, on external 
auditor independence and internal auditor effectiveness, and (2) the extent of the JCGC 
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disclosure, transparency and the accountability requirements on institutional investor 
perceptions regarding the reliability of the audit report and reducing the audit expectation gap. 
 
1.3.2 Reviewing the Related Empirical Jordanian Studies. 
This section presents relevant Jordanian literature about Jordanian corporate governance and 
the existence and effect of the audit expectation gap on the auditing profession in Jordan. It 
also focuses on the roles of audit committees in relation to external and internal auditors. This 
section aims to explore prior empirical work in relation to corporate governance environment 
in Jordan. The results of this exploration will be used, in the next section, to show how the 
current study contributes to the knowledge of Jordanian corporate governance.  
A study aimed at developing a system for corporate governance in Jordanian shareholding 
companies and reinforcing external auditor independence was conducted by Al-Hanini and 
Dahmash (2008). Al-Hanini and Dahmash designed and distributed a questionnaire to 120 
external auditors and conducted an unspecified number of interviews. The study pointed out 
that the auditors thought that both effective corporate governance systems and sub-
committees (e.g. Audit committee) derived from the board of directors positively enhance 
external auditor independence. The study recommended that auditors should express their 
opinion about corporate governance through their audit report. 
Swaiti (2006) argued that, according to Jordanian regulations and laws in force, all public 
shareholding companies are required to form audit committees. However, Swaiti argues that 
the audit committee functions and responsibilities stipulated in those regulations and laws 
were insufficient. For example, they did not require any qualifications for audit committee 
members, such as having financial management experience or holding a degree in accounting 
or any related fields. 
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Swaiti (2006) proposed a model for the role of audit committees in Jordan. Swaiti designed a 
survey questionnaire which was given to financial managers, general managers, external audit 
firms, and internal audit managers, and then conducted personal interviews with some of those 
who were involved in his study2. The study concluded that audit committees at that time did 
not have the basic requirements to fulfil their roles effectively, and they did not have a 
substantial impact on external auditor independence. The study recommended that all audit 
committee members should be independent and suggested they have an industry expert and a 
legal expert among their members.  
The researcher would argue that all audit committee experience and qualifications must be in 
the fields of auditing, accounting and finance, not just because the committee’s name is ‘the 
audit committee’ and its main function is to ensure the integrity and the accuracy of the 
financial reporting, it is also because the audit committee has the authority to consult external 
legal consultants or experts for any issue related to fulfilling their roles properly. The JCGC 
stipulated that each company “shall put at the disposal of [its Audit] Committee all facilities 
that it needs to perform its duties, including the authority to seek expert assistance whenever 
needed” (Corporate Governance Code in Jordan, 2009, Chapter 5, section 1-3). 
The effectiveness of audit committees in Jordan and the factors affecting the effectiveness of audit 
committees have been explored by Abdullatif (2006).  In his study, a questionnaire was distributed 
to external auditors. The study concluded that audit committees in Jordan were somewhat 
effective, and they marginally fulfilled their jobs as stipulated in the related Jordanian regulations. 
The study revealed that those regulations were insufficient and recommended reinforcing audit 
committee independence from company management in order to strengthen their role in 
overseeing the financial reporting processes, and their role in nominating, dismissing and setting 
external auditor’s remuneration.  
Abdullatif (2007) conducted another study to investigate the relevance of audit committee 
responsibilities to corporate governance. The study utilized the same methodology as the previous 
                                                          
2 The study interviewed executives, board members, auditors, and staff at Jordanian regulating bodies.  
   29 
 
one and the same sample category. The study concluded that external auditors in Jordan perceived 
audit committee responsibilities as being relevant in general, and they suggested some additional 
responsibilities such as providing the external auditor with any necessary information and 
coordinating between external and internal auditors. The study also revealed that external auditors 
in Jordan were against giving audit committees the authority of nominating, dismissing, and setting 
external auditors’ fees.    
External auditor opinions against the role of the audit committees in nominating external 
auditors were also observed by Swaiti (2006).  Abdullatif (2007) attributed this partially to the 
external auditors’ criticisms of the weak composition of audit committees at that time, such as 
there being no requirements of being independent or having any financial experts. He also 
partially attributed this reluctance to the external auditors' unwillingness to undertake 
additional tasks or to change their personal relationship with their clients. Swaiti’s study (2006) 
revealed that there was consensus between auditors and company executives in rejecting the 
role of audit committees in selecting the external auditors. Swaiti (2006), however, pointed out 
that the auditors’ rejection was based on the audit committee members being unqualified to 
evaluate auditor work3. On the other hand, the study also attributed this rejection to the 
possibility that external auditors desire to maintain a personal relationship with their company 
(management) clients. 
The causes and structure of the audit expectations gap have been investigated by Al-Thuneibat 
(2003). A quantitative method approach was adopted in the study. The questionnaire explored 
expectations about auditor responsibilities and duties, including whether they were reasonable 
or unreasonable4, and was distributed to the study sample which consisted of the external 
                                                          
3
  This could be a suggestion that audit committee members are incompetent, or it could be a mistaken belief that 
only experts can evaluate experts when in fact their output is for non-auditors and ultimately it must be the 
shareholders who decide whether they have performed a useful role.  
4
 The study identified the unreasonable auditors' responsibilities, based on the previous literature especially the 
study of Porter (1993). The study defined the unreasonable responsibilities as those duties and responsibilities 
which were not stipulated in the international standards on auditing (the adopted standards in Jordan) or in the 
legislation that regulates the auditing profession in Jordan.     
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auditors, and executive and financial managers of Jordanian listed companies. Based on the 
analysis of the data, the study concluded that the audit expectations gap existed in Jordan, and 
it consisted of the following three basic components: deficient standards gap, ignorance gap 
and deficient performance gap.  
To narrow these gaps, the study recommended that the regulatory bodies of the auditing 
profession in Jordan should play a more effective role in educating society as to the auditor’s 
duties and responsibilities, developing the profession and overseeing the auditors’ job, ensuring 
they continuously participate in seminars related to the profession, and imposing quality 
control on the auditors. 
The performance gap could also be narrowed by strengthening the external auditor's 
performance. This thesis aims to investigate the role of the JCGC and support from the audit 
committees in reinforcing the external auditor's independence, which is expected to encourage 
external auditors to express an independent opinion about the company's financial position. 
The gap between auditors and investors’ perceptions about the qualitative characteristics of 
accounting information has been investigated by Obaidat (2007). These qualitative 
characteristics include the reliability and relevance of information in relation to helping 
investors in decision making (Kieso, Waygandt, & Warfield 2010). The Obaidat study adopted 
quantitative methods, with questionnaires distributed to a sample which consisted of 30 
investors and 40 auditors. The study revealed that the major focus of the investors was on 
timeliness while the auditors gave neutrality the first rank in importance.  
Obaidat (2007) explained the difference in priorities between investors and auditors, explaining 
that individual investors in Jordan are not interested in long-term investment, being more 
interested in gaining profits as soon as possible through speculation in the stock exchange. The 
auditors focused on neutrality, which means providing information that has not been prepared 
to favor one party of interested users over another (Kieso et al, 2010), which is the basis of the 
auditor's independence (Arens, Best, Shailer, Fiedler, Elder, & Beasley 2010). To ensure 
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neutrality, audit committees should strengthen the external auditor's independence, even in 
the face of management pressure. In Jordan, management pressure to issue clean opinions has 
been a significant problem for external auditors (Omari, 2003; Dahmash, 1989; Bani-Ahmad, 
2000; Matar, 1995; Al-Adeli, 1993; Malhas, 1992). This pressure impairs the auditor's 
independence and highlights the necessity of adopting effective corporate governance systems.  
The audit expectations gap and auditors’ responsibilities, from investors’ perspective, have 
been investigated by Hajir (2001). The researcher designed and distributed 72 questionnaires to 
individual investors, present at the Amman Stock Exchange at the time of data collection, and 
28 questionnaires to institutional investors (the brokerage companies). The study found that 
perceptions of inadequate disclosure5, inadequate independence of auditors and inadequate 
performance by auditors, all contributed to a widening of the audit expectation gap. 
The study also revealed that the only difference in perceptions between individual investors 
and institutional investors, regarding the factors affecting the existence of the expectations 
gap, related to the level of disclosure.  The study found that the individual investors believed, at 
that time, that the levels of disclosure in the audit and financial reports, alongside the 
accompanying notes in the annual report, were adequate and provided relevant information 
for decision making. The institutional investors thought the level of disclosure inadequate. A 
possible explanation for this issue is that the institutional investors employ qualified and 
sophisticated financial analysts who can devote more time and skill to the analysis of the 
reports and notes. 
The study of Omari (2003) investigated the expectation gap in relation to the credibility of the 
accounting figures in the financial reports, the extent of the auditor’s responsibility in 
expressing an opinion about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern, the auditor’s 
                                                          
5
 The study defined the level of disclosure by stating that financial reports and the notes accompanying the 
financial statements should include all necessary information that reflect the real financial position of the company 
to make the investors informed and in helping them to make their investing decisions.  
 
   32 
 
independence and the scope of the auditor’s responsibility in finding the misleading financial 
data during the auditing process. In addition, that study set out to identify which of the investor 
groups (individual investors, financial brokers, employees of banks' investment units) have the 
greatest expectations gap. A quantitative approach was adopted in the study, with 
questionnaires distributed to investors and external auditors. The study concluded that the 
audit expectations gap in Jordan was mainly focused on the independence of the external 
auditors, which was affected by non-audit services, unlimited audit tenures, and perceptions of 
management pressure. 
Al-Khadash and Al-Sartawi (2010) investigated the usefulness of legislation along the lines of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in enhancing the independence of external auditors in Jordan and 
narrowing the audit expectation gap. The study, as did most of the previous Jordanian studies, 
adopted a quantitative approach in which questionnaires were used to collect data from 
Jordanian Institutional Investors and external auditors. The study concluded that such 
legislation was expected to reinforce the external auditor’s independence and narrow the audit 
expectation gap. Based on this, the study recommended that the Jordanian regulatory 
supervisory bodies of the auditing profession should define a list of non-audit services 
prohibited to their audit clients, and those prohibitions should be enforced by relevant 
legislation (using the SOX legislation as a guide). In addition, the legislation should reinforce the 
auditor’s independence, limit the audit partner's tenure, and activate the role of well-
structured audit committees. 
 
1.3.3 Contribution of the Thesis and to the Jordanian Studies 
The objective of this thesis is to gain insights into the perceptions of institutional investors in 
the period subsequent to the adoption of the JCGC, in so far as those perceptions relate to the 
reliability of the audit reports and the extent to which they contribute in narrowing the audit 
expectations gap. This thesis investigates, experimentally, the impact of the external auditor’s 
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independence, the internal auditor’s effectiveness, disclosure and transparency, and corporate 
accountability, on the level of the audit expectation gap and the perceived reliability of the 
audit report. Thus, the contribution of this thesis is to complement the existing research by 
investigating the relative main and interactive weights of the posited four variables on the 
reliability of the audit report and the reduction of the audit expectation gap, following the 
relatively recent introduction of the JCGC in Jordan which was intended to increase the actual 
and perceived independence of auditors. In addition, the thesis explores cause and effect 
relationships, including interactions, in the Jordanian context, in contrast to prior research 
focusing on associations.    
The results of this thesis fill a gap in the extant body of the literature and are more 
comprehensive than the prior research in Jordan. For instance, the study of Al-Hanini and 
Dahmash (2008) focused on corporate governance’s role in reinforcing the external auditor's 
independence. Another study, Al-Khadash and Al-Sartawi (2010), investigated the capability of 
legislation like the American Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), rather than the JCGC, to reinforce the 
independence of external auditors in Jordan and narrow the audit expectation gap6. The 
current study considers a wider range of variables and focuses on investigating the 
relationships in the Jordanian environment.   
In addition, this thesis investigates the extent to which Jordanian financial analysts possess self-
insight as to the weight they place on the decision cues when evaluating the reliability of audit 
reports and when assessing the size of the audit expectation gap. By comparing financial 
analyst beliefs about the weights they placed on various factors, on one hand, to the weights 
revealed by an experiment, on the other, it is possible to gauge the accuracy of self-insight of 
the group. This comparison provides clues as to the quality of the decision making and the 
likelihood of consistency in judgments (Libby, 1981; Hooper & Trotman, 1996). 
                                                          
6 The study of Al-Khadash and Al-Sartawi (2010) had been conducted before the establishment of the JCGC, the 
study was sent for publishing in September 2008 as mentioned in the footnotes of the study.  
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This thesis contributes to the Jordanian literature by using experimentation. This thesis 
presents a new methodology to the area of understanding corporate governance in Jordan. The 
use of the experiment, along with in-depth interviews, aims to enhance understanding of how 
and why Jordanian listed companies are affected by the key components of the newly adopted 
Jordanian corporate governance code, from the point of view of institutional investors. The use 
of an experiment is intended to overcome methodological limitations inherent in prior 
Jordanian studies which mostly adopted quantitative approaches based on questionnaires. The 
use of the experiment, employing the repeated measures design, enabled cause and effect 
relations to be investigated and some insights to be developed, including insights into 
interactions between the independent variables in their impact on the dependent variables. 
The study results will provide valuable information to external users such as the Jordanian 
Securities Commission (JSC), the Certified Financial Analysts Society in Jordan (CFA-Jordan), the 
Jordanian Association for Certified Public Accountants (JACPA), other Jordanian regulatory 
bodies in addition to shareholders, as well as to the Internal users such as members of boards 
of directors, audit committee members, executive managers and the internal auditors.  
The research’s importance also stems from the lack of previous empirical Jordanian studies in 
this regard. Most local and international studies investigated the effect of corporate 
governance on market share prices, company performance, earnings management and 
financial reporting quality, and dealt primarily with exceptionally large firms in the U.S.A and 
Europe, countries with highly developed and active markets for corporate control in 
comparison to those of emerging markets like Jordan (Tomar & Bino, 2012; Ishhadat & Abed Al-
Jaleel, 2012; Al-Manzou, 2009; Exi et al, 2001; Al-Najjar, 2007; Al-Khouri, 2005; Gompers, Ishii, 
& Metrick 2001; Al-khabash & Al-Thuneibat, 2009; Klein, 2006). Nevertheless, corporate 
governance best practices and the roles of the board of directors and the audit committees in 
communicating and supporting the internal and the external auditors may also influence the 
auditing profession and the demand for audit quality (Ballesta & García-Meca, 2005) 
Finally, this study has the potential to contribute further to the knowledge of the impact of 
corporate governance on the auditing profession literature through the database that it has 
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developed for Jordanian listed companies. This database could be used to study other 
corporate governance issues. 
 
1.4 Research Statement  
This study enhances understanding of the newly adopted JCGC and audit reports in Jordan. The 
purpose of this thesis is to corroborate primary and interactive effects of factors and variables 
related to the constituents of the JCGC on the reliability of the audit report and the extent they 
contribute in narrowing the audit expectation gap as perceived by the institutional investors. 
This research employs a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to provide a 
grounded investigation of the elements of the JCGC in so far they relate to the auditing 
profession, specifically the external auditor's independence, the internal auditor's 
effectiveness, disclosure, transparency and accountability. The study also includes 
consideration of the relative weights of effects, casual relationships, how the factors influence 
and interact and how they are evaluated.  
 
1.4.1 Research Questions  
The main question addressed in this thesis is: 
How and why do the selected elements of the JCGC affect the institutional investor's judgment 
of (a) the reliability of the audit report and (b) a narrowing of the audit expectation gap?7 
                                                          
7 The audit expectations gap exists in Jordan (Al-Thuneibat, 2003; Obaidat, 2007; Abdullatif, 2003; Omari, 2003; 
Hajir, 2001) as discussed earlier. This thesis endeavors to contribute to narrowing the audit expectation gap by 
investigating the posited independent variables of the JCGC experimentally. 
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In answering this fundamental research question, this thesis both explores institutional 
investors' perceptions and reviews previous studies, investigating how and why corporate 
governance affects the auditing profession, in particular, how and why external auditor 
independence, internal auditor effectiveness, disclosure, transparency and corporate 
accountability affect institutional investors’ perceptions of the reliability of the audit report and 
the size of the audit expectations gap. In addition, this thesis utilized the mixed method 
approach to answer the research questions by interviewing institutional investors to facilitate 
additional insight into their decision-making processes. Moreover, this thesis employs a 
factorial experiment, based on a questionnaire, to identify the causal relationship between the 
hypothesized elements of the JCGC and auditing. Also, by using the experimental technique, 
this study aims to identify the relative weights of the independent variables and their 
interactions with the dependent variables, in other words the perceived reliability of the audit 
report and the level of the audit expectation gap. 
The first research question relates to the impact of the selected elements of JCGC, in so far as 




What are the relative main and interactive weights of:  
  External auditor independence, 
   Internal auditor effectiveness,  
   Disclosure and transparency, and    
   Corporate Accountability  
                on the perceived reliability of the audit report? 
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The second research question relates to the perceived impact of the selected elements of JCGC, 




Slovic, Fleissner, & Bauman (1972) argued “Analysts believe that factors relevant to investment 
decisions should often be interpreted configurally” (p. 286). However, they defined 
configurality as meaning “that the analyst’s interpretation of an item of information varies 
depending on the nature of other available information” (Slovic et al, 1972, p. 286). Previous 
literature that investigated judgmental decisions for capital market investment (Wood & Ross, 
2006; Hopkins, 2009; Nguyen & Ross, 2006) and judgmental decision making in auditing 
(Ashton, 1974; Hofstedt & Hughes, 1977; Brown & Solomon, 1990, 1991; Hooper & Trotman, 
1996) have revealed that influential factors interact and intermingle in their influence in 
judgmental decision making. “An interaction means that the effect of one independent variable 
depends on the level of the other independent variable being considered” (Trotman, 1996, p. 
21). 
RQ.2 
 What are the relative main and interactive weights of:  
  External auditor independence,  
   Internal auditor effectiveness,   
   Disclosure and transparency, and    
   Corporate Accountability 
       on the level of the audit expectation gap?  
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The four independent variables hypothesized to influence the dependent variables in this study 
might interact and result in different impacts depending on the combination of values of the 
other independent variables. For instance, the impact of evidence of uniformly high or low 
performance on all the variables might have a greater impact than would have been expected 
from examining the impact of each variable in the absence of the other factors. Thus, high 
levels of performance on all four factors may convince the investors that the company and its 
auditors take governance seriously because of the strong and consistent message. In such 
circumstances, it is possible to envisage investors having a perception of reliable reporting and 
robust auditing.     
A further example of the interaction of the elements of corporate governance would be that 
high or strong levels of external auditor independence and performance, coupled with high 
levels of internal auditor effectiveness, might not ensure the perceived maximum influence and 
outcomes of corporate governance if they were associated with inadequate and untimely 
disclosure and transparency and a poor accountability system.  
It has been evidenced that interactions between variables in experimental studies are 
particularly important and deliver great value to the decision makers because they lend the 
findings additional useful dimensions; for instance, Hopkins (2009) found statistically significant 
interaction between intensity of private equity involvement and duration of involvement on the 
attractiveness of the Initial Public Offering (IPO). Hopkins pointed out that the result was 
noteworthy and interesting because the intensity of private equity involvement failed to satisfy 
standard statistical tests of significance, but it was a relevant factor when it interacted with the 
duration of involvement. Teoh and Lim (1996) found two statistically significant interactions in 
their experiment investigating the factors affecting the level of confidence in the auditor’s 
independence. They also found that the existence of audit committees mitigates perceptions of 
impairment of auditor independence when that auditor gained large audit fees (more that 15 
%) from one client. Moreover, the study also found that the perceived external auditor 
independence was enhanced by the absence of both non-audit fees and a fee dependency 
situation. 
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Evidently, manipulation of the four independent variables may provide combined effects that 
are relevant information for investors in their decision making. Therefore, it is hypothesized 
that institutional investors will recognize the potential interactions and interrelations between 
the four factors and evaluate and process them configurally when considering the influence of 
the Jordanian corporate governance code. Given the potential significance of interactions 
between the four independent variables, this thesis establishes the following hypothesis:  
 
 
1.4.1.2 Self Insight 
The unit of analysis in this thesis consisted of institutional investors.  Institutional investors are 
perceived as experienced and sophisticated analysts whose judgments and opinions are trusted 
as sources of information related to investment assessment (Bouwman, Frishkoff, & Frishkoff, 
1987; Schipper, 1991; O'Brien & Bhushan, 1990). This thesis also aims to investigate the degree 
of self-insight demonstrated by Jordanian financial analysts. Self-insight is the extent of insight 
that individuals have into their judgment process (Trotman, 1996). Typically, the degree of self-
insight has “been assessed as the correlation, over all cues, between a subject's cue usage and 
the importance rating subjectively attached to each cue” (Solomon & Shields, 1995, p. 151). 
This technique has been employed in studies about judgment decision making in finance, 
including Hopkins (2009), Wood & Ross (2006), Mear & Firth (1987) and Nguyen & Ross (2006). 
This thesis builds on these studies and considers the level of self-insight among Jordanian 
financial analysts regarding their assessments of the elements of the Jordanian corporate 
H1:      
Institutional investors process decision making information configurally 
when considering the influence of the selected components of the 
Jordanian corporate governance code.  
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governance code, in so far they relate to auditing among, by addressing the following 
questions:  
 
This thesis also aims to provide an in-depth understanding of how institutional investors assess 
the selected constituents of the JCGC, and to provide a justification for their conclusions. This 
could be achieved by conducting in-depth semi-structured interviews with a concentration on 
‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Symon & Cassel, 1998; Yin, 2009). The fifth research question of this 
study is: 
 
The study’s research questions and hypothesis are the basis for the research objectives.  
RQ.3  
What degree of self-insight do institutional investors demonstrate in their 
assessments of the selected key constituents of the Jordanian corporate 
governance code on the reliability of the audit report? 
RQ.4  
 What degree of self-insight do institutional investors demonstrate in their 
assessments of the selected key constituents of the Jordanian corporate 
governance code on the audit expectation gap?  
 
RQ.5  
How and why do institutional investors’ assessments of the 
selected constituents of the JCGC affect their perception of: 
    The reliability of the audit report, and 
    The level of the audit expectation gap?  
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1.4.2 Objectives of the Study 
The primary objective of this thesis is to improve understanding of how implementation of the 
Jordanian corporate governance code, in so far as it relates to auditing, has affected the 
perceived reliability of an independent audit opinion and the extent to which the code might 
help in narrowing the audit expectation gap. The experiment conducted during this study aims 
to test the inter-relationships between the elements of the corporate governance code (namely 
the external auditor's independence, the internal auditor's effectiveness, disclosure and 
transparency, and accountability) as regards to their influence on the auditing profession in 
Jordan, from the institutional investors' perspective. In particular the study sets out to: 
1- Investigate the impact of the external auditor's independence, in the post JCGC implementation 
period, on the reliability of the audit report and the size of the audit expectation gap. This 
includes reviewing the related literature of the impact of the audit partner rotation, preventing 
non-audit services, external auditor's selection, remuneration, and dismissal by the audit 
committees, and the role of a well-established audit committee in supporting and 
communicating with the external auditors. 
2- Investigate the impact of the internal auditor's effectiveness, in the post JCGC implementation 
period, on the reliability of the audit report and the size of the audit expectation gap. This 
includes reviewing the previous studies and highlighting the role of appropriately constituted 
audit committees in appointing the internal auditors of the company, setting their budget and 
communicating with the internal auditors, in addition to their role as liaisons between internal 
and external auditors. 
3- Investigate the impact of the disclosure and the transparency, in the post JCGC implementation 
period, on the reliability of the audit report and the size of the audit expectation gap. This also 
includes reviewing the literature of how adequate, timely, and transparent information 
influence the institutional investor's perception.   
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4- Investigate the impact of accountability, in the post JCGC implementation period, on the 
reliability of the audit report and the size of the audit expectation gap. This includes reviewing 
the literature of how and why the appropriately constituted responsibilities and authorities of 
external auditors and governance bodies involved with auditor accountability affect 
institutional investor's perception of the reliability of the audit report and the size of their 
expectation gap.  
5- Determine whether Jordanian institutional investors consider and evaluate the impact of the 
elements of the JCGC individually or in combination (configurally). 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
Before embarking on any research project, the researcher should develop a plan, outlining a 
research approach and the techniques that will be used to collect the necessary data. The 
importance of obtaining high quality data cannot be overestimated as, according to Gill & 
Johnson (2010), the quality of the findings of the research project are determined by the quality 
of the data on which they are based. Corporate governance studies tend to use an agency 
theoretical frame, with research objectives expressed in testable hypotheses and using publicly 
available information, and in some instances a survey method is used to collect data (Saunders, 
Lewis, & Thornhill, 2012). The research design can be either qualitative or quantitative or a 
mixture of both. This research will use a strategic combination of approaches including semi-
structured interviews and a factorial experimental design.   
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1.5.1 The mixed method approach 
 Although business research predominantly uses quantitative methods, the use of mixed 
methodology has become common in some fields of business research (Collis & Hussey, 2003). 
The mixed method approach uses both qualitative and quantitative methods to achieve the 
study objectives. Mixed methods can provide both quantitative and qualitative research 
strengths and offset their different weaknesses, and can also increase the generalizability of the 
results (Bryman, 2006; Johnson and Christensen, 2010). Conducting an experimental research 
design alongside a qualitative method may deliver better understanding of the research 
problem (Burns, 2000).  
 
 1.5.2 In-depth Interviews            
Semi-structured interviews are used in this thesis because there have been few studies dealing 
with Jordanian corporate governance in the context of the role of audit committees as liaisons 
between corporate governance constituents. In Jordan, as in many developing countries, there 
is limited availability of financial information beyond the financial statements (Afifi, 2009). A 
possible explanation could be that Jordan has only recently applied a formal code of corporate 
governance, or it could be due to the availability of other mechanisms of acquiring information, 
or it could be that there is greater reliance on substantial investor-directors to look after all 
shareholders in a close knit commercial community, or it could be due to yet unrecognized 
factors. 
Given the current incompleteness of knowledge, interviews offer various useful advantages,  
such as getting higher response rates, greater depth of information and the availability of the 
interviewer to clarify any misunderstood questions. The use of semi-structured interviews 
provides flexibility that allows new questions and topics to arise as a result of what the 
interviewee says (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002; Gendron and Bedard, 2006; Al-Lehaidan, 2006). In 
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this way, the insights gained are less constrained by the researcher’s preconceptions of the 
likely relationships.  
 
1.5.3 Experimental Treatments 
Factorial experimentation enables researchers to evaluate interaction effects between two or 
more independent variables, something that cannot be obtained from single-factor 
experimentation (Winer et al, 1991). “Interaction effects” are effects that cannot be predicted 
from the sum of effects of individual variables but, rather, from the interaction of these 
variables together (Winer et al, 1991, p.284). 
The factorial experiment method is a systematic treatment of the study variables. It allows the 
researcher to manipulate and control the independent variables and observe the resulting 
variation in the dependent variables under each scenario (Kerlinger, 1986; Collis & Hussey, 
2003). 
The research objectives of this study are addressed by conducting a qualitative in-depth 
investigation (interview) alongside the experimentation. A completely crossed (2^4 = 16 cases) 
factorial experiment is employed to investigate the influence (including relative and interactive 
weights) of the selected elements of the Jordanian corporate governance code on the 
perceptions of their impact on the value of the audit opinion as measured by the reliability of 
the audit report and the size of the audit expectation gap. “Another advantage to this design is 
that we can use each participant as his or her own control ‘group,’ thereby reducing the 
amount of variance within each treatment condition in the ANOVA” (Weathington, 
Cunningham & Pittenger, 2010, p. 446). 
Experimental treatment provides a strong platform to ensure the evidencing of the causality of 
the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variables, and also helps identify any 
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interaction between the four independent variables in influencing the dependent variables 
(Keppel & Wickens, 2004; Creswell, 2009). The experiment method is recommended and well 
established in auditing, accounting and financial research (Libby & Lewis, 1982; Black, 1986; 
Chewning & Harrell, 1990; Baker and Nofsinger, 2002; Trotman, 1996; Wang & Tuttle, 2009; 
Krishnamoorthy, 2002; Brown, 1983; Ashton, 1974;  Hofstedt & Hughes, 1977; Stocks & Harrell, 
1995; Ashton & Ashton, 1995; Hooper & Trotman, 1996), and particularly in those studies that 
have investigated informed and knowledgeable participants such as financial analysts, 
professional auditors and accountants  (Arnold, Bedard, Phillips, & Sutton 2011; Teoh & Lim, 
1996; O'Reilly, 2009; Ganzach, 1994).  
 
1.6 Study Population   
The main purpose of sampling is collecting the data needed to answer the research questions. 
This thesis aims at evaluating the current JCGC as regards to its impact on the reliability of the 
audit report and the level of the audit expectation gap in Jordan. This expectations gap arises 
from the differences in perceptions between the auditors and users of audit reports. The main 
users of audit reports are the investors; therefore, this thesis investigates the perceptions of 
investors in Jordan.  
Investors could be either individuals or institutions. In order to provide more reliable results 
based on well-informed respondents’ feedback, in addition to the justifications mentioned in 
chapter four8, particularly the differences in perceptions of individual and institutional investors 
as disclosed in previous Jordanian research, the study focuses on institutional investors. In 
addition, the suggestion that developing markets are more reliant on institutional investors to 
ensure the integrity of the market further justifies the focus on institutional investors (Afifi, 
2009; Zureigat, 2010; O'Reilly, 2009). Therefore, the study sample of this thesis is derived from 
institutional investors in Jordan rather than individual investors; they are the financial analysts 
                                                          
8
 See sections: 4.3 & 4.4  
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who work in institutional investment companies including insurance companies, investment 
and portfolio departments in banks, investment funds and companies, retirement funds, 
mutual funds and brokerage companies. The following figure summarizes the mixed method 
approach of this study.  
 
Figure 2: The Mixed Method Approach Adopted in this Thesis 
Research Methodology & 
Data Collection
Semi-Structured Interviews 
- Increase the external validity 
(Generalizability) 
- Validate and develop a deeper 
understanding of the results of the 
quantitative survey approach. 
- Identify whether there are any 





- Have very strong power (internal validity)
- Identify any interaction between Independent 
Variables in influencing Dependent Variables 
- Ensure evidencing causality of the effect of 
Independent Variables on the Dependent 
Variables 
- Get strong results even when used in a 
mono-method approach
Quantitative Data 
Collection & Analysis 
Qualitative Data Collection & 
Analysis 
Mixed Method Approach
(Collis & Hussey, 2009; Creswell, 2009; Johnson & 
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1.7 Definitions 
This section provides definitions of key terms used in this thesis. An operational definition is 
“specification of how you will define and measure the variable in your study” (Creswell, 2008, p. 
160). As the definitions presented in this section indicate the meaning of the terms used in this 
thesis, where applicable, this study adopts definitions from the Jordanian corporate governance 
code, The International Standards on Auditing (ISA) (which are the valid standards in Jordan), 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and other resources that 
provide comprehensive definitions that help the researcher in achieving the goals of this thesis 
and/or in constructing the study’s own definitions.    
The Jordanian Corporate Governance Code (JCGC): Refers to the JCGC approved and issued by 
the board of the commissioners of the Jordanian Securities Commission (JSC) on the 29th of 
July 2008 for the publicly traded companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) and 
which came into effect as of the first of January 2009. The JCGC contains five chapters as 
follows: Definitions, The Board of Directors of the Shareholding Company, General Assembly 
Meetings, Shareholders Rights, and Disclosure and Transparency.  
Auditors' Independence: "Freedom from those pressures and other factors that compromise, 
or can reasonably be expected to compromise, an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit 
decisions" (ISB, 2000, para. 4). 
Audit committees: Audit committees are sub-committees of the board of directors of at least 3 
members established by and amongst the members of the board of directors of a company 
whose main responsibilities are reviewing the annual financial statements and reporting before 
submission to the board of directors, safeguarding the internal audit function, nominating and 
reviewing the findings of the external auditors, in addition to their role as liaisons between 
internal auditors, external auditors, executive management and the board of directors.  
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Internal Audit Effectiveness: Internal Audit Effectiveness refers to the extent to which the 
designated internal audit objectives and functions are achieved properly, are unbiased, and are 
free from management pressure that may compromise the internal auditor's performance. 
Examples of those designated internal audit functions are safeguarding assets against loss and 
theft, providing reasonable assurances that the financial and operating information are 
accurate and reliable, and ensuring the entity's compliance with laws and regulations. 
Disclosure and Transparency: Refers to the quality and reliability of information, whether 
financial or non-financial, provided by the company to the shareholders and users of the 
financial reporting (International Chamber of Commerce, 2011). For the purpose of this study, it 
refers to the disclosure and transparency items as mentioned in chapter five of the Jordanian 
Corporate Governance Code.  
Corporate Accountability: Refers to the ability of the shareholders and the stakeholders to hold 
the governing body of the company, such as the executive management, board of directors and 
external auditors, accountable and answerable to the laws, the regulations and the company's 
bylaw, based on their power and responsibilities (Porter, 2009; Gay & Simnett, 2010; Harris & 
Spannier, 1976). 
The going concern assumption: The going concern assumption states that the financial 
statements of an entity should reflect that the value of its assets and liabilities are recorded on 
the basis that the entity will be able to realize its assets and discharge its debts and liabilities 
when they fall due in the normal course of operation for the foreseeable future, unless there is 
evidence to the contrary.  
The audit expectation gap: The audit expectation gap refers to the different perceptions 
between the auditors’ actual performance and to what report users believe the auditors should 
be performing and achieving as auditors.  
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Institutional Investors: An institutional investor is an individual who works in the investment 
section of an organization that trades securities for investment purposes on behalf of the 
organization's members. Common examples are an insurance company, a bank, a hedge fund, a 
retirement fund, a mutual fund, brokerage, or another such group that has a large amount of 
cash or assets to invest.  
Reliability of the audit report: refers to the extent to which the audit report clearly conveys 
significant instances of poor internal controls, accounting errors, biases, or omissions; and 
concerns regarding the application of the going concern assumption. Such reports can be relied 
upon by institutional investors, enabling them to make informed investment decisions.  
Error: "The errors refer to the unintentional misstatement in the financial report, including the 
omission of an amount or a disclosure" (IFAC, 2010b, p. 18).  
Fraud: "Intentional act by one or more individuals among management, those charged with 
governance, employees, or third parties, involving the use of deception to obtain an unjust or 
illegal advantage" (IFAC, 2010b, p. 19).  
Independent Member of the Board of directors: "A member of the board of directors who is 
not tied to the company or any of its upper executive management, affiliate companies, or its 
external auditors by any financial interests or relationships other than their shareholding in the 
company that may be suspected to bring that member benefit, whether financial or 
incorporeal, or that may affect his/ her decisions or lead to exploitation of his/ her position with 
the company" (Corporate Governance Code in Jordan, 2009, P. 5). Nor should the member be a 
recent employee of the company or its suppliers as those relationships could cause conflicts of 
interests. 
Non-Executive Board Member: The board member who is not staff or employed by the entity, 
and accordingly does not get a regular salary or remuneration from the entity and is not 
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involved in the day to day management of the company. Such members may be remunerated 
for their role as a board member only.  
 
1.8 Summary of the Study Limitations and Prospective Future Studies  
As mentioned earlier, there are three sets of corporate governance codes in Jordan; one for 
each of the following groups: the banking sector, the insurance sector and publicly traded 
companies. The code for publicly traded companies is the corporate governance code 
investigated in this thesis. 
This thesis aims to identify the impact of the elements of the Jordanian corporate governance 
code in so far as they relate to the perceived reliability of the audit report and the extent to 
which they narrow the level of the audit expectations gap, in the perception of institutional 
investors in Jordan. In doing so, this thesis endeavours to contribute to narrowing the 
expectation gap. This thesis focuses on the external auditor's independence, the internal 
auditor's effectiveness, disclosure and transparency, and corporate accountability. Other 
studies (Ojo, 2009; Siddiqui, Nasreen, & Lema 2009; Dickins & Higgs, 2009; Rehana, 2010; Sikka, 
Puxty, Willmott, & Cooper, 1992; Sidani & Olayan, 2007; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Fadzly & 
Ahmad, 2004; Pierce & Kilcommins, 1997; Wolf, Tackett, & Claypool 1999) have investigated 
and pointed out the importance of other factors on the reliability of the audit report, such as 
the role of accounting professional associations, the code of professional ethical conduct in 
relation to auditing, the role of audit education on narrowing the audit expectations gap, and 
the role of the auditor’s experience, integrity and the size of the non-audit services provided by 
the auditors. The scope of this thesis and the unit of analysis is limited to institutional investors 
in Jordan and excludes other users of financial statements such as the managers, members of 
the board of directors, creditors and the credit staff at banks, as well as the preparers of the 
financial statements, such as the company financial managers and accountants. 
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These limitations might open the door for further studies. Accordingly, there are opportunities 
for further research to be undertaken in Jordan in order to identify a comprehensive approach, 
to be adopted alongside implementation of and education about the JCGC, to minimize the 
audit expectation gap.  
 
1.9 Structure and Overview of the Thesis 
This thesis - including this introductory chapter - is organized into six chapters, which are briefly 
described below: 
Chapter One provided a background for and an overview of the thesis; the justification for the 
study, a statement of the study research questions and objectives, and the organization of the 
remaining chapters of the thesis. Chapter One also looked at selected prior Jordanian research, 
with a view to identifying the gaps in the research which can be addressed by this thesis. 
Chapter Two provides a theoretical and historical perspective on corporate governance and the 
auditing profession in Jordan, and the definition, establishment and need for the corporate 
governance code. Chapter Two also discusses, in the context of authoritative guidance, the 
development of audit committees, internationally and locally, and communication between 
both external and internal auditors with the audit committees. Chapter Three reviews the 
literature relevant to the main themes of the thesis. Among the themes discussed in Chapter 
Three is the audit expectation gap phenomena and its effect on the auditing profession and 
investors' confidence, including the nature and the structure of the audit expectation gap in 
Jordan. The review presented in Chapter Three covers and critically analyzes the study of 
independent and dependent variables mentioned in the model of this thesis.  
Chapter Four reviews the research methodology employed in the fieldwork of the thesis and 
based on the study model. Chapter Four provides a justification for the chosen research 
strategy and provides a rationale for combining the qualitative and the quantitative methods. 
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Sampling, data collection techniques and the limitations of this methodological approach are 
also presented and discussed. 
Chapter Five reports an analysis and interpretation of the results of both research methods. The 
chapter describes and discusses the interviews and analyzes the interviewees’ themes and 
feedback. Chapter Five also presents a description of the respondents to the survey instrument 
and discusses the validity of the experiment. The chapter concludes with a presentation of the 
integrated data from the two methods. 
Finally, Chapter Six summarizes and discusses the main findings of the study, in line with the 
extant literature. Recommendations, potential areas for future research and recognition of 















Chapter 2: An Overview of Corporate 
Governance in Jordan 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the application of corporate governance and provides an overview of 
the auditing profession in Jordan. The chapter explores the theoretical framework of the 
corporate governance, and the importance of adopting the corporate governance codes to 
reform the capital markets and mandate that listed companies provide the shareholders and 
other stakeholders with adequate disclosure, and transparent information. In addition, this 
chapter provides a review of the definitions of corporate governance; as well it focuses on the 
development of the roles of the audit committees in order to enhance the independence, and 
the effectiveness of the external and the internal auditors.  In conclusion, this chapter discusses 
the agency theory, and delivers an understanding of the nature of corporate governance and 
auditing profession in Jordan.   
 
2.2 The Theoretical Framework 
Theoretical frameworks are tools for explaining and analyzing complex concepts. Several such 
frameworks have been developed for corporate governance, each examining the concept from 
the perspective of a different discipline, profession or school of thought (Solomon, 2010). These 
different theoretical frameworks often varied only slightly, and some applied different terms to 
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describe the same concepts (Solomon, 2010). Leung, Paul & Cooper (2011) reviewed three 
explanatory theories that have justified the use of audits such as the information hypothesis, an 
insurance hypothesis, and agency theory, while Adelopo (2010), in his study about the impact 
of corporate governance on auditor independence, referred to the stakeholder theory, and 
pointed out that the essence of corporate activity is not only for the benefit of the 
shareholders, but also for the benefit of all relevant stakeholders.     
 
2.2.1 Corporate Governance & Agency Theory  
Theoretically, the agency theory framework has been employed in corporate governance 
studies (Saunders et al, 2012). Dalton, Daily, & Roengpitya (2003) argued that most research on 
corporate governance is based on agency theory. The critical concern of corporate governance 
emerges from the separation of ownership of the entities, and the control of those entities 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997b). This separation gives rise to agency problems9 (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  
When the era of limited liability shareholding companies first began, it heralded a dramatic 
expansion in investment, and ownership in companies, by the general public, but it also 
resulted in a fundamental change in the way that companies were controlled (Solomon, 2010). 
Under the new system of ownership, shareholders generally delegate the day to day control of 
the company to managers, essentially separating company ownership and control and resulting 
in the now infamous phenomenon known as the ‘agency problem’ (Solomon, 2010).      
                                                          
9 There is a double agency problem. Individuals invest in superannuation funds and in financial institutions. These 
organisations then invest in listed companies on behalf of their contributors. The executives and directors of the 
superannuation funds and financial institutions are often influential in appointing or removing directors of listed 
companies who in turn appoint senior managers and structure their reward systems. Thus primary investors are 
subject to two agency problems namely their initial investment being managed by others which is in turn placed 
with agents in the form of directors of the listed companies. The audit committees of the listed companies address 
the second agency problem. Also there are potential conflicts between the interests of major shareholders and 
minority shareholders.   
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that conflicts of interest inevitably exist between the 
management and the owners of businesses in cases where owners are not managers. This is 
because the theory assumes a model of   a man (manager) who is self-serving, individualistic 
and opportunistic in nature, prefers to maximize his own utility functions at the expense of the 
owners10. As a result, the theory is built on the assumption that there is almost always a 
divergence of objectives between the goals of the management, and those of the shareholders. 
The Effective corporate governance is seen as an active tool in reducing agency problems 
because it “promotes open dialogue and communication while ineffective corporate 
governance gives rise to conflicts and lack of transparency” (Leung, Paul, & Cooper 2011, p. 
814).  
The relationship amongst corporate governance constituents has been described based on the 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Adams, 1994; Christopher, Sarens & Leung 2009) as 
follow: The shareholders elect a board of directors which meets a few times each year; the 
board of directors is responsible for appointing the company’s management, including 
appointing a chief executive officer to lead the managers; as the shareholders’ agents, the 
board of directors and the company management are charged with the responsibility of 
controlling the company; Independent external auditors are appointed to provide the 
shareholders with assurance on the quality of the financial statements prepared by company 
management but, in practice, the value of this assurance depends on the external auditors 
perceiving that their responsibility is towards the company owners rather than to the company 
management. In order to protect the interests of the owners, an audit committee is appointed 
to ensure that an appropriate relationship is maintained between external auditors and 
company management. An independent internal audit function that is adequately funded can 
further monitor internal controls and adherence to policies and risk profiles, and in that way  
provides further assurance to the board, via the audit committee. 
                                                          
10
 Some theories such as stewardship theory which sees managers as stewards carrying out the wishes of the 
shareholders. The reality is probably a mixture of good stewards and managers who are gaming the system.  
Agency systems are designed to curb the latter. 
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As shown by this description of the relationship between the various constituents of corporate 
governance systems, a separation between ownership and management is a key characteristic 
of public shareholding companies. The problems created by this separation have been 
prompted significant debate among scholars, investors, finance and accounting professionals, 
regulators and law makers, regarding how to best ensure that management works in the best 
interests of company owners (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Allen & Gale, 2001; Adelopo, 2010).  In 
the face of the ineffectiveness of market mechanisms alone to control management behavior, it 
would seem, as suggested by Solomon (2010), that there is a need to reform corporate 
governance. 
 
2.2.2 Agency Theory & the Auditing Profession 
The need for independent auditors, according to Imhoff (2003), was a direct result of the 
separation of company ownership and management that arose following the formation of 
capital markets that grew to feed the industrial revolution in the 18th century. The separation of 
ownership and management created opportunities for management to use their authority in 
ways that did not serve the owners’ best interests, thus creating a need for an independent 
party to provide owners with assurance regarding management’s reports (Imhoff, 2003; Leung, 
Paul, & Cooper 2011). In the framework of the agency theory, auditors are responsible for 
monitoring and controlling the quality of financial reporting and, consequently, are part of the 
corporate governance system (Beasley & Salterio, 2001). Auditors play a significant corporate 
governance role in helping shareholders monitor and control company management (Beasley & 
Salterio, 2001). In their role of monitoring and controlling the quality of financial reporting, 
auditors provide objective assurances that financial statements and reports fairly present all 
materially significant facts, thus lending credibility to the disclosures in management’s financial 
reports and, consequently, increasing investor confidence in the transparency of the company 
(Solomon, 2010). Given the importance of the role of independent auditors, procedures for 
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enhancing the independence, objectivity and professionalism of auditors are included in most 
governance codes and guidelines (UNCTAD, 2006). 
 
2.3 Definitions of Corporate Governance 
The following three sections review the development of the term corporate governance and 
explore the different translations of the term in the Arab world in general, and in Jordan in 
particular, and the most popular and generally accepted definitions of the corporate 
governance are discussed in the last section. 
 
2.3.1 Introduction  
Corporate governance is a “fashionable” terminology, albeit an ambiguous concept (Farrar 
2005, p. 141). In order to understand the concept of corporate governance, it is important to 
highlight its emergence and definition. Corporate governance has not identified with a unique 
accepted definition (Ching, Tan, & Ching, 2006). Abu-Tapanjeh (2009) traced the emergence of 
the term governance and pointed out that this term was originally derived from the Greek word 
"kyberman" which referred to guide, direct, and govern, then that term was transferred to the 
Latin and had been known as "gubernare", while the French version of the term is “governor".  
Corporate governance is not a phenomenon solely for shareholding companies, it is also 
applicable for all sorts of entities and its definitions could be expanded to cover all of the 
economic and non-economic firms and government organizations. Abdullah and Valentine 
(2009) pointed out that corporate governance literature contributed to ambiguity around the 
terms regulate, control, manage, govern and governance.  
 
   58 
 
2.3.2 Translation Dilemma   
The concept of corporate governance in the Arab world has not  been understood properly 
since its first emergence and adoption, in fact, there is no definite acceptable translation of the 
term 'governance' in Arabic (Boutros-Ghali, 2001). This confusion of terminology has impacted 
the discussion seminars11 and the implementation of corporate governance in Jordan. 
Moreover it has affected academics and researchers in designing their studies. As an example, 
Abdullatif (2007) avoided the use of the Arabic translation of the term corporate governance in 
his questionnaire in order to reduce terminological issues.  
The Academy of Arabic Language has endorsed the word 'Hawkama' as an Arabic translation 
after discussions of the other alternatives (Saeed, 2003), while the Jordanian Academy of Arabic 
language adopted the word 'Hakemeyya'12. In spite of the adoption of the word 'Hakemeyya' by 
the Jordanian Academy of Arabic, there is no consensus on a single term in the Jordanian 
literature. Most of Jordanian researches used the term 'Hakemeyya' (Al-Hanini and Dahmash 
2008; Matar, & Nour, 2007; Dahmash & Abu-Zerr; Zureigat, 2011a; Al-Barghouthi, 2009; 
Ishhadat & Abed Al-Jaleel, 2012). Some other Jordanian literature used the term 'Hawkama' (Al-
Manzou, 2009; Ahmad, 2003; Ashmawi, 2005; Shehadeh, & Barghouthy, 2009; Al-Aqdeh, Juda, 
& Saadah, 2011; Al-Waked, 2007). Others have used the term 'Tahakkom' as suggested by Al-
Basheer (2003), the previous chairperson of the Jordanian Association of Certified Public 
Accountants, (Abdullatif, 2007; Bashtawi and Suleiman, 2003; Matar, 2003).  
Interestingly, it is noteworthy to mention that the inconsistencies of the translation can also be 
seen in the Jordanian governmental regulatory bodies themselves, they have not adopted a 
specific term consistently; in the Jordanian corporate governance code for the publicly 
shareholding companies, issued by the JSC, the term 'Hawkama' was used, while the corporate 
                                                          
11 The Policy Debate on Economic Issue has referred to the confusion of these multiple translations on its periodic. 
See (Jordanian Forum for Economic Development, 2004) page 5.  
 
12 The Decision No. 200406 issued by The Jordanian Academy of Arabic language on 8 June 2004. 
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governance code for the bank sector, issued by the CBJ, and the corporate governance code of 
the insurance sector, issued by IRC have used the term 'Hakemeyya'.  
It is important to reach an acceptable Arabic version that does not compromise the theme of 
the term to be used consistently in the literature. This thesis is written in English, since an 
Arabic version of the questionnaire that should be provided to the subjects and the interviews 
should be conducted in Arabic, this thesis used the term "Hawkama" because this is the term 
that has been employed in the JCGC for the Jordanian listed companies. However, the 
ambiguity of the new term caused initial confusion, currently academicians and institutional 
investors are aware of these different translations.  
 
2.3.3 Corporate Governance Definition  
Discussions of the corporate governance issues came into the spotlight due to big corporate 
scandals all over the world. Issues such as the agency theory problems and how to ensure the 
rights of the shareholders in the entities, joint corporate-audit firm collusion, poor internal 
control, weak accountability system and insufficient evaluation of the risks are examples of 
some catalysts that have contributed to corporate collapses and raised the call to reform the 
capital market and to establish and adopt best practices guidelines of corporate governance. 
Plessis, McConvill, & Bagaric (2005) pointed out that there is no consensus on a specific 
definition for corporate governance although many academicians and scholars have attempted 
to establish a comprehensive definition. 
According to Solomon (2010) and Millstein (1998) the concept of corporate governance has 
many definitions. Most of the definitions have a common denominator which are: the 
accountability, the disclosure and transparency, protecting the rights of the shareholders and 
the stakeholders alike, organizing the roles and the responsibilities of the board of directors and 
the company management, and to reinforce the effectiveness and the performance of the 
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external and the internal auditors in order to ensure the soundness and the accuracy of the 
financial reporting system (Archambeault, DeZoort, & Holt 2008; Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith 
2004; Dalton et al, 2003; Monks and Minow, 2011; Farrar, 2005; Levitt, 1999; Cadbury Report, 
1992; Zingales, 1994; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997a; IIA, 2011; Parkinson, 1995).   
The most widely used definition of corporate governance is the definition of the Cadbury 
Report (Applied Corporate Governance, 2012). It defined corporate governance as "the system 
by which companies are directed and controlled" (The Cadbury Report, 1992, section 2.5). The 
codes of best practice of the Cadbury Report focused on the principles of accountability, 
disclosure and transparency, and probity. In addition to the equity, these four concepts have 
become the benchmark and the foundation for forming effective corporate governance (IIA, 
2012). The four concepts are explained in figure 3. 
Figure 3: Effective Elements of Corporate Governance 
 
 This figure is quoted from the Institute of Internal Auditors website (IIA, 2012) 
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Finally, as Jordan has mainly referred to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) principles of corporate governance, this thesis adopted the definition of 
the OECD. The OECD defined corporate governance as “Procedures and processes according to 
which an organization is directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies 
the distribution of rights and responsibilities among the different participants in the 
organization – such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders – and lays 
down the rules and procedures for decision-making" (OECD Glossary, 2007. p. 151). 
 
2.4 Importance of Corporate Governance 
Corporate collapses have negative consequences for the society because the companies are the 
livelihood of many communities. Corporations' governance has affected economies, and a wide 
range of aspect of the social environment. Corporations are banks, insurers, factories besides 
many other sorts working under the private sector system. Corporations generate jobs, income, 
incorporate capital with labor, raw materials, and management expertise to produce goods and 
services. Corporations also supply the state treasury with revenue and taxes (Prentice and 
Holland, 1993). Therefore, countries and states around the world, in relation to their public 
social security responsibilities, should take decisions, and implement measures to maintain the 
soundness of the private sector. Hence, the regulatory and the supervisory bodies of the capital 
market issues their own corporate governance codes of best practices and they also monitor 
the shareholding companies' compliance with it financially, politically, and even ethically 
(Cohen & Boyd, 2000). 
Shareholder's confidence in the capital market and affects the market value of securities and 
the availability of investment funds. With the emergence of globalization, there is a threat to 
the ability of any government to control large multinational companies. That state of affairs 
places increased importance on the role of the economic regulatory bodies and also a need for 
establishing sufficient accountability (Crane and Matten, 2010).  The corporate governance 
   62 
 
codes specify guiding principles for all participants involved with the entities corporate affairs in 
regards to their rights, duties, obligations and accountability,  in addition to that it identifies 
and evaluate any potential challenges that corporations may encounter  (Healy, 2003). 
Internationally, big corporate scandals in the early 21st century such as the demise of Enron-
Arthur Andersen, HIH and WorldCom have undermined the stakeholder’s confidence in the 
world’s capital markets and in audit reports13, and also have motivated economic policy-
makers, researchers and academics to develop and find solutions of the weak points of the 
corporate governance structure. In 2008 the world has witnessed the global financial crisis 
which was triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brother Bank in August 2008. This financial crisis 
has raised and directed critical questions to the auditing profession such as the age-old 
question of where were the auditors? (Tricker, 2009). Cooper & Grose (2010) reviewed audit 
firm scandals and raised the question of can auditors be trusted? Cheng and Abdel-Qader 
(2010) raised the argument of whether auditors were guilty for surprise corporate collapses.  
Building and adopting a strong corporate governance structure helps achieve an entity’s 
objectives such as implementing their strategic long-term goals by maximizing the owners’ 
wealth, securing the rights of the employees by ensuring the company is providing them fair 
health coverage, training, and retirement security, it also aims to maintain good relationships 
with outsider parties by providing good quality services to the entity's clients and suppliers, and 
finally a strong corporate governance system enforces the company's compliance with the  laws 
and the regulations (Sheridan & Kendall, 1992; Cadbury, 2002; Millstein, 1998; Gregory & 
Simms 1999). 
A survey of the Institutional investors' perception of good corporate governance in the U.S has 
been conducted by McKinsey and Company in 1996. The survey findings revealed that investors 
believe that good corporate governance is important in their decision making to the same 
                                                          
13 The audit expectation gap is at least partly due to the failure of audit firms to stand for clear disclosure to 
shareholders rather than assisting management to avoid their accountability to shareholders e.g. Enron. Hence the 
need for an audit committee to ensure they have the right priorities in spite of the financial incentives for partners 
to align their interests with management.   
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degree of the importance as the financial performance. The study found that two-thirds of the 
participants revealed that they would readily pay on average over ten percentage points for 
well-governed14 entities. In June 2000, McKinsey and Company repeated this survey again and 
expanded the countries from which participants were drawn; the study surveyed Europe, Asia, 
and Latin America.  Over 200 institutional investors in Asia, Latin America, Europe in addition to 
USA, representing US $3.25 trillion in assets were surveyed and similar results were obtained 
(For more details about the two surveys see: McKinsey and Company, 2000; Felton, Hudnut, & 
Heeckren 1996; Hopkins, 2007; Block & Epstein, 1995). 
 
 2.5 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
As mentioned earlier, the Jordanian corporate governance code for listed companies is based 
on the non-binding OECD principles of corporate governance which were endorsed by the 
OECD Ministers in 1999. These codes were revised and replaced in 2004, albeit remain non-
binding, OECD principles proved its efficiency and effectiveness to the extent that even non-
member countries adopted and implemented these principles (Morck, 2006; Jesover & 
Kirkpatrick, 2005)  
The OECD principles of corporate governance aim to provide countries, both OECD and non-
OECD countries, with guidelines and good practices of corporate governance provided in order 
to assist in achieving these goals. “The Principles are a living instrument offering non-binding 
standards and good practices as well as guidance on implementation, which can be adapted to 
the specific circumstances of individual countries and regions” (OECD, 2004, p. 4). The OECD 
cooperated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in promoting 
                                                          
14 The study defined well-governed company by referring to those companies with majority of outside 
directors, responsive to investors' requests for any data they ask for, and had a board of directors 
independent from the company management to hold the executive management accountable to 
shareholders. 
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corporate governance best practices, in fact, the IMF used the OECD corporate governance as a 
benchmark for observing its members (Low, 2002; OECD, 2004; Kirkpatrick, 2005). 
Low (2002) argued that the main four themes of OECD corporate governance principles of 1999 
lies on the basis of transparency, accountability, fairness and responsibilities, Abu-Tapanjeh 
(2009) argued that the revised OECD principles of 2004 were built on four core concepts that 
are: business ethics, decision making methods, disclosure and transparency, and the integrity of 
the financial reporting system.  
The six OECD corporate governance principles are outlined below (OECD, 2004): 
Principle One: “Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework”.  
Principle Two: “The rights of shareholders and key ownership functions”. 
Principle Three: “The equitable treatment of shareholders”. 
Principle Four: “The role of stakeholders in corporate governance”. 
Principle Five: “Disclosure and transparency”. 
Principle Six: “The responsibilities of the board”. 
 
2.6 Corporate Governance Assessment in Jordan 
An important assessment of corporate governance was conducted in Jordan in 2004 by the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund joint committee. This joint initiative was 
referred to as (Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes "ROSC"). It benchmarked 
developing country’s assessment of corporate governance code against those developed by 
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OECD (World Bank: Corporate Governance Assessment, 2004). The conducted program 
provides a diagnostic tool for evaluating the strengths and deficiencies of the Jordanian 
corporate governance framework. The ROSC evaluation of the Jordanian corporate governance 
was released for publication by the Jordan Securities Commission in 2005. The main ROSC 
results were: 
• Disclosure standards (Largely observed). 
• Standards of Accounting and Audit (Observed). 
• Independent audit oversight body (Partially observed). 
• Fair & timely dissemination (Largely observed). 
 
Figure 4: ROSC Assessment of the Compliance to OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance in Jordan 
 
The figure quoted from (World Bank ROSC experience in MENA and the World, 2005, p. 5) 
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2.7 Background of the Auditing Profession in Jordan 
This section discusses the historical development of the auditing profession in Jordan 
simultaneously along with the relevant laws and regulations especially the companies' law and 
the auditing profession law in Jordan.  
 
2.7.1 The Companies' Law 
The establishment of the auditing profession regulations in the Middle Eastern countries first 
appeared in the early twentieth century, and that exactly was in 1909 in Egypt and in 1919 in 
Iraq. By the passage of the time, Middle Eastern countries developed their auditing profession 
laws, and then established their own auditing profession associations to regulate and control 
the auditing profession. In Jordan, the Palestinian companies' law which was primarily based on 
the British Acts was applied in both countries from 1929 since they were under the British 
colonialism and those acts remained operational until the issuance of the provisional law in 
1962 which became permanent in 1964. The companies' law of 1964 regulated the formation of 
the companies, liquidation, management, the financial reporting system and added some 
general responsibilities and rights to the external auditors (Abdullah, 1982). In 1989 another 
companies' law enacted and added some details to the previous one in addition to regulate the 
consolidations of the foreign companies working in Jordan (Abdullah, 2007). 
In the middle of the last decade of the last century, Jordan was concerned of openness and 
being involved with the world, setting government plant reform programs, legislating and 
regulating the privatization to cope and deal with the globalization. In January 1994, Jordan 
submitted an application for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in order to 
gain a membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Jordan conducted several meetings 
of negotiations to answer and respond to the queries of the WTO Members on Jordan’s foreign 
trade system and economic policies and facilities. In an endeavor to achieve this objective, 
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Jordan has amended, revised and enacted major legislative reforms to promote the Jordanian 
economic climate and to bring the Jordanian foreign trade system into conformity with WTO 
conditions. The majority of these amended or enacted legislations were to those related to the 
intellectual property rights, the free  movement of capital, and taxation; examples: Trademarks 
law, Patents law, Copyrights laws, Trade Secrets and Unfair Competition, Customs law, General 
sales tax law, law on unifying fees and taxes.  On the 17th of December 1999 The WTO General 
Council officially accepted the membership of Jordan which made Jordan the 136 WTO member 
(Jordan's Membership to WTO, 2011). 
In 1997 Jordan issued the companies' law No. 22, this current law has been established to work 
in line with other commercial and capital market laws and regulations, such as the securities 
law of 199715, to facilitate Jordan accession to the WTO and to accelerate the government 
economic reform plans. The companies' law of 1997 also added more details concerning the 
issuance of the shares, the face value and types of companies. The companies' law of 1997 law 
has been amended several times to enforce and encourage the Jordanian companies to adopt 
the corporate governance codes best practices. In fact, the Jordanian capital market regulatory 
bodies started drafting for another revised and developed companies' law (Companies Law 
1997; Company Law Draft 2011; Securities law of 2002). 
 
2.7.2 Auditing Profession Law 
The first specific law dedicated to regulating the auditing profession in Jordan was established 
in 1961. Prior to the establishment of the Practicing of the Auditing Profession in 1961, there 
were no regulations or conditions to control the profession including the absence of a minimum 
qualification requirement that the practitioners should meet to be eligible for practicing 
auditing. The law of the auditing profession of 1961 set license’s conditions to be met by any 
person willing to practice auditing and required specific academic and professional 
                                                          
15 Currently, The Securities law of 1997 has been replaced with the Securities law of 2002.  
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qualifications and experience, the law also established committees to be responsible for 
overseeing the profession which includes licensing and penalizing of auditors, this committee 
was mainly composed of governmental members (Abdullatif, 2003; Abdullah, 1982).   
In 1985, the new law of the auditing profession was established to keep pace with the 
developments of the economic environment, the capital market, the auditing profession and to 
add more details to the 1961 law especially to the external auditor's rights and responsibilities 
and to provide a more precise framework as a guidance to the profession. In this law, the 
external auditors were given the right not to be rejected by the companies during the financial 
period of engagement. Non audit services were not prohibited in this law, the law identified 
and stipulated ten prohibited acts that the auditors should avoid such as the auditors must not 
have another job beside the auditing, unethical competition to gain audit job or unethical 
advertising and disclosing their client's secrets as examples. Under this law, the Auditing 
Profession Council was established to oversee and control the profession and its member 
practices. Similar to the previous committee, the majority of the council's 12 members were 
from the government. Based on this law, the regulation of classifying the external auditors (No. 
30 for 1986) was enacted to classify the auditors on three main categories which are A, B and C 
where the A category represents the highest level or the highest qualified and experienced 
auditors.  
Another important regulation enacted by the same law is the establishment of the Jordanian 
Association of Certified Public Accountants (JACPA) in 1987 and became legally effective in 
1988. The JACPA aims at considering the members' interest; setting codes of professional ethics 
conducts, encouraging scientific research, protecting the rights of the auditors, conducting 
seminars and training workshops to follow up and explain any new additions or amendments to 
the International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) in order to enhance the capacity of the auditors. 
The membership of the JACPA is mandatory, and all of the licensed auditors represent the 
JACPA's general assembly and they have the right to elect the JACPA board of directors. 
Contrary to the companies' law of 1989 that required companies to prepare the financial 
statements in accordance with the generally accepted accounting and auditing standards, 
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taking in consideration that this expression was ambiguous since there were no specific 
generally accepted accounting and auditing standards in Jordan, the JACPA adopted the ISAs 
and International Accounting Standards (IASs)16 after about two months of the operation of the 
companies' law of 1989 (Khouri, 1994; Abdullah, 2007; Abdullatif, 2003).  
The current auditing law that regulates the auditing profession in Jordan is Law No. 73 of 
regulating the Auditing Profession for the year of 2003. The article No. 3 stated that this law 
aims at regulating and developing the profession, ensuring the implementation of the ISAs and 
the International Financial Reporting Standards, develop the scientific and the professional 
level of JACPA members, and reinforce the certified public accountants independence and 
neutrality (Al-Tamimi, 2006; Al-Matarneh, 2009).  
Based on Articles 29 and 45 of 2003 law, the bylaw of practicing the auditing profession No. 7 
for the year of 2006 was issued to set a framework of the roles, the responsibilities, the 
conditions and fields for practicing the profession. The bylaw stressed the importance of 
following up the updates of the auditing profession and standards by the auditors. The article 
No. 8 identified the continuous training as following up all updates, and issues related to the 
profession by attending seminars and workshops or participating for training in specific 
institutions or by writing related articles and essays in topics related to the profession. The 
article No. 8 also added that the auditors should provide the JACPA with a certificate of 
attending at least 20 training hours or 10 hours with either participating of a research in a 
conference or two published articles in topics related to the auditing profession. The same 
article stressed that the license of practicing auditing must not be renewed unless the auditor 
satisfy the above requirement.  
                                                          
16
 Replaced with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) after 2005.  
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Article No. 10 regulated the qualifications and the training experience 17conditions for any 
individual who wants to apply for a license to practice auditing as follows (Law of Regulating the 
auditing profession No. 73, 2003; Bylaw of Practicing the Auditing Profession, 2006):   
A. Individuals who hold an accounting degree: 
1- One year of training for those who hold a PhD degree. 
2- Two years of training for those who hold a Master degree. 
3- Three years training for those who hold Bachelor degree. 
4- Five years of training for those who hold a Diploma degree18. 
B.  Individuals who hold the bachelor certificate majoring in fields related to the auditing 
profession such as finance, banking and management as an examples with at least 24 credit 
hours in accounting, have the right to apply for the training as follows:  
1- Two year of training for those who hold a PhD degree. 
2- Three years of training for those who hold MA degree. 
3- Four years training for those who hold Bachelor degree. 
 
                                                          
17 Item (b) from article 10 stated that the training should be conducted under the supervision of licensed auditors. 
18
 In general, the  Diploma Certificate in Jordan issued by the community colleges and it is equivalent to two years 
after secondary school,  
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2.8 The Development of Audit Committees 
In response to recent concerns about the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting, expressed 
by various groups including accountants, users of financial reports, law makers and regulators, 
companies have, among other things, established audit committees (McMullen, 1996). These 
concerns have also brought about debates about the so called audit expectation gap. 
Narrowing the audit expectations gap continues to be a key issue of interest to the accounting 
profession (Dewing & Russell, 2002).  
Many recall that the success of corporate governance in the organization depends significantly 
on the success of audit committees and the failure of the composition, responsibilities and the 
effectiveness of the audit committee can then cause a gap in the corporate governance system 
of the organizations (Abdel-Al, 2008). 
A historical review of the development of audit committees in the US, Canada, UK, Australia, 
and Saudi Arabia will highlight the importance of such committees to ensure reliable, high 
quality financial reporting and thus by implication the need for an effective audit committee to 
enhance the integrity of companies’ financial reports. In fact, the main theme of establishing 
audit committees emerged from the necessity of having another tool to protect the 
stakeholders, in addition to those protections provided by the external and internal auditors. 
The first introduction of the audit committees in the U.S. came in response to the McKesson & 
Robbins scandal where the management exaggerated the value of the company’s assets and 
the auditors had relied on the management assertions of the receivables and the inventory 
(Teed, 2010; Mautz & Neary, 1979). 
 
2.9 The Development of the Audit Committees in Jordan 
This section reviews,  and discusses the development of the audit committees in Jordan in three 
stages; that are the period before the establishment of Jordanian Securities Commission (JSC) in 
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1997, followed by the first instructions issued by the Jordanian Securities Commission in 1998 
about the disclosure requirements, accounting standards, and auditing standards in which all 
listed companies were mandated to establish audit committees for the first time in Jordan and 
then followed by the revised instructions in 2004, and finally the issuance of the Jordanian 
corporate governance codes which became operational in 2009. 
 
2.9.1 Audit Committees in Jordan before the establishment of the Jordanian 
Securities Commission (JSC) in 1997 
The beginning of the appearance of the shareholding companies in Jordan started in the early 
thirties of the last century, that time witnessed the establishment of the Arab Bank in Amman 
followed by the establishment of Jordan Tobacco & Cigarette Company and the Jordanian 
Electricity Company. By 1978 the number of shareholding companies in Jordan reached 66 
companies, and their shares used to be traded in unlicensed offices. The Amman Capital Market 
was established in 1978 to control and organize the issuance of the shares and to regulate the 
trading process. In 1997, the corporation law, and the securities law were issued and the 
Amman Capital Market was replaced by three financial regulating bodies; that are the 
Jordanian Securities Commission (JSC), Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), and Securities Depository 
Center (SDC). The divisions of these financial institutions came in response to the calls for 
separating the executives and the supervisory roles of the regulating bodies and to bridge the 
gap between Jordan and other developed countries (Swaiti, 2008). Following to these calls for 
economic reforms, in 1998 the JSC issued instructions relating to the disclosure and accounting 
and auditing standards in which all of the listed companies were mandated to establish audit 
committees. 
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2.9.2 The 1998 JSC Instructions of Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards 
Forming the audit committees in Jordan became mandatory for the listed companies in 1998. 
Based on the securities law of 1997 the Jordanian Securities Commission (JSC) issued the 
Instructions on Disclosure and Accounting Standards and Auditing Standards (1998) in which 
the JSC mandated all listed companies to establish audit committees (Jordan Securities 
Commission, 1998).   
Jumaa (1999) criticized these instructions and regulations and argued that selecting audit 
committee members by and amongst the board of directors especially from those who lack 
accounting and financial experience compromises their effectiveness and leads the external 
auditors to waste time explaining their point of views. Jumaa also criticized lack of written 
charter and that there were no requirements regarding the qualifications of the audit 
committee members. Al-Basheer (2003) and Dahmash, Hajjier & Al-Farah (2003) pointed out 
that audit committees' primary functions are examining the reports of auditors, and its 
conformity with ISAs and the comprehensiveness of the scope of audits. They should also 
ensure that top management responds to the observations of both external and internal 
auditors, and make sure that the external auditors are doing their job without any obstacles 
facing them in effectively conducting their audit. The study also recommended a greater role 
and more supervision to be taken by the Jordanian capital market regulatory bodies over the 
shareholding companies and the auditing profession. Al-Wardat (2003) also criticized that 
selecting audit committee's members without proper accounting and financial qualification 
increases the bureaucracy of the job of the audit committees as a liaison between the external 
and the internal auditors.  
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2.9.3 The 2004 JSC Instructions of Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards for 
Listed companies. 
The instructions on Disclosure and Accounting Standards and Auditing Standards (1998) have 
been revised and replaced with the Instructions for Issuing Companies Disclosure, Accounting 
and Auditing Standards (2004). Abdullatif (2006) pointed out that the new revision of the 
Instructions in 2004 added some extended details, but did not include any new responsibilities 
to audit committees. The new roles and responsibilities of the audit committees have also been 
criticized in the Jordanian literature (Malkawi, 2008; Swaity, 2006; Abdullatif, 2006; Abdullatif, 
2007; Al-Farah, 2001; Al-Khadash and Al-Sartawi, 2010; Al-Saudi, 2007; Khsharmh, 2003; 
Ameera, 2004) as follows: 
In spite of fact that the instructions on disclosure and accounting standards and auditing 
standards (1998), the revised instructions in 2004, and the ‘Directives for Listing Securities on 
the Amman Stock Exchange’ (2004) mandated all Jordanian listed companies to form audit 
committees, the Jordanian listed companies' compliance with this rule was not fully 
implemented, although the latter one has clearly stated in article No.1 that any security can be 
listed in the ASE once the issuing company verifies that it has established an audit committee.  
Swaiti (2006) and Abdullatif (2006) pointed out that at that time only about 75% of listed 
companies had audit committees. The study also revealed that both the banking and insurance 
sectors responded 100% to the requirement of establishing an audit committee and hence it 
was the other categories of the listed companies which had substantial non-compliance. The 
explanation for the high response by banking and insurance sector was due to the strict 
legislation and regulations set by other supervisory bodies that regulate the work of banks and 
insurance companies in Jordan, i.e. there are additional specific regulatory bodies whose main 
job is to follow up their activities. Banks in Jordan work under the supervision of the Central 
Bank of Jordan (CBJ), while the Insurance Regulatory Commission (IRC) supervises the work of 
insurance Companies.   
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The Jordanian literature - mentioned above of this section - also showed that audit committees 
were ineffective due to the insufficient power and functions stipulated in the laws and 
regulations, and they were not required to be independent or required to have a minimum 
experience in the accountancy and finance. Abdullatif (2006; 2007) pointed out that most of 
listed companies in Jordan formed audit committees in order to meet the revised Instructions 
issued by the Jordanian securities commission in 2004.  Abdullatif (2006) and Malkawi (2008) 
also added that listed companies established audit committees without adequate power and 
even their role in relation to the auditor-related decision was undertaken by the company 
management. The audit committees did not get fair remunerations in line with their 
responsibilities. Swaity (2006) revealed that the audit committees in Jordan used to get similar 
remuneration to the other members of the board of directors, and attributed that to the 
assumption that audit committee members did not have extra burdens, tasks or fulfil a role that 
justified extra remuneration.    
The literature has also criticized the lack of a written audit committee charters which affected 
the efficiency and the objectivity of their work especially in the decision of nominating the 
external auditor's where the personal relationships between audit committee members and the 
auditors affected the selection process (Al-Saudi, 2007; Khsharmh, 2003; Ameera, 2004).  
 
2.9.4 The Jordanian Corporate Governance Code for listed Companies   
On the 29th of July 2008, the board of the commissioners of the Jordanian Securities 
Commission (JSC) has issued, and approved the Jordanian Corporate Governance Code (JCGC) 
for the publicly traded companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) which has come 
into effect as of the first of January 2009. The JCGC consist of five chapters as follows: 
Definitions, The Board of Directors of the Shareholding Company, General Assembly Meetings, 
Shareholders Rights, and the Disclosure and Transparency respectively. Chapter five of the JCGC 
contains four sections, in addition to the disclosure and the transparency, the chapter has also 
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addresses audit committees, duties of the audit committee, powers of the audit committee, 
and the external auditor respectively.  
 
2.9.4.1 Audit Committees Formation 
The JCGC stipulated the conditions of the two committees that should be formed by the board 
of directors, these two committees are: the audit committee, and the nominations and 
compensations committee. The committees shall be composed of three or more non-executive 
members of the board of directors. The JCGC also stated that at least two of the members must 
be independent, and one of the two independent members must be the chairperson of the 
committee. Members of the audit committees in Jordan should have knowledge in accounting 
and finance, and at least one of them must have previous work experience in the accounting or 
financial fields, as well it must possess scientific qualifications such as a professional or an  
academic certificate in accounting or finance or related fields. 
 
2.9.4.2 The Role of Audit Committees in Nomination and Communication with the 
External Auditors  
The audit committees must oversee, and monitor the accounting and the internal control 
procedures and the auditing to ensure the integrity of the financial reporting system. The right 
of electing the external auditor is in the hands of the shareholders according to the Jordanian 
laws and the corporate governance code (corporate governance code in Jordan, 2009, chapter 
five, section, 2). The role of the audit committees in the selection process is to discuss matters 
associated with the external auditor to check whether they meet all the conditions stipulated in 
legislations in force, and also to ensure that their independence were not violated. The next 
step after the nomination is to submit recommendations to the board of directors in order to 
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recommend the election of the nominated external auditor by the shareholder at the general 
assembly meeting.  
The role of the audit committees is not confined to the nomination of the external auditors in 
the JCGC, it goes further; once the auditors started fulfilling their job and setting their audit 
plan, the audit committees have to review their plan of work, and ensure that the entity 
provides them with all facilities needed to fulfill their job properly. In order to strengthen the 
attitude and the independence of the external auditors, the audit committee has to conduct 
meetings with external auditor of the company at least once a year without the presence of the 
company management or any of their representatives. The audit committee also has the power 
to request the presence of the external auditors to discuss and ask for clarifications of any 
issues related to their job and to seek their opinion in writing if necessary. Moreover, one of the 
audit committees' tasks is to discuss the external auditors' observations, reservations and 
suggestions, following up the extent of the company management's responsiveness to them, 
and submit recommendations to the board of directors in this regard.  
All of the correspondences between the company management and the external auditors 
should be reviewed and evaluated by the audit committees and they should comment and 
submit recommendations to the board of directors. The audit committees also must review the 
periodic reports before they submit them to the board of directors. 
 
2.9.4.3 The Role of Audit Committees in the Nomination and Communication with 
the Internal Auditors 
The internal auditors play an important role of protecting the company's assets and the 
company's financial and accounting records from errors, frauds and misappropriation. The JCGC 
stated that the board of directors has the responsibility to take the necessary measures to 
ensure the integrity of the internal control procedures by establishing an internal audit unit 
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with functions such as: ensuring compliance with the legislations in force, the regulations of 
regulatory bodies, policies, procedures, and plans set by the board of directors (corporate 
governance code in Jordan, 2009, chapter two, section one, item 12). 
The audit committees also have a role to reinforce the effectiveness of the internal auditors, 
and they coordinate the work of the internal and external auditors to ensure the maximum 
benefits of these two controlling arms. According to the JCGC, the audit committees have the 
power to nominate the company's internal auditors. Moreover, the audit committees have to 
evaluate the internal control and audit procedures, examining external auditor’s assessment of 
the internal audit function, reviewing the internal audit reports especially those related to any 
breaches detected by the internal auditor, finally, the audit committee must provide the board 
of directors of recommendations regarding internal audit function and suggestions of any 
further necessary requirements for internal auditors.  
 
2.9.4.4 Criticisms to the Current Corporate Governance Codes 
Suleiman (2011) criticized the power of the audit committees section as stipulated in the JCGC 
and pointed out that those powers are vague, and limited, in other words they should be 
expanded to facilitate the audit committee members achieving their objectives. Suleiman 
argued that they should have the right and the power to investigate those matters that affect 
the performance of the external auditors and the accuracy of the financial reports issued by 
them and recommended that all companies must improve the skills and the experience of the 
audit committee members.  
The JCGC stipulated that "the company shall take appropriate actions to ensure that the 
external auditors perform their duties impartially without interference from the board of 
directors or the executive management" (corporate governance code in Jordan, 2009 ch.5, 
Section 4, D). The JCGC did not explain how the external auditors could avoid their interference 
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or any possible pressure from the company management. The literature19 revealed that a 
strong and independent audit committee supports the external auditors and mitigates the 
management pressure to issue a clean or favorable audit opinion and also protecting them 
from dismissal after issuing qualified or a going concern modification. Therefore, the researcher 
would argue that one of the most important deficiencies of the current composition of the 
audit committees as stipulated in the JCGC is that it does not require all the audit committee 
members be independent. 
Al-Jazy 20 (2005) criticized the selection process of the audit committee members in Jordan, and 
argued that it is not efficient and lacks of transparency. Al-Jazy explained and pointed out that 
the board of director’s decision of selecting or changing any director does not require the 
general assembly approval. In this regard, the researcher would argue that the selection 
process of the audit committee members should be conducted directly by the shareholders at 
the general assembly meeting whereas only eligible candidates who satisfy the conditions and 
possess the appropriate qualifications can be nominated for the election.  
Finally, the researcher found that the role of audit committee in the selection process of the 
external auditors is not identified clearly as it stated that the audit committees should discuss 
matters related to the nomination of the external auditors, and the role of the audit 
committees in dismissing, retaining and compensating the external auditors has not been 
clearly defined. Similarly, the JCGC has not mentioned any role for the audit committee to set 
the budget of the internal audit. Moreover, it has not required the audit committee to conduct 
meetings with internal auditors without the presence of the company management, and also it 
has not given the internal auditors the authority of accessing and reporting to the audit 
committee directly, although the JCGC stated that the audit committee should review the 
internal audit reports. 
                                                          
19 These studies have been discussed in more details in chapter three. Section 3.6 
20
 Managing Partner for the Jordanian Centre for Dispute Resolution (JCDR) 
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Corporate governance code for Jordanian banks is more precise than the JCGC for all listed 
companies in regard to the roles of the audit committees. For instance it is clearly mentioned 
that the role of the audit committee to suggest to the board of directors “the appointment, the 
removal, the remuneration, and other contractual terms of the external auditors, in addition to 
assessing the objectivity of the external auditors, including the consideration of any other non-
audit work performed by the external auditors” (Corporate Governance Code for Banks in 
Jordan, Chapter 6, Item b-vi), where the JCGC stated the right of the audit committee in 
discussing all matters related to the nomination  of the external auditors without referencing to 
the external auditor’s dismissal or fees.  
Additionally, corporate governance code of Jordanian banks stressed the necessity of that audit 
committees must work under a charter approved by the board of directors in which their 
powers and responsibilities are clearly documented. Furthermore, it states that “The Audit 
Committee has, by a specific provision in the written charter of its functions and 
responsibilities, the ability to obtain any piece of  information from executive management, and 
the ability to call any executive or director to attend its meetings” (Corporate Governance Code 
for Banks in Jordan, Chapter 3, Item b-v)  
Corporate governance code of Jordanian banks since its issuance in 2007 requested banks to 
state their compliance with corporate governance code every year within their annual reports, 
as part of its commitment to the disclosure and transparency requirements, (Corporate 
Governance Code for Banks in Jordan, Chapter 6, Item vi-1), while the JCGC requested the same 
in 2010, i.e. in the subsequent year of the issuance of the JCGC in a separate circulation21.  
 
                                                          
21 See Circular Number: 12/1/4659. dated on December 15, 2010. Issued by Jordanian Securities Commission.  
Available on: http://www.jsc.gov.jo/Public/english.aspx?site_id=1&Lang=3&Page_Id=2550&Menu_ID2=257 
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2.10 Chapter Summary 
This chapter aimed to shed the light on the environment of corporate governance, and the 
auditing profession in Jordan along with the theoretical framework of these two topics. Starting 
by the agency theory, the context then extended by a detailed discussion, and analysis of its 
impact on corporate governance and the auditing profession. The chapter highlighted and 
discussed the needs, and benefits of adopting corporate governance in Jordan added to its 
emergence, assessment, the different Arabic translations of the term, and concluded with 
criticisms directed to the current Jordanian corporate governance code. The chapter also 
reviewed the development of the auditing profession in Jordan and the legislations that 
regulate the auditor’s work and the conditions of licensing the Jordanian certified public 
accountant. Finally, the chapter reviewed the development of the audit committees in Jordan 
and analytically discussed their roles, responsibilities and authorities as stipulated on the JCGC 
in addition to their relation with both of external and internal auditors.  
The next chapter (chapter 3) reviews the literature relevant to the main themes of the thesis. 
That chapter starts by discussing the extent of investor’s reliability of the audit report followed 
by discussing the audit expectation gap phenomena, their effect on the auditing profession, and 
investors' confidence, and reviews literature of this issue in Jordan to explain the nature, and 
the structure of the audit expectation gap. Additionally, the extent of investor’s reliability of the 
audit report is discussed. The presented review in this chapter has covered, and critically 
analyzed the study’s both independent and dependent variables which were mentioned in the 








Chapter 3: The Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the literature review of this thesis. Starting with the audit expectation 
gap, this chapter sheds light on the meaning, nature, and causes of the audit expectation gap in 
Jordan. The chapter also discusses audit opinions and the reliability of the audit report as 
perceived by the Jordanian financial analysts. In line with the study model presented in Chapter 
One, this chapter reviews the Jordanian corporate governance codes and critically analyzes the 
influence of the four selected factors in regards to bridging the audit expectation gap in Jordan, 
namely; the external auditor’s independence, the effectiveness of internal auditors, disclosure 
& transparency, and corporate accountability. This chapter investigates the role of audit 
committees in supporting corporate governance mechanisms such as external and internal 
auditors, enabling them to produce reliable, accurate and independent financial reports.  
 
3.2 An Overview of the Audit Expectation Gap 
Over the last decade, calls for reforming corporate governance structures have become a 
significant global issue. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 and corporate scandals and collapses 
of large entities such as Barings, HIH, Parmalat, Enron (Demirag & Solomon, 2003) and Lehman 
Brothers have raised fears of a global economic meltdown and raised the importance of 
reforming corporate governance systems. The auditing profession has also come under the 
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spotlight, especially after the dramatic collapse of famous companies without any prior warning 
signals in audit reports. These events have highlighted the phenomena of the audit expectation 
gap (Koh & Woo, 1998). 
Ojo (2009) defined the audit expectation gap as “the difference between what users of financial 
statements, the general public perceive an audit to be and what the audit profession claim is 
expected of them in conducting an audit” (p. 3). The audit expectation gap might have a 
substantial effect on the continuing existence of the auditing profession, especially given recent 
corporate collapses. These collapses have been costly to the audit profession in many ways 
such as compromising the profession’s reputation, incurring high costs of litigation and settling 
these cases in the courts, and the fear that they may increase the burdens (more 
responsibilities) placed on the auditors (Wolf et al, 1999).  Moreover, Hassan (2004) pointed 
out that the audit expectation gap is considered one of the greatest dilemmas affecting the 
auditing profession around the world and it has affected the public’s confidence in the 
profession’s role in economic life. These potential negative impacts of the audit expectation gap 
have caused it to be of considerable interest to researchers of the auditing profession and to 
practitioners, especially in the last two decades of the twentieth century.  
The expectations gap in auditing is an old phenomenon and goes back to the start of the 
compulsory audit in the late eighteenth century (Al-Duneibat, 1998). The use of the term ‘audit 
expectation gap’, however, likely appeared for the first time in the 1970s. Porter (1991) traced 
and attributed the first appearance of the term to Liggio (1974) who is considered the first 
academic to use the term in accounting and auditing literature. Criticisms and attacks directed 
at the auditing profession since the late 1960s motivated Liggio to identify the two dimensions 
defining the gap; the expected performance of auditors as envisioned by external auditors and 
as envisioned by the public who rely on the audit report’s opinion of the financial statements.  
In regards to Jordan, the results of the study of Al-Thuneibat (2003), which aimed to investigate 
the structure of the expectations gap in Jordan, are consistent with those found by Porter (1991 
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and 1993) and Humphrey (1997) in regard to an ignorance gap, a deficient standards gap, and a 
deficient performance gap. 
Porter (1991, P. 4) reviewed and analyzed the components of the audit expectation-
performance gap and provided the following breakdown of key components:  
1- “The reasonableness gap: defined as the difference between what the public expects 
auditors to achieve and what they can reasonably be expected to accomplish”.  
2- “The performance gap: defined as the difference between what the public can reasonably 
expect auditors to accomplish and what they are perceived to achieve”. 
 The latter gap i.e. “performance gap” is further subdivided into: 
 A- “The deficient standards gap: defined as the difference between what can reasonably be 
expected from auditors and auditors' existing duties as defined by the law and professional 
promulgations”.  
B- “The deficient performance gap: defined as the difference between the expected standard of 
performance of auditors' existing duties and auditors' perceived performance, as perceived by 
the public".  
An audit expectation gap can, according to Humphrey (1997), be defined narrowly as a “role-
perception gap” between what could reasonably be expected from auditors and what is 
actually expected by the users of financial reports. This definition of the audit expectation gap 
suggests that some portion the gap (perhaps the entire gap) is, in fact, an “ignorance gap” and 
that it can thus be narrowed or closed by educating the users of financial reports. Knutson 
(1994), on the other hand, argued that the audit expectation gap was a difference between the 
expectations of users of the audit reports and the insufficient performance of external auditors, 
thus suggesting that the “ignorance gap” was not the problem. 
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As mentioned in Chapter One, in the definitions and limitations sections, this thesis deals with 
the auditors’ performance gap. For the purposes of this thesis, the audit expectation gap refers 
to the difference between the auditors’ actual performance and to what report users believe 
the auditors should be performing and achieving as auditors.  
In response to Porter's analysis of the gap, Gray and Manson (2006) argued that lack of external 
auditor independence and competence are the main causes of deficient performance. The 
performance gap could also be narrowed by strengthening the external auditor's performance. 
This thesis aims to investigate the role of the JCGC and support from the audit committees in 
reinforcing perceived external auditor's independence and performance. External auditor 
independence is the cornerstone of the auditing profession (Leung, Paul, & Cooper 2011), and 
reinforcing external auditors’ independence leads them to express an independent opinion 
about the company's financial position unaffected by any management pressure.  
According to Sidani and Olayan (2007), resolving the audit expectation gap does not necessarily 
require an increase in the auditors' responsibilities. The gap can be bridged by adopting an 
effective corporate governance mechanism which ensures the sharing of the organization’s 
responsibilities and accountability amongst corporate governance constituents, including top 
management, the board of directors, external auditors, internal auditors and the capital market 
regulatory bodies.  
Corporate governance bodies with effective constituents and co-operation between the 
auditors and audit committees can help establish effective internal control procedures, 
enhancing directors' accountability and transparency, which are crucial factors in narrowing the 
expectations gap. Hakim (2002) pointed out that agency problems could be reduced by 
adopting corporate governance best practices. 
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3.3 The Audit Expectations Gap in Jordan 
The audit expectation gap partly exists because of the difference in perceptions and beliefs 
between the users of the audit reports and the auditors in regard to the auditors’ duties and 
responsibilities and the messages implied by the external auditor’s reports (Koh & Woo, 1998). 
The audit expectations gap has re-emerged in Jordan during the last two decades due to the 
modernizing of audit legislation, the privatization of some large public institutions which has led 
to an increase in the size, number, and power of shareholding companies in the market 
(Abdullatif, 2003), and due to the “increasing expectations from auditors” in Jordan (Al-
Thuneibat et al, 2007, p. 85). Asfoor22 (2003), in the 5th Scientific Conference of JACPA, pointed 
out that the practical reality of the auditing profession in Jordan reveals a gap between auditors 
and non-auditors regarding external auditor’s performance. In addition to that, corporate 
collapses and scandals in Jordanian entities, such as the failures of Petra Bank, the scandal of 
Magnesia Company and the scandal involving credit facilities to an IT company (Al-Awaqla, 
2008; Malkawi, 2008; The Economist, 2003).  
As mentioned in Chapter One, the audit expectations gap does exist in Jordan (Al-Thuneibat, 
2003; Obaidat, 2007; Abdullatif, 2003; Omari, 2003; Hajir, 2001). The nature and the structure 
of the audit expectation gap are briefly presented below:  
Al-Thuneibat’s study (2003) investigated the causes and the structure of the audit expectations 
gap in the perception of external auditors and company managers, and concluded that the 
audit expectations gap did exist in Jordan, and consisted of three main components: a deficient 
standards gap, an ignorance gap, and a deficient performance gap. 
A study by Obaidat (2007) aimed at investigating the gap between external auditors and 
investors in regard to the qualitative characteristics of accounting information. The study 
                                                          
22 Member of the founding committee of the Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accountants.  
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revealed that the primary focus of investors lay on timeliness while auditors primarily focused 
on neutrality.    
The audit expectations gap and the auditors’ responsibilities in investors' perceptions have 
been investigated by Hajir (2001). The study found that the low levels of disclosure of financial 
information, auditor independence and auditor performance and efficacy contributed to 
widening the expectation gap in Jordan. The study defined the appropriate level of disclosure, 
stating that financial reports and the notes accompanying financial statements should include 
all the information required to reflect the financial position of the company and enable 
investors to make informed investment decisions.  
A study by Omari (2003) investigated the expectation gap in regard to auditors’ responsibility to 
express their opinion about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern, the auditor’s 
independence, and the scope of the auditor's responsibility in identifying misleading and 
incomplete financial data. The study concluded that the audit expectations gap in Jordan was 
mainly focused on the independence of the external auditors, which was negatively impacted 
by the potential loss of sales in lucrative non-audit services, unlimited audit tenures and 
company management pressure on the external auditors. 
In summary, previous studies that investigated the audit expectation gap in Jordan revealed 
that the gap did exist in Jordan and that it was partially affected by external auditors’ 
performance and independence (Al-Thuneibat, 2003; Asfoor, 2003 Omari, 2003; Al-Khadash & 
Al-Sartawi, 2010) and the level of disclosure & transparency (Hajir, 2001). The gap was also 
affected by differences between the perceptions of auditors and investors regarding the 
importance of different qualitative characteristics of accounting information (Obaidat, 2007). 
External auditors' independence, neutrality and objectivity and the level of disclosure & 
transparency could be improved by adopting effective corporate governance codes.  
This thesis aims to investigate the role of the JCGC and audit committees in reinforcing external 
auditor independence. Such reinforcement is expected to lead external auditors to express 
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independent opinions about companies' financial positions, in the face of any management 
pressure, thus enhancing investor confidence in audit reports. The study also evaluates the 
extent of the JCGC requirements mandating Jordanian shareholding companies to provide 
adequate and timely disclosure and transparency and adopt sufficient accountability systems. 
The study also investigates the JCGC’s impact on the perceived reliability of the audit report and 
the narrowing of the audit expectation gap. Moreover, this thesis investigates the role of the 
JCGC in reinforcing internal auditor's effectiveness, enabling them to detecting fraud and errors 
effectively, which should lead to greater reliability of audit reports and a reduction of the audit 
expectation gap. 
Through a factorial experiment, this study investigates the degree of each variable's influence 
on institutional investors’ perceptions of the reliability of the audit report and the level of the 
audit expectation gap. The factorial experimentation method identifies if there are any causal 
relationships rather than just correlations between variables.  
 
3.4 Investor Reliance on the Audit Report    
Financial reports published by corporations every year contain very useful information used in 
the decision-making processes of many parties, such as shareholders, investors, lenders and the 
government. The growing interest about financial reports and the extent to which they could be 
trusted by investors and stakeholders suggests that they should be prepared objectively and 
audited by an independent and neutral body, this body normally being the independent 
external auditors. It is a mandatory condition that public companies appoint an external auditor 
during the company general assembly. The Jordanian companies' law specified that listed 
companies, private shareholding companies, limited partnerships in shares, and limited liability 
companies must appoint licensed external auditors (Companies Law, 1997, Article 192).  
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The auditing profession is vital, playing a crucial role in reinforcing the “quality and reliability of 
financial statements” (Zureigat, 2011b, p. 38). The audit report adds value to the credibility of 
financial reports. Auditing has been defined as "being concerned with the verification of 
accounting data, with determining the accuracy and reliability of accounting statements and 
reports" (Mautz, 1964, p.1). Audited financial statements enhance investors’ judgment 
decision-making in the capital market (Sudsomboon & Ussahawanitchakit, 2009), and different 
sorts of audit reports have a significant impact on investor reactions toward the capital market 
(Herboh, Ragunathan & Garsden 2007). 
Reliability of audit reports refers to a condition in which investors, and all those interested in a 
company’s business affairs, consistently find the audit reports and opinions about a 
company's financial statements and position to be dependable and credible. Reliable audit 
reports clearly identify any significant weaknesses in internal controls, as such weaknesses limit 
the auditor's ability to confirm that the accounting systems produce accounts which reflect all 
the company’s transactions in accordance with relevant accounting standards. Reliable audit 
reports also reveal whether accounting reports are reasonably free from error and bias and 
whether the accountants are justified in making a ‘going concern’ assumption. In other words, 
for the audit report to be reliable it must give institutional investors adequate information 
about the quality and comprehensiveness of the accounting reports so that they can decide to 
what extent they can rely on the accounting reports in making investment decisions. 
The extent of the reliability and credibility of the audit report is considered the starting point 
for decisions by stakeholders and potential investors about the viability of an entity (Jones, 
1996; Epstein & Geiger, 1994; Gul, 1990; O'Reilly, 2009; Firth, 1980; Citron et al, 2008; Saaydah, 
1998; Guillamon, 2003; Zureigat, 2006; Zureigat, 2010; Al-Awaqleh, 2008). The audit report has 
been seen as the primary tool or medium of communication between auditors and the rest of 
the financial society (Hatherly & Skuse, 1991).  
Auditors are assumed to be belong to one of two categories: rigid external auditors who do not 
compromise on their probity and reliability and always report their judgments truthfully, and 
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other auditors who compromise their professional reporting decisions based on a cost-benefit 
analysis (Beyer & Sridhar, 2006; Antle, 1982). Beyer & Sridhar (2006) argued that the latter type 
misreport their professional assessment due to the absence of the auditing regulatory bodies 
while others attribute that to management pressure and auditor competition on fees (Knapp, 
1985; Malhas, 1992; Omari, 2003).  
This has caused Taylor, DeZoort, Munn, & Thomas (2003) to argue that the reliability of the 
audit report is the backbone of the auditing profession and “our view is that auditor reliability 
rather than auditor independence is, or should be, the profession’s cornerstone for protecting 
the public interest” (p. 258). They argued that the external auditor's independence was an 
input into stakeholders' reliance on the audit report, as were external auditor experience and 
integrity. Taylor et al (2003) defined the reliability of the audit report as the condition in which 
the users of the audit report perceive the audit report as dependable and credible.  
Zureigat (2010) conducted an event study to investigate the impact of the modified auditor's 
opinion on the share prices of Jordanian listed companies during the period 2002 to 2007. 
Based on the analysis of the abnormal returns of 53 listed companies during the test period (i.e. 
10 days before the assembly meeting23 date and 10 days after), the study concluded that 
modified audit opinions significantly influenced the listed companies' share prices. The study 
attributed this to the Jordanian investor’s capability to evaluate the contents of the audit report 
and assess the audited financial statements.  
Zureigat’s (2010) study confirmed the results (i.e. the issuance of qualified audit opinions 
influenced the shares prices of the Jordanian companies) of two prior studies utilizing that same 
methodology (Zureigat, 2006; Saaydah, 1998). Zureigat’s study (2006) covered the period 1993 
to 2005, and Saaydah’s study (1998) investigated 19 listed companies that received qualified 
opinions during the period from 1991 to 1994.  
                                                          
23
 The study adopted the general assembly meeting date rather than the release of the audited annual report date, 
because that is the date in which the financial statements disclosed for the first time to shareholders and usually 
this meeting includes the ratification of the auditor's report.  
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The effect of the international auditing standard ISA No. 700 and its amendments24 on the audit 
expectation gap and the level of disclosure in the audit report has been investigated by Al-
Khadash, et al, (2012). The study surveyed external auditors, preparers of the financial 
statements, investors and academicians. The results of the study showed that ISA No. 700 and 
its amendments contributed in bridging the audit expectation gap and enhancing the disclosure 
level of the audit report. Based on the participants’ opinions, the study recommended an 
expansion to the audit report whereby another separate paragraph would be added at the end 
of the audit report – after the opinion paragraph - in which the auditors should state their 
opinion about the effectiveness of the internal control system, the extent they relied on it, 
compliance with the corporate governance codes, and earnings management practices.  
O'Reilly (2009) pointed out that the general assumption is that expressing an explicit statement 
about the likelihood of the firm being a going concern should be useful to users of the audit 
report. The study experimentally investigated the issuance of (uncertain) going-concern 
opinions, including financial analysts’ expectations about how share prices in the USA will react 
to such opinions.   The results of the experiment provided strong evidence that the going-
concern opinion influenced perceptions of share values and that financial analysts perceived 
the auditor's opinion about the financial viability of the entities as useful information for 
valuing companies' shares. The results of the experiment also found that the importance of the 
auditor's opinion was higher when it provided information different from the market 
expectations.  
Gómez-Guillamón (2003) investigated the extent that institutional investors rely on the audit 
report in investment and financing decisions in Spain. The study surveyed a sample of head 
officers of credit institutions who actively make investment and credit decisions and managers 
of investment and analysis companies. The study showed that the types of audit opinion (clean, 
qualified, disclaimer or adverse) provided by the external auditor affected the institutional 
investors in their investment and lending decisions.  
                                                          
24 The study referred to the amendments of The ISA 700 “Forming an Opinion and Reporting on Financial 
Statements” that became operational in the first of January 2006.  
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3.5 Types of Audit Reports and Opinions 
The previous section indicated that assurance provided by the external auditors is relied upon 
by users of financial reports such as shareholders, lenders and investors to help evaluate and 
make investment decisions. Moreover, the literature suggested that the external auditor's 
opinion about the ability of companies to continue as going concerns is appreciated by the 
users of the audit report, and they reconsider their investment decisions accordingly (Jones, 
1996; Gul, 1990; Epstein & Geiger, 1994; Firth, 1980; O'Reilly, 2009; Guillamon, 2003; Citron et 
al, 2008). This section summarizes the types of audit report as categorized in International 
Standards.  
As stated in International Standard on Auditing (ISA) No. 700, auditors are required to provide 
an opinion on whether, in all material respects, financial statements are prepared in 
accordance with all applicable financial reporting frameworks. That opinion, according to ISA 
No. 700, is to be reached by obtaining reasonable assurance that the financial statements are 
free from all material misstatement, whether from error or fraud, and thus fairly reflect the 
true financial condition of the organization. 
Auditing standard (ISA 700) requires that the external auditors must clearly express their 
opinion as one of the following types: 
1- An unqualified25 audit report: is the most common type of audit report and is issued when 
the financial statements are presented fairly, in all material respects, according with applicable 
standards and the relevant statutory such as the corporations act (Leung, Paul, & Cooper 2011).  
2- A qualified audit report: “issued when there is a disagreement with management concerning 
appropriate accounting policies, a conflict between applicable financial reporting frameworks, 
or a limitation on the scope of the audit” (Arens et al, 2010, p. 48). This opinion is issued when 
material misstatements exist, but their effects are not pervasive to the overall financial report.  
                                                          
25 This type is also referred to as un unmodified opinion 
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3- A disclaimer of opinion is issued when the auditors are unable to express an opinion about 
the fairness of the financial reports due to a substantial restriction or a severe limitation on the 
scope of the audit such as the client concealing substantial evidence.    
4- An adverse opinion: issued when the external auditors believe that the overall financial 
reports are not presented fairly nor prepared according to the applicable accounting standards.  
The executive management and the board of directors of companies always prefer the first 
type of the audit report in order to send a message to the shareholders that they are diligent, 
competent, and deserve to keep their positions and be elected for another period. Therefore, 
executive managements put pressure on the external auditors to ensure the issuance of the 
unmodified audit report. In the context of Jordan, the literature pointed out that poor 
corporate governance mechanisms, including the lack of well-established and independent 
audit committees, encourages top management to undertake the role of selecting, retaining 
and setting the external auditor's fees (World Bank: Corporate Governance Assessment, 2004; 
Swaiti, 2006; Abdullatif, 2006; Al-Farah, 2001; Al-Khadash & Al-Sartawi, 2010) which 
consequently compromises the objectivity of the external auditors and leads them to issue 
audit reports in favor of company management. 
  
3.6 The Role and the Potential Support by an Audit Committee  
The International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) also require auditors to communicate significant 
findings, arising from or discovered during the financial statement audit, with the appropriate 
persons charged with the governance of the organization, these persons usually being the audit 
committee (Colbert, 2002). ISA No. 260 (Communications of audit matters with those charged 
with governance) and ISA No. 265 (Communicating Deficiencies in Internal Control to Those 
Charged with Governance and Management) provide guidance on communicating matters of 
interest to the governance body of an entity (IFAC 2010b). Jubb, Rittenberg, Johnstone, & 
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Gramling (2012) argued that, under these standards, the external auditors have a responsibility 
to discuss with the audit committee all significant audit matters, deficiencies in internal control 
and any pressure, restriction and disagreements with company management in relation to the 
accounting. Jubb et al (2012) also added that the audit committee must support auditors and 
ensure that they are free of management pressure during the course of the audit.  
Audit committees play a role in bridging the audit expectation gap. Sharaby (2010) investigated 
the role of audit committees in narrowing the audit expectations gap in commercial banks in 
Yemen. The study found that audit committees play a significant role in reinforcing external 
auditors' independence and performance, and the quality of financial reporting. The study also 
pointed out the importance of effective communications with external auditors in enhancing 
the quality of the audit process which would, consequently, increase the auditor’s capability in 
reporting about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. Another study from the 
region, this time conducted on Egyptian pharmaceutical companies during the period from 
2005 to 2008, investigated the role of the audit committee as a key pillar of corporate 
governance for improving the quality of financial reports (Ahmad, 2011). The study’s regression 
analysis of pooled data suggested that audit committee independence, the size of the audit 
committee in terms of number of members, and the financial experience of audit committee 
members are positively related to the issuance of clean opinions in the external auditor's 
report. 
Effective audit committee is considered a cornerstone and crucial pillar of effective corporate 
governance (Gramling, Maleta, Schmeider, & Church 2004). Independent audit committees are 
an essential part of the corporate governance mosaic (NYSE & NASD, 1999; The UK Corporate 
Governance Codes, 2010).  
The audit committee has been considered a safeguard of the external auditor’s independence 
(albeit among some other factors and bodies) due to its role in overseeing the financial 
reporting system and monitoring compliance with the regulatory instructions (ISB, 2000, para. 
14). Furthermore, the audit committees have been seen as a safeguard for reinforcing the 
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internal auditor’s effectiveness as well; The Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) 
recommended that all publicly-traded company establish audit committees in order to prevent 
frauds and increase the integrity of the financial reports. The MIA added “audit committees 
provide additional safeguards against fraud and malpractice by monitoring the effectiveness of 
record keeping, internal controls and internal audit. They also provide an assurance to 
regulatory authorities, investors and depositors of the objectivity, credibility and integrity of a 
company” (Malaysia Institute of Accountants, 1990, p. 27, cited by Teoh & Lim, 1996). Libby, 
Libby & Shor (2001) went further, affirming the pivotal role of the audit committee among 
other safeguards. They pointed out that internal and external auditors provide a safeguard for 
maintaining the soundness, accuracy and reliability of financial reporting, and added that 
companies establish an audit committee “whose job is to review these other two safeguards” 
(p. 24). 
The figure below shows the relationships between the major constituents of the audit- 
corporate governance system, emphasizing the crucial role of the audit committees in the 
corporate financial reporting system. The audit committee is an important body in the 
corporate structure because it is involved with overseeing and communicating with all other 
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Figure 5: Relationships between the Major Constituents of Corporate Governance 
as they Relate to Auditing 
Executive Management BoD




Whittington and Pany (2012) pointed out that one of the main duties of the audit committee is 
to oversee and ensure accountability and responsibility over the company's financial reporting 
process to the external users, monitoring the company's risk and related control processes, in 
addition to coordinating the work of the internal and the external auditors. Rittenberg and 
Schweiger (2007) pointed out that proper authority and powers of audit committees enable 
them to oversee the flow of the financial reporting and prevent fraud by company 
management. 
The board of directors must ensure that audit committees have the proper authority and power 
to do their job properly. Audit committees with inadequate authority cannot ensure corporate 
accountability and cannot enhance disclosure and transparency, thus negatively impacting 
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investor confidence and creating incorrect impressions amongst them. Audit committee 
effectiveness depends on the efficacy of its members.  Megat (2000) pointed out that audit 
committees cannot help in reinforcing corporate governance unless they are composed of truly 
independent members, and they should have experience and analytical skills and the capability 
to confront management pressure. Megat (2000) also added that if audit committees do not 
play their vital role and are nothing more than just "window dressing", then the audit 
expectations gap from investors’ perception will be widened.  
Goodwin and Seow (2000) argued that the investors, auditors and managers all believe that a 
powerful and effective audit committee support external auditors to perform their job 
effectively and independently.  
Corporate failure in Malaysia has raised questions regarding the professionalism of external 
auditors and affected public confidence negatively as the public blamed auditors for those 
scandals. Teoh and Lim (1996) conducted an empirical study of the factors affecting the 
perception of the external auditor’s independence in Malaysia. The study employed the 
repeated measures experimental design. An experimental instrument consisting of 32 scenarios 
was distributed to a sample of 100 accountants, 50 of which worked in auditing firms and the 
other 50 worked in non-auditing firms. The study concluded that the establishment of audit 
committees has a strong positive influence in reinforcing the perceived independence of 
external auditors. Moreover, the study found that providing non-auditing services and the large 
size of audit fees gained from a single client impair the perception of auditor independence. 
However, the negative effect of the latter could be mitigated by the formation of audit 
committees. The study revealed a statistically significant interaction between the existence of 
an audit committee and large audit fees obtained from a single client.   
 Abdel-Qader (2002) highlighted the importance of establishing audit committees to bridge the 
audit expectations gap. The study pointed out that the AICPA, the Treadway Commission, and 
the SEC have affirmed that the main objective of audit committees is to foster auditors' 
independence. Abdel-Qader (2002) argued that an external auditor’s independence is 
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enhanced when the auditor has direct communications with and a path to an independent 
party. Therefore, the existence of an independent audit committee is seen as enhancing and 
reinforcing the quality of the auditor's work and thus mitigating control of management over 
the financial reporting process. The committee should review the scope of the audit, significant 
accounting estimates and provisions26, and policies on external audit services, thus helping the 
auditors reach an independent opinion in the audit report. 
Prior to the JCGC, audit committees in Jordan were ineffective and had insufficient power. That 
lack of power could be attributed to the fact that there were no requirements regarding the 
qualifications that the audit committee members should hold, and no requirement for them to 
be independent (Swaiti, 2006; Abdullatif, 2006; Malkawi, 2008).  
The JCGC has clearly defined the requirements for the independent and the non-executive (i.e. 
non-management) members of boards of directors, and defined the conditions that impair the 
independence of the board of directors. The JCGC (Chapter Five, Section One, Item 1) required 
that each and every member of the audit committee have knowledge and experience in the 
field of accounting and finance. Moreover, the JCGC requires that at least one member of the 
audit committee must have actually worked in accounting, finance or a related field and must 
also hold an academic degree or professional certificate in one of those fields.     
Additionally, the JCGC (Chapter Two, Section two, Item 2) required audit committees be 
comprised of at least three non-executive (i.e. non-management) members selected from the 
board of directors, of which at least two must be independent (i.e. not be an employee of the 
company). One of these independent members is required to chair the audit committee.  
Requiring only two independent members means that one of the audit committee members 
might have a beneficial interest other than ownership of shares with the company or its 
external auditor or the company upper executive management. Therefore, the presence of 
                                                          
26 Provisions refer to the “liabilities for which the amount of the future sacrifice is uncertain” (Carlon, Mladenovic-
McAlpine, Loftus, Palm, Kimmel, Kieso, & Weygandt 2008). 
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even one member who is not independent means that all discussions could leak back to the 
management and the non-independent member may exercise a heavy influence particularly if 
they are a person of high prestige. In the case of Jordan, some literature showed that upper 
executive management had undertaken the roles of the board and the shareholders, especially 
in decisions related to the selection and remuneration of external auditors (World Bank: 
Corporate Governance Assessment, 2004; Swaiti, 2006; Abdullatif, 2006; Al-Farah, 2001; Al-
Khadash & Al-Sartawi, 2010). 
Green (2004) argued that ''a more independent audit committee means a more independent 
auditor" (p. 12). "Qualified, independent and tough minded audit committees represent the 
most reliable guardians of the public interest" (Levitt, 1998)27. Abbott, Park, & Parker (2000) 
found that companies with audit committees with independent members, and which meet at 
least twice a year, are associated with a less likelihood of both fraud and malpractice. 
In the U.S.A., the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ), 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the Securities  and Exchange Commission (SEC) have 
taken many actions to enhance the quality of companies’ disclosures and transparency, and  
have forced the corporations to alter the composition of their audit committees.  
Felo and Soliere (2009) pointed out that the SOX legislation requires all audit committee 
members be independent of the company management. They argued that independent audit 
committee members are stronger, unbiased and provide better oversight over the company 
management because they are less likely to be influenced by management pressure. They also 
added that insider audit committee members are more likely to be influenced by management 
pressure and that CEOs could override their powers.  
The SOX initiative in the U.S.A. has influenced other countries to establish reforms to 
strengthen the independence requirements of their capital markets. Tafara (2006) pointed out 
                                                          
27 The former US Securities and Exchange Commission chairman 
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that, since the issuance of the SOX in 2002, the UK, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong and Mexico 
have introduced reforms.  
The difficulty and the vagueness associated with reporting about the going-concern principle 
may put the auditor under pressure of the executive management. Independent and effective 
audit committee members could help mitigate such pressure by supporting the auditor in any 
conflicts with management (Parker, 2000). It is expected that a non-executive audit committee 
independent of the company management is more likely to support the external auditors when 
they face any management pressure to issue an unqualified opinion when the assumption of 
the entity’s ability to continue as a going-concern is questionable (McMullen, 1996). 
Carcello and Neal (2000) have examined the relation between the characteristics of the audit 
committee’s composition and the likelihood of issuing going-concern opinions for USA 
corporations experiencing financial distress during 1994. The study developed a logistic 
regression model and found that the higher the percentage of affiliated28 directors amongst the 
audit committee members, the lower the likelihood that the companies receive a going-
concern opinion by the auditor. The study supported the call of some capital market regulators 
for more independent audit committee members.  
Carcello and Neal (2003) investigated the relationship between audit committee characteristics 
and auditor dismissals following the issuance of a going concern opinion between 1988 to 1999. 
The study utilized the previous study’s methodology to, this time, investigate the relation 
between the likelihood that the company dismisses its external auditor and the qualities of the 
audit committee of that company. The study concluded that audit committees with a higher 
                                                          
28
 Affiliated directors are directors who lack independence; which includes current or past officers, employees and 
the staff of the company or of a related entity, relatives of executives, professional advisors to the company such 





percentage of independent members, governance and financial expertise, work effectively, and 
support and shield the auditors from dismissal especially after expressing a going-concern 
opinion. 
Carcello (2000) and Neal (2003) found a relationship between the variables, using the logistic 
regression model rather than causation relationship. This thesis includes an experiment aimed 
at identifying the causal relationships, rather than just correlations, between the independent 
variables and both the reliability of the audit report and the audit expectation gap.   
 
3.7 External Auditors’ Independence  
Auditing or assurance services can be defined as an analysis of an auditee's financial statements 
conducted to improve the quality and reliability of the presented information for the users of 
the financial statements, enabling them to make informed investment decisions. This includes 
checking accounts to prove their truth and fairness by an independent third party and the issue 
of a credible and independent opinion in a special report (Gray & Manson, 2006; Arens et al, 
2010; Strawser & Strawser, 2001; Whittington & Pany, 2012). The ISB considered external 
auditors’ independence to provide significant benefits to investors and other users of financial 
information. The ISB stated “auditor independence helps ensure quality audits and the 
reliability of the financial reporting process, which also may lead to increased confidence in that 
reliability” (ISB, 2000, para. 28-a). Moreover, in paragraph 28-c, the ISB added that external 
auditors’ independence is also beneficial to the company management, board of directors and 
to the audit committee, ensuring the credibility of the financial reporting prepared by lower-
level management. 
The concept of Independence is one of the most important foundations on which the auditing 
profession is built. Knapp (1985) defines auditor independence as the auditor’s ability to resist 
pressure from the client (i.e. the company being audited).  
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Potential ethical dilemmas exist in any situation where auditors face outside pressure to 
compromise their professional integrity or objectivity (e.g. management pressure to decide in 
favor of the appropriateness of the accounting policies chosen by management) (Leung, Paul, & 
Cooper, 2011). Furthermore, potential problems arising from a close relationship between the 
auditors and company management may compromise the external auditor's independence 
(Cadbury Report, 1992).    
Auditors’ independence and the quality of the audit can be enhanced by support from effective 
audit committees, the maintaining of audit working papers and auditor rotation (Arens et al, 
2010). 
The auditing profession and the business society are interested in ensuring that the users of the 
audit report perceive auditors as being independent (independence in appearance) and that 
the auditors actually maintain an unbiased attitude throughout the audit (independence in fact) 
(Arens et al, 2010).  According to Leung, Paul, & Cooper (2011) "independence in mind relates 
to the state of mind that permits the expression of a conclusion without being affected by 
influences that compromise professional judgment. It requires the professional accountant to 
exercise skepticism and act with integrity and objectivity. Independence in appearance means 
avoiding situations and facts that are so significant that a reasonable person, knowing all 
relevant facts and having considered the safeguards in place, would reasonably conclude that a 
firm's or a professional accountant's integrity and objectivity may have been impaired" (p. 85). 
 
3.7.1 External Auditors' Selection, Retention and Remuneration   
Audit committees are expected to choose the external auditors, presenting their choice of audit 
to the board of directors who usually have the final say (although, legally, the shareholders 
have the final say). The board of directors normally accepts the auditor proposed by the audit 
committee. It is also expected that the external auditor should report any problems to the audit 
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committee. As such, the audit committee is, in effect, the guarantor of the auditor’s 
independence, an independence that is enhanced if the audit committee, not management, is 
truly responsible for selecting the audit. By selecting truly independent auditors and enforcing 
the integrity of the auditing process in the face of possible opportunistic behavior by 
management, audit committees serve the best interests of company shareholders (Alleyne, 
Howard & Greenidge, 2006). 
In response to Enron’s scandal in 2002, Abdel-khalik (2002) argued that the auditor’s 
independence is critically affected by the body which has the responsibility of nominating, 
dismissing, and setting the external auditors’ fees, and suggested establishing another board, 
called the Shareholders’ Board of Trustees (SBT), whose sole function is to select, retain and 
compensate the external auditors.  
Nagy (2005) pointed out that by making a voluntary auditor change, the company can: 
1- Seek an accounting firm whose views on accounting and reporting matters are more 
consonant with those of the company. 
2- Seek an accounting firm that the company views as more pliable. 
3- Signal that the company is willing to change auditors in the future. 
In the case of Jordan, personal relationships play a pivotal role in the external auditor selection 
process. Malkawi (2008) pointed out that, in practice, the board of directors and the company 
management29 select the external auditors and, moreover, set the auditors’ remuneration, 
negatively impacting the independence of the external auditors. Zureigat (2011b) found that 
ownership concentration in Jordan negatively impacted auditing quality in Jordan. He 
attributed this ownership concentration to the nature of family owned companies in Jordan. 
Zureigat (2011b) argued that family owned companies tend to hire external auditors based on 
                                                          
29 Prior to the establishment of the Jordanian Corporate Governance Codes there were no requirement to separate 
the positions of the chairperson of the board of directors and any executive position. 
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personal relationships; therefore, the study recommended moving the authority of nominating 
the external auditors to the audit committees.  
           
Means of reinforcing external auditor independence have been investigated in Jordan by Matar 
(1994). The researcher designed and distributed questionnaires to supervisory bodies of the 
auditing profession, the users of the financial statements, and external auditors. The study 
found that the role of the directors in appointing, dismissing and setting audit fees was the 
most influential factor affecting external auditors’ independence. However, the study found 
significant negative impact of other factors on the external auditor’s independence, such as 
audit tenure, non-audit services, and audit fees.  
A lack of written audit committee charters in Jordan has possibly affected the auditor selection 
process. The lack of such systematic guidelines affects the work of audit committees and may 
contribute to them compromising their own objectivity and failing to operate in the company 
stakeholders’ best interests, especially in decisions to nominate an external auditor (Al-Saudi, 
2007; Khsharmh, 2003; Ameera, 2004). For instance, Al-Saudi (2007), whose study investigated 
audit committee members, pointed out that personal relationship between the audit 
committee and the auditors affected the selection process of the external auditors, in the 
perception of the audit committee members. He attributed this to the absence of systematic 
procedures regulating external auditors’ nomination by those charged with governance, 
especially the audit committee. 
External auditor’s selection and retention dilemmas have been experienced in other countries. 
In the USA, for example, Abdel-khalik (2002) pointed out that, in practice, auditor-related 
decisions are taken by the company management, and even non-executive members of the 
board of directors are often chosen by the executives. In order to resolve this dilemma, Abdel-
khalik proposed establishing another board, independent of the company board of directors 
and the company management, whose sole function will be to select, retain and compensate 
the external auditors. He called this board the Shareholders’ Board of Trustees (SBT). Abdel-
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khalik also suggested that the stock exchange administer the process of selecting the SBT, in 
exchange for a fee.  
    From the researcher’s point of view, the potential weaknesses of the model proposed by 
Abdel-khalik (2002) are as follows: 
1- The model stated “the BoD will not have any role in the choice of SBT other than acting as 
shareholders voting their shares” (Abdel-khalik, 2002, page 101). The researcher argues that 
the shareholders who elect the board of directors (BoD) are themselves the same people 
who elect the Shareholders’ Board of Trustees (SBT). Through this lacuna, the probability of 
the Board of Directors having control over the Board of Trustees is high because they would 
elect representatives who somehow “belong” to them and work as they desire, thus 
compromising the independence of the SBT when selecting external auditors. This proposal 
might not work efficiently in Jordan due to the presence of a large portion of family 
businesses, thus impacting the election process. Abu-Tapanjeh (2006) pointed out that 
many Jordanian shareholders elect members of their families and relatives, during  general 
assembly meetings, to become members of the board of directors and then to occupy the 
key executive positions. 
 
The researcher would argue that this lacuna could be narrowed by excluding major 
shareholders, directors, executives, and associates (relatives and companies, trusts, etc 
controlled by them) from voting in the election of the Shareholders’ Board of Trustees.  
 
2- The cost-benefit of paying fees to the stock exchange to administer the election process of 
the SBT, in addition to the costs of establishing and maintaining a new board whose sole 
function is to select or retain an external auditor, should be taken in to consideration.  
In Jordan, factors affecting decisions to select and change the external auditors have been 
investigated in several studies (Al-Qam, 1997; Khsharmh, 2003; Al-Saudi, 2007). These three 
studies were quantitative, and utilized questionnaires distributed to internal auditors, company 
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management, external auditors and financial managers, and audit committees. Khsharmh’s 
study (2003) suggested that, in order to mitigate the influence of the board of directors in the 
external auditor’s selection, the selection should be made by the ministry of trade and industry 
through the companies’ controller. Al-Qam (1997) recommended establishing non-executive 
qualified audit committee to approve the appointment of an external auditor. Al-Saudi (2007) 
concluded that audit committees in Jordan had, at that time, no standards or systematic 
guidelines for the process of selecting auditors and that personal relationships between audit 
committee members and auditors affects the selection process. The study also revealed that 
both of audit fees and audit committees’ powers30 affect the external auditor's nomination in 
Jordan.  
 
3.7.2 External auditor's Independence and the Audit Expectation Gap 
Jarbou (2004) pointed out that the lack of external auditor independence is the primary factor 
for the audit expectation gap. He argued that the financial community and the stakeholders 
should be convinced that external auditors are independent because the survival of the audit 
profession depends on the independence of auditors. He argued that if the independence of 
auditors in general came to be doubted, then their reports would have limited value and, 
consequently, the auditing profession would become worthless. The study concluded that the 
perceived independence of external auditors is a crucial factor in narrowing the expectations 
gap, and emphasized the importance of the role of the audit committees in nominating, 
dismissing, and maintaining the independence, of the external auditor. 
As an aside, it is worth noting that early warnings in an audit report can reduce the likelihood of 
unsustainable firms growing and causing losses in the wider community. Thus, while this study 
                                                          
30 The study referred the powers of the audit committees in (1) the committee’s ability in accessing and 
communicating with external auditors freely, and (2)   the committee’s ability to hold private meeting with the 
external auditors without the presence of the company management.  
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focuses on the relevance to the audit profession, it also has considerable significance for the 
achievement of satisfactory allocations of investments in the Jordanian economy. 
Similarly, Jarbou (2007) concluded that the lack, and the suspicion of the lack, of the external 
auditor's independence was the principal factor widening the expectations gap. In that study, a 
questionnaire was developed and distributed to external auditors, bank managers, and income 
tax department employees in the Gaza province in Palestine. The study recommended 
encouraging the independence and the neutrality of the external auditor in practicing the 
auditing profession, and encouraging the role of the professional associations and their control 
over the accounting and auditing profession. 
The audit expectation gap in Britain has been empirically investigated by Humphrey, Moizer & 
Turley (1993). The study surveyed auditors, financial analysts, directors of corporate finance, 
credit officers at banks, in addition to financial journalists. The study identified auditor 
independence as a key element of the audit expectations gap. The study confirmed that the 
critical components of the expectations gap included expectations regarding auditors' role in 
fraud detection, auditors' responsibility to third parties, auditors’ valuation of companies’ 
financial positions, and threats to auditors' independence. Humphrey et al (1993) also 
concluded that auditor independence was, perhaps, the core around which the debate about 
audit expectation gap is waged. 
Much of the literature related to the audit expectations gap referred to the perceived lack of 
external auditors' independence as being the main factor in widening the gap. Those studies 
include Jordanian (Abdel-Qader, 2002; Hajir, 2001; Al-Thuneibat, 2003; Omari, 2003; Al-
Khadash & Al-Sartawi, 2010), regional31 (Jarbou, 2004; Jarbou, 2007; Sidani & Olayan, 2007; Al-
Qarni, 2004; Elmeligy, 2006; Al-Husaini, 2000) and international studies (Humphrey et al, 1993; 
Koh & Woo, 1998; Dewing & Russell, 2002; Salehi & Rostami, 2009; Gloeck & Jager, 1993; Gray 
                                                          
31 Regional studies referred to those studies that have been conducted in the Middle East and North Africa's area 




& Manson, 2008; Lin & Chen, 2004). This lineup of studies reflects the importance of external 
auditors' independence and performance in bridging the expectation gap. 
The issue of independence is vital because auditing, as a function, was established to provide 
independent and expert opinions on financial statements to assist users in making decisions 
regarding financial statements. These vital functions of the external auditors can be seen in the 
JCGC. The JCGC (Chapter Five, Section 4, Item 6- D) stated the duties of the external auditors. 
One of these duties is “examining the financial, administrative, and internal auditing systems of 
the company and submitting their opinion on their effectiveness and ensuring their suitability 
for the company's business and safeguarding of its assets”. Therefore, the Jordanian regulatory 
bodies and professional association should ensure that external auditors meet the standards of 
independence.  
There have been many debates and criticisms surrounding the external auditor's independence 
in Jordan (Swaity, 2006; Malkawi, 2008; Al-Khadash & Al-Sartawi, 2010; Abdullatif, 2006; Omari 
2003; Dahmash, 1989; Matar, 1995; Momany, 1994). Dahmash (1989) pointed out that 54% of 
auditors in Jordan feel themselves under pressure from management. Matar (1995) also 
pointed out that the external auditor's independence in Jordan is impaired because of 
management pressure on auditors. Moreover, Omari (2003) revealed that investors in Jordan 
believed that auditors are responding to management’s desires. 
In 2004, World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) joint initiatives reviewed the 
accounting and auditing standards and practices in Jordan. They reported several drawbacks 
that affected the audit profession in Jordan. In regard to the external auditor's independence,  
the report revealed that some auditors are dependent on one key client, have close 
relationships with the company management and provide non-audit services such as internal 
audit services to audit clients (World Bank: Accounting and Auditing, 2004). 
The Jordanian corporate governance codes, in Chapter Five – Section 2 and 4, focused on the 
importance of the external auditor's independence, and the role of the audit committees in 
019 
 
reviewing issues related to the selection of the external auditor, this aims to ensure that 
companies satisfy all the conditions as stipulated in the legislation in force. The codes also 
stated that the “company shall take appropriate actions to ensure that the external auditor is 
independent in accordance with International Standards on Auditing”. The main external 
auditor's duty is to fulfill their job with impartiality and independence without interference 
from the board of directors or the executive management. (Corporate Governance Codes in 
Jordan, 2009 Chapter Five: Section Two Item 1; Section Four items 3- C, D and 6- A). 
           
3.7.3 Non-Audit Services 
The provision of audit and non-audit services by one audit firm to the same client, and the 
resulting potential impairment of the independence of the auditor when issuing the audit 
report, has repeatedly been a controversial issue. Non-audit services are all services provided 
by the incumbent external auditor that are not considered as an audit.  Such services may 
include bookkeeping, tax services, financial information systems design and implementation, 
management consultation and any service other than the audit service. In the United States, 
the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) (2002) banned audit firms from providing most non-audit 
services. In Jordan,  there were also many criticisms directed at the non-audit services provided 
by auditors to their clients prior to the JCGC’s establishment.  
Abdel-Qader (2002) pointed out that Jordanian commercial laws did not require public 
companies to disclose non-audit services. The study argued that, in order to maintain integrity, 
objectivity, and independence, the public accounting firm should not act as internal and 
external auditor for the same entity. Malkawi (2008) pointed out that the Law of the Audit 
Profession of 2003 in Jordan does not specify whether auditors can perform non-audit services. 
Omari (2003) concluded that the expectation gap is concentrated on the independence of the 
external auditors and that Investors believed external auditors' independence to be negatively 
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affected when auditors provide non-audit services to their audit clients as this would create a 
conflict of interest and affect their performance. 
Chan, Wong, & Wong (2002) pointed out that, in the last two to three decades, audit firms have 
expanded their services beyond auditing companies’ financial statements, and the non-audit 
services business had grown to the point where fees generated from non-audit services were 
substantial. Chan et al (2002) also found that the largest New Zealand audit companies 
indicated that audit firms generated as much from non-audit services as they do from their 
audit work. The analysis suggested that audit firms have increased their provision of non-audit 
services to companies over the 1996 to 2000 period. Given this rebalancing of audit and non-
audit services, auditors should consider how auditor independence and, consequently, investor 
confidence will be impacted and take action to address related problems.  
These changes in the structure of services provided by audit companies must also be addressed 
by regulators, perhaps placing appropriate restrictions on the type or value of services that an 
audit company, whether directly or through partnerships or affiliations with other service 
providers, can provide.  
There are other ways in which these potential conflicts of interest can be addressed. The 
auditing profession continues to establish broad guidelines for audit independence, as it has 
done for quite some time, but these guidelines, perhaps, give auditors too large a margin for 
maneuver. Alternatively, auditors could be required to disclose the types and value of services 
provided the client, perhaps within the audited financial reports of the client. Such an approach 
would be useful in reducing some, but not all, perceived conflicts of interest. A more extreme, 
but perhaps more effective, measure would be to totally forbid certain services on the premise 
that they compromise auditor independence. In applying this approach, regulators could 
balance the potential impact on the auditor’s independence against the potential benefit of 
each non-audit service to the quality of the audit.       
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At the same time, audit committees could help investigate the types of services that auditors 
perform and question whether it would be in the investors’ interests to have some of those 
services performed by another party. An effective audit committee can moderate management 
attempts to pressure auditors into accepting inappropriate accounting treatments.     
Non-audit services are prohibited in Jordan. The JCGC states that each company must ensure 
that its external audit service provider not provide them with any additional services, including 
administrative support or technical consultation (Corporate Governance Codes in Jordan, 2009, 
Chapter Five, Section Four, Item 3-b).   
 
3.7.4 Audit Rotation 
There are two types of audit rotation: rotation of the audit partner and rotation of the audit 
firm. The rotation stipulated in the JCGC is the audit partner rotation.  
Mandatory rotation of audit partners plays a role in enhancing auditor independence and 
bridging the expectation gap. Nagy (2005) pointed out that enforcing mandatory rotation of 
auditors would break the auditor’s expectation that the audit client is a perpetual source of 
income as well as bring a fresh and perhaps more skeptical point of view to the audit.   
In a case study by Dewing and Russell (2002) describing how UK investment fund managers 
define the audit expectation gap and their perceptions regarding the degree to which it be 
closed, audit rotation was identified as a significant contributor towards narrowing the 
expectation gap. The same study also suggested that frequent rotation of audit management 
partners would help to improve auditor's independence.  
Governing bodies and major professional accounting associations viewed management fraud as 
a major influence on the reliability of the audit report and the audit expectation gap.  “A gap 
exists between the expectations of the users of financial statements and the performance of 
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the auditing profession” (Pankaj, 2003, p. 22). Pankaj investigated the relationship between 
corporate governance and management fraud in the USA. The study investigated instances of 
management fraud and reviewed the Accounting & Auditing Enforcement Releases issued by 
the U.S Security Commission. The results of the study suggested the importance of the role of 
corporate governance mechanisms in limiting management fraud, particularly in the way these 
mechanisms handle the selection of external auditors32. The study also added that these 
mechanisms lead to a decreasing of the level of the audit expectation gap as they enhance 
auditors’ ability to detect and prevent management fraud. 
Both the revised 8th Directive of the European Countries (Council of the European 
Communities, 2006) and the United States’ SOX require key audit partner rotation every five 
years. In the context of Jordan, Omari (2003) referred to the impact of audit firm rotation on 
the auditors’ independence. The study indicated that the tenure of audit firms was almost 
unlimited, negatively impacting external auditors' independence. Al-Khadash and Al-Sartawi 
(2010) also recommended audit partner rotation to reinforce external auditors' independence 
in Jordan. Matar (1994) also found that long audit tenure was a factor, among several other 
factors, that had negatively impacted external auditors’ independence in Jordan. Swaiti’s (2006) 
proposed model for the role of audit committees in Jordan suggested mandating audit partner 
rotation every five years. 
The newly adopted JCGC mandated audit partner rotation. It stated “the external auditor shall 
exercise his duties for one year renewable, provided that the renewal for the partner at the 
external auditor may not be for more than four consecutive years, and the re-election may not 
take place before a minimum of two years” (Corporate Governance Codes in Jordan, 2009, 
Chapter Five, Section four, Item 2). 
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3.8 The JCGC and the Internal Audit 
Effective internal audit contributes to good corporate governance systems (Leung, Cooper & 
Perera, 2011). The principal duties for internal control are to prevent and detect frauds and 
errors. Hence, organizations should establish an adequate internal control system to protect 
their assets. As insider staff, and due to their subordination to company management, the 
internal auditors are not perceived to be as independent as the external auditors. Mandating 
that decisions on appointing, dismissing and compensating internal auditors is the responsibility 
of an independent body, such as the audit committee, may enhance the independence and the 
effectiveness of internal auditors.  
The JCGC pointed out the importance of establishing an adequate internal control system. The 
JCGC (in Chapter Five, section 3, item 3) stated that nomination of a candidate to be appointed 
as the company’s internal auditor is one of powers of the audit committee. The JCGC also 
pointed out the roles of the audit committee in reinforcing the effectiveness of the internal 
audit. In Chapter Five, Section 2, Items 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, it stated these duties of audit 
committees as: 
- Assessing the adopted procedures of the internal control and internal audit functions. 
- Examining the external auditor’s evaluation of the adopted procedures of the internal control 
and internal audit functions. 
- Examining the internal auditor’s reports, especially those related to any irregularities  
- The audit committees must provide the board of directors with recommendations regarding 
the adopted procedures of internal control and the work of the internal auditor.   
Zureigat (2011a) investigated the impact of the corporate governance codes of the banking 
sector, issued by Central Bank, in improving internal audit quality and effectiveness in Jordan. 
The researcher designed a questionnaire and surveyed the internal auditors of Jordanian banks. 
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The study concluded that corporate governance of the Jordanian banking sector significantly 
improved the quality of the internal audit. The study revealed that giving internal auditors the 
authority to report directly to the audit committee was the main factor enhancing the internal 
auditor's performance.  
The current research contributes further to Zureigat’s study (2011a), which focused on 
investigating internal audit quality and effectiveness. This thesis covers external auditors’ 
independence, disclosure and transparency, corporate accountability, and internal auditors’ 
effectiveness as key elements of the corporate governance codes of publicly traded companies 
on the Amman stock exchange.  
In a study of internal auditing in Australia and New Zealand, Goodwin (2003) examined the 
impact of audit committee independence and financial experience on the committee’s 
relationship with Internal Audit. While both Audit committee independence and experience 
were found to have an effect on the internal audit function, independence was more strongly 
linked to having fewer audit process-related issues. On the other hand, committee experience 
was more strongly linked to the degree to which Internal Audit work was reviewed by the audit 
committee.      
Goodwin & Seow (2000) surveyed the chief internal auditors in Singapore to investigate the 
factors affecting internal auditor’s independence. They argued that internal auditors’ 
independence and objectivity might be compromised because of company management 
pressure, which could be mitigated by giving the internal auditors private and direct access to 
the audit committee, and by giving the audit committee the power of appointing and dismissing 
the internal auditors. The study concluded that the relationship between the internal auditors 
and an independent audit committee was the first factor affecting internal auditor’s 
independence.  This is also consistent with Braiotta (2004) and Leung, Cooper, & Perera (2011) 
who argued that holding several meetings with the internal auditors, without the presence of 
the company management, enhances their independence. Leung, Cooper & Perera (2011) also 
added “In order to provide relevant, timely and complete information for the board and senior 
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management, chief audit executives should have a clear reporting role directly to the audit 
committee of the board . . . . A close relationship between the chief audit executive and CEO, 
rather than with the audit committee, can potentially result in the risk of intimidation or 
management pressure on the chief audit executive” (p. 813). 
Qin (2007) investigated the impact of audit committee financial expertise on earnings quality in 
the U.S. The author developed a regression model to test his hypothesis, concluding that 
members of audit committees with financial expertise strengthen the internal control system of 
companies, and enhance the reliability of financial reporting. The results of the study, 
contradicting the SEC rules, suggested that only accounting-literate professional members are 
associated with good quality of reported earnings. 
In the period after the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the U.S., Krishnan & 
Visvanathan (2007) investigated how reporting of weakness in internal control is influenced by 
the audit committee and external auditors. The study found that companies that reported 
weaknesses were characterized by a higher frequency of audit committee meetings, lower 
financial experience within the audit committee and more frequent change of auditor, in 
comparison with companies that did not report weaknesses.    
Another study, in which 114 chief internal auditors participated, also found a significant 
relationship between the membership structure of the audit committee and the Internal 
Auditing Function (Raghunandan, Rama & Read, 2001). Audit committees that consisted only of 
independent members, of which at least one member had experience in accounting, finance or 
a related field, were found to be more likely allow the chief internal auditor to address the 
committee in private (i.e. outside the presence of company management) and tended to have 
longer meetings with the chief internal auditor. Such committees were also more likely to 
review the work of internal auditors.        
Christopher et al (2009) examined the internal auditor's independence in Australia. In the 
study, a questionnaire was designed and sent to Australian chief audit executives to examine 
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the impact of the relationships between the internal auditors, company management and the 
audit committee on the internal auditor's independence. 
The study concluded there were three threats affecting internal auditor's independence: 
1- The internal auditor's dependency on the management to move to other positions or seek 
promotion. 
2- The setting of the internal audit budget by the company's chief executive officer or chief 
finance officer. 
3- The heavy involvement of the upper management in developing the internal audit plan. 
The study attributed these threats to (1) Non-compliance with the corporate governance codes 
of best practices that recommended that internal auditors report about technical matters to 
the audit committee and administratively to the company upper management; (2) Inconsistent  
adherence to audit committee compositions to guarantee the independence of the internal 
audit function, even though “the majority of audit committees have the right composition to 
guarantee the independence of the internal audit function”(p. 214); (3) The management’s 
power in selecting and dismissing the head of the internal audit. The study revealed that in one-
quarter of entities, company executive management, rather than the audit committee, made 
the decisions to select and dismiss internal auditors.     
By reviewing the plans and work of internal auditors, audit committees can ensure that internal 
auditors are actually able to investigate all potential risks that should be disclosed in financial 
reports (Mohamed & Hussain, 2005). Such a review reveals potential problems that may 
prevent internal auditors from adequately accomplishing their roles, and thus allows the 
committee to correct problems impairing internal auditors’ independence.   
Reporting about internal audit effectiveness is one of several aspects that may help in bridging 
the audit expectation gap. Abdel-Qader (2002) pointed out the importance of external auditors’ 
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reporting on management responsibilities and internal control, the auditor being the only 
independent authority who can evaluate and report on the internal control system to users of 
the audit report. The study concluded that the auditor should review and evaluate the internal 
control system in sufficient depth to form an opinion as to its effectiveness, and any 
weaknesses which present potential for significant injury to the client should be reported to the 
public. 
Audit committee support also plays a significant role in increasing internal auditors' confidence 
in their ability to detect frauds and errors. In regard to audit effectiveness, Davies (2009) 
argued that audit committees must actively support the work of the internal audit function. 
This active role requires that audit committees evaluate the work of the internal audit function 
and remove any obstacles standing in the way of the accomplishing of the function’s duties. 
The audit committee should also select the heads of the internal audit function, helping ensure 
that the appointees are willing and able to protect the independence of the internal audit 
function in the face of potential pressure from management. Internal auditors should be able to 
respect the audit committee’s ability to evaluate and support the work of the internal audit 
function.  
According to Vinten & Lee (1993), audit committees have significant roles to play in enhancing 
the work of internal auditors. As previously mentioned, Audit committees can ensure that 
internal auditors investigate all the company’s high-risk areas of activity. This role can be 
enhanced through coordinating work with both internal and external auditors. Furthermore, by 
facilitating coordination between internal and external audit efforts, the committee can 
optimize the costs of both audits.     
In 1994, a study conducted in Australia by the Australian Society of Certified Practicing 
Accountants and The Institute of Chartered Accountants recommended requiring company 
managements to disclose the effectiveness of their company’s internal controls (Koh & Woo, 
1998). These disclosures would be made in the financial reports and external auditors would 
provide their opinions regarding these disclosures.     
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Muneer (2010) focused on the importance of communication as an approach to bridge the gap. 
The study pointed to the role of International Standard of Auditing ISA No. 700 that stated that 
the auditor's report on financial statements improves awareness and understanding of the 
financial reporting users about the nature, duties and limitations of the auditors' function, and 
the level of assurance they provide. The results of the study indicate that (1) conveying vital 
information, observed during the audit process, to the Audit Committee and (2) evaluating and 
conveying the fundamental deficiencies in internal control to management and the audit 
committee, increases the external auditor's performance and the effectiveness of the internal 
audit in detecting frauds and errors, and increases the credibility of financial statements, 
consequently contributing to narrowing the audit expectation gap. 
In summary, the literature revealed the crucial role of the audit committees in maintaining the 
independence and the effectiveness of internal auditors. Well-established and independent 
audit committees appoint the chief internal auditors, review the work of the internal audit 
function, report recommendations to the board of directors and work as liaisons between 
external and internal auditors, thus reinforcing the effectiveness of the internal auditors in 
safeguarding company assets and increasing the credibility of the financial reporting system. 
Independent audit committees can provide auditors with direct access to the committee, 
without the presence of the company management, thus preventing any potential 
management pressure and reinforcing the independence of auditors.   
 
3.9 Disclosure & Transparency      
Without transparence of corporate governance, shareholders and other stakeholders do not 
have adequate confidence in the information provided by company management. According to 
Hakim (2002) and Leung & Cooper (2005), effective corporate governance cannot exists in the 
absence of acceptable levels of transparency, accountability and disclosure. Hence, it can be 
concluded that corporate governance is a set of mechanisms that help in confirming the 
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fairness and justness of company dealings with all the stakeholders, and in reinforcing the level 
of disclosure, transparency, and accountability. Bushman et al (2004) defined governance 
transparency as “availability of firm-specific to those outside publicly traded firms” (p. 207).  
An audit committee also has a significant role in meeting investors' expectations and ensuring 
that a company has complied with approved accounting standards and disclosure rules for 
corporate reporting. In this respect, Audit committees are expected to adopt good practices 
aimed at maintaining high standards of corporate disclosure and integrity of information, with 
prime concern for responsibility and accountability to shareholders and other stakeholders 
(Megat, 2000). 
Disclosure aims to provide financial report users with adequate information needed for sound 
financial decisions. Jordanian corporate governance codes have devoted a complete chapter 
(Chapter Five) to the subject of Disclosure and Transparency. The chapter mainly deals with the 
role and duties of audit committees, external auditors and internal auditors, and 
communications between corporate governance constituents, in regards to ensuring and 
maximizing transparency, disclosure and reporting quality.  
According to the JCGC and the instructions on disclosure for listed companies and accounting 
and auditing standards (2004, Articles 8 and 9), all listed companies on the Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE) are obliged to establish their own websites, yet many companies have not 
generated their websites, which is a clear contradiction of the JCGC’s disclosure & transparency 
section. As per the code, all listed companies are required to inform the public of any new 
material facts, as soon as possible. Within a week of this public disclosure, a copy of the public 
disclosure, in addition to a detailed report on the new facts, should be submitted to the 
Jordanian Securities Commission (JSC).  Surprisingly, companies are also required to promptly 
and publically confirm or deny any and all news items published in the media regarding 
material facts about the company, and are required to provide a copy of the official statement 
to the JSC. 
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Similarly, all listed companies are required to provide the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) with all 
material financial and non-financial information, without delay, and to release that information 
to the public through the ASE's website under the circulars and disclosure section.  
The importance of having a website for each listed company is maximized when the companies 
provide continuously updated information to the shareholders and potential investors. 
“Accounting information has relevance if it is timely; it must be available to decision makers 
before it loses its capacity to influence decisions” (Kieso et al, 2010, p. 491). Listed companies 
must use their websites, in addition to the annual and interim reports, to release all necessary 
information to the public. This information, in the hands of current and potential shareholders, 
will help them take the right decision regarding keeping, selling and buying shares. Concealing 
information will have a negative impact on the quality of investors' decisions, creating potential 
future surprises for investors and, consequently, raise the dilemma of accountability regarding 
the audit expectations. On the other hand, there is such a thing as having too much 
communication, whereby the crucial information is lost within a deluge of routine disclosures. 
The JCGC (Chapter 5, item 2) required companies to publically disclose all relevant information 
in a timely, accurate and clear manner so as to allow investors to make informed decisions. 
These disclosures should include periodic reports, all emerging material facts, insider dealing, 
related party transactions, and board of directors and executive management’s remuneration 
and benefits.      
Before the establishment of the JCGC, Malkawi (2008) pointed out that related-party 
transactions, such as transactions between the company and the directors and general 
managers, were prohibited. For example, loans to directors are prohibited. The law required 
companies to provide relevant disclosure for loans made to the related parties such as the 
company’s executives, directors, its major clients and suppliers, and parent companies. 
However, the definition of related-party transactions was unclear.  
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The newly adopted JCGC has clearly defined "Related Party Transactions" in Chapter One- The 
Definitions.  It has been defined as "Any deal or contract, the value of which exceeds JD 50,000 
(fifty thousand Jordanian Dinars JD)33 made between the company and any the related parties”. 
The codes go on to describe and identify related parties: “families and relatives of directors, 
partners, and companies under the control of members of the board of directors are within the 
definition of related parties.” The JCGC stated that the company shall provide shareholders and 
investors with accurate, clear and timely disclosure of information about the related party 
transactions. The codes also stated that the audit committees must ensure that no conflict of 
interest may arise from the company’s transactions, contracts or projects with related parties. 
Audit committees also must review and approve related party transactions prior to their 
ratification by the company (JCGC: Chapter Five, section two, items 11 & 12). 
Wright (1996) pointed out that the role of the corporate governance system is to ensure the 
company provides adequate disclosure and transparencies on the financial reporting to the 
shareholders. The study found a strong positive relationship between the soundness of the 
governance structure and the quality of disclosure and transparency. The study also found non-
independent audit committee members are associated with negative financial reporting 
quality, in the perception of analysts. 
 Cheng and Abdel-Qader (2010) have investigated whether auditors were responsible for 
surprise corporate failures. The paper suggested that the lack of management disclosure of 
how they assess going concern assumptions, along with the lack of auditors' disclosure of how 
they evaluate management’s going concern assumptions, in addition to the passive approach of 
the auditing standards, were associated with surprise corporate failures and widened the audit 
expectation gap between investors and auditors. In regards to narrowing the expectation gap, 
the article recommended improvement in disclosures by both management and auditors, with 
adequate disclosure of material uncertainties and an explicit qualification on the audit going 
concern opinion. Abdel-Qader (2002) recommended that the audit report should be expanded 
                                                          
33 JD has fixed exchange rate with the USD; Approximately, 1 JD = 1.41 USD  
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by including a statement about the auditor's evaluation of the internal control system and the 
results of reviewing the entity's ability to continue in the future. 
 
3.10 Corporate Accountability  
“Accountability has definitely become a topic of concern throughout governance literature” 
(ERKKILÄ, 2007). The recent spate of big-name corporate collapses, such as Enron, WorldCom 
and Tyco in the U.S, Barings Bank in UK, Philipp Holzmann and Comroad in Germany, Yline in 
Austria, HIH in Australia, SAirGroup in Switzerland, Lernout & Hauspie in Belgium and  Parmalat 
in Italy,  have increased public pressure to reform corporate governance systems and demand 
greater accountability over the corporations. In response to corporate failures, governmental 
and non-governmental regulating and supervisory bodies worldwide issued strict legislation, 
regulations and directives in order to restore public trust in capital markets and the auditing 
profession (Pott, Mock & Watrin, 2009). For instance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of the United 
States and the revised 8th Directive of The European Union (Council of the European 
Communities, 2006), both included strict penalties to be implemented on those who violate the 
regulations.  Mohamed and Hussain (2005) pointed out that dramatic pressure for greater 
accountability has placed an immense emphasis on the functions and the vital roles of the audit 
committees in reinforcing corporate governance. The external auditor profession also came 
under fire for their failure to develop a ‘whistle blower’ type mechanism. 
It is perceived that increasing the awareness of accountability, in addition to having a clear 
delineation of powers and responsibilities, helps in limiting and /or preventing fraud and 
malpractice. Corporate governance can be defined, in its narrowest sense, as a system for 
improving accountability (Farrar, 2003; Wolfensohn, 1999; Higgs Report, 2003; Tricker, 1984; 
Jubb et al, 2012). Hence, corporate governance initiatives have placed a great deal of emphasis 
on ensuring accountability over corporate governance bodies. For instance, the British 
Corporate Governance Codes, issued by The Financial Reporting Council (FRC), devoted a 
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separate section to accountability, emphasizing the duties and responsibilities of the board of 
directors, the company management, the internal auditors, the audit committees and the 
external auditors. The section included the role of the directors in preparing the annual report, 
specifying their responsibility for the soundness of the financial reporting system and that the 
entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. The codes also stipulated the role of the 
directors in assessing the company's risk and reviewing the internal control system, in addition 
to the board's responsibility to establish an independent audit committee whose main 
functions and responsibilities must be set in a written charter (The UK Corporate Governance 
Codes, 2010). 
Solomon (2010) pointed out that the most common characteristic in the definitions of 
corporate governance is accountability because it helps protect the wealth of the shareholders 
and the rights of the stakeholders. Sherer & Turley (1997) pointed out that the most significant 
elements of corporate governance were ensuring the proper implementation of accountability 
and overseeing the company executive management. Millstein (1998) pointed out that the 
corporate governance simply aims to ensure that the managers are accountable to the board of 
directors and directors are accountable to the shareholders. He also argued that having the 
managers and the directors accountable for corporate assets leads to improved corporate 
performance.  
Accountability, in the context of financial reporting, is defined as "the responsibility to provide 
information to enable users to make informed judgments about the performance, financial 
position, financing and investing, and compliance of the reporting entity" (Statement of 
Accounting Concepts, SAC 2.5, 2012). Gay & Simnett (2010) pointed out that accountability 
refers to the responsibilities of the governing body of the company to be held accountable for 
reporting, and is subject to an examination according to an accountability system that involves 
both internal and external parties.   
Wild (1994) argued that the audit committees are the most effective pillar of corporate 
governance, overseeing accountability and reducing fraud, error and the risk surrounding the 
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financial reporting. Wild (1994) examined and reviewed data from 260 companies in the U.S.A., 
both before and after the establishment of an audit committee. That data covered the period 
from 1966 to 1980, and was analyzed to establish empirical evidence about the relationship 
between accounting earnings and audit committees. The results showed that the formation of 
audit committees has significantly made the earnings more informative to users of financial 
statements and reports. The study attributed that to the vital role of the audit committee in 
overseeing the quality of the management accountability to the shareholders.  
Porter (2009) reviewed the corporate governance accountability literature, pointing out that 
accountability was demanded, due to giant corporate collapses, to counter any possible abuse 
of executives' powers and to produce reliable and informative financial statements that were 
free of error and fraud. Porter stressed on the importance of the tripartite or "trinity" audit 
function (external auditors, internal auditors and audit committees) in maintaining the integrity 
of corporate accountability, and argued that the audit trinity members have interlocking and 
mutually supportive functions. Porter also added that, in addition to the vital roles of the audit 
trinity in securing the integrity of the financial reporting, audit committees should have the 
power and responsibility to ask probing questions of executives and employees, and should 
possess a high degree of skepticism in order not to be easily satisfied with any reply.  
Corporate governance systems characterized as having a poor accountability system impair 
internal and external auditors’ ability to do their jobs effectively and with due professional care 
which, in turn, affects the integrity of the financial reporting system. In Jordan, Qadamani 
(2007) criticized the accountability of corporate governance systems, and pointed out that 
some of the large controlling investors, especially those who hold both positions on the board 
of directors and are executive managers, believe that they own the assets of the entity 
regardless of the interest of the minority shareholders, and feel that they are not accountable.  
The former controller of the Companies Control Directorate in Jordan, Khaza'alah (2001), 
pointed out that, due to the lack of accountability, external auditors did not accomplish their 
tasks as agents of shareholders, and were mainly tasked with preparing the financial 
statements from the ending balances as per the trial balance while external auditors were 
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supposed to assess their client's risk, the efficiency of their internal control, and perform 
preliminary analytical procedures. Khaza'alah also attributed this situation to the unbalanced 
(low) audit fees compared to the external auditors’ legal responsibilities. Furthermore, weak 
accountability in Jordan brought about demands for implementing strict punishments against 
external auditors who violate the code of the auditing profession (Matar, 1994). 
Abdullatif (2003) has interviewed Jordanian lawyers and revealed that the weak accountability 
system, insufficient legal responsibilities and the low probability of punishment falling on 
corporate governance constituents in Jordan, have led some external auditors to cooperate 
with dishonest managers at client companies to keep their jobs as auditors. He also added that 
in the case of Jordan, where the owner/manager was a dominant characteristic among 
companies (i.e there was no separation between the positions of owners and management), 
the likelihood of malpractice and theft of company assets was high. This duality of positions 
(owner/manager) in Jordan was also criticized by Al-Hasani (1999), Saadah (1993), and Al-Jazy 
(2005), all of whom criticized relevant laws and demanded reform of corporate accountability 
to separate management of listed companies from their owners. They also argued that the 
separation enhances the external auditor's independence and performance when the 
appointers of the auditor are different from the company executive management.  
Abed et al (2012) investigated, over the period 2006-2009, the impact of Jordanian corporate 
governance characteristics on management's ability to manipulate financial reporting and 
income. The study revealed that Jordanian listed companies' compliance with the corporate 
governance code was poor due to insufficient accountability and penalties. The authors also 
related this to the fact that the JCGC became operational in 2009 on a comply or explain basis. 
The study recommended Jordanian policy makers encourage compliance with the codes in 
order to control the opportunistic behavior of boards of directors and management regarding  
manipulation of financial statements, such compliance thereby enhancing the reliability of the 
financial reporting system.  
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Compliance with the JCGC might be enhanced by mandating the external auditors to report, 
within the audit report, the entity's compliance with the JCGC, as suggested by Al-Hanini & 
Dahmash (2008) and Al-Khadash, et al, (2012). In the UK, Porter (2009) pointed out that, under 
the United Kingdom Listing requirements, the external auditors report about the publicly 
traded companies' compliance with the accountability provisions of the UK corporate 
governance codes. 
The JCGC (Chapter 2, Item 5) has prohibited duality of the roles CEO and chairman. This 
segregation of duties aims clarify the responsibility and accountability of the company board 
and management. The JCGC stipulated the role of the audit committee in making 
recommendations on the selection of the internal and external auditor and securing the 
independence of the latter. The audit committees also have the responsibility to evaluate the 
internal control and auditing procedures. The JCGC stated that the external auditors have the 
responsibility to audit the company's accounts according to the ISAs and to answer any queries 
and questions raised by the shareholder during the assembly meetings. In addition, the auditor 
has the responsibility to inform the authorities concerning any violation of the legislation in 
force and regulations, or any administrative or financial matters that affect the company's 
financial position negatively (Corporate Governance Codes in Jordan, 2009, Chapter Five, 
Section 4). 
In regard to corporate governance bodies' legal liabilities toward the laws, the JCGC (Chapter 2, 
Item 12) stated that members of the boards, the company executive management and the 
external auditors are legally accountable to notify the supervisory authorities if: 
- The board of directors or the general manager exploits their powers for their personal benefit.  
- The board of directors or the general manager performs any act that implies fraud, 




- If the entity suffers severe financial or administrative deficiencies, or if the company suffers 
massive losses that might impact shareholders’ and/or stakeholders rights. 
The JCGC (Chapter 2, Section 1, Items: 13, 14, 17) also stipulated the responsibility of the board 
of directors to oversee and evaluate the performance of company management, and to 
annually review their implementation of the codes of corporate governance. The board also has 
the responsibility to establish a mechanism to receive complaints and recommendations from 
the shareholders.   
In regard to the shareholders' rights, the JCGC has devoted a chapter to the discussion of their 
rights. In an effort to give shareholders the power to hold company management and the board 
of directors accountable for their actions and decisions, the JCGC (Chapter 4, Section 1, Items 8 
& 9) stated that the shareholders have the right to file a lawsuit against the company 
management and directors. The JCGC added that shareholders can further claim for 
compensation for damages or losses incurred as a result of revealing the company's secrets, 
confidentiality, and breaches of the legislation in force or of the company’s bylaw, or any fraud 
or negligence in managing the company. 
Interestingly, the JCGC has not identified the legal responsibilities of the external auditors, 
although they were stipulated in the Company's Law of 1997 (Articles 201, 202 and 203). The 
law stated that the auditors are legally accountable toward the company, the shareholders and 
the stakeholders for any violation of the legislation in force, the company bylaws and the 
internationally accepted (adopted) accounting and auditing standards. The auditors are also 
liable to compensate any realized loss incurred as a result of negligence and errors committed 
by the auditors, or as a result of their failure to fulfill their duties, or as a result of expressing 
opinions about the financial statements that significantly do not confirm with real facts, or for 
approving disordered financial statements. Furthermore, the law also stipulated penalties if the 
auditors disclose client company secrets or speculate in the company’s shares.  
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In summary, this section, reviewed the literature of corporate accountability and their impact 
on the reliability of the audit report and the level of the audit expectation gap as perceived by 
financial analysts. The section reviewed corporate failure and the need to adopt effective 
corporate governance systems in order to protect the capital market.  Corporate accountability 
was considered one of the major constituents of corporate governance, as can be seen in many 
cited definitions of corporate governance. This study discussed how and why the institutional 
investors consider, or might be affected by, the extent of corporate accountability and the 
responsibility of the board of directors, the company management, the external auditors, the 
internal auditors and the audit committees in formulating their judgment decisions.  
 
3.11 Chapter Summary 
Narrowing the audit expectations gap continues to be a key issue of interest to the accounting 
profession (Dewing & Russell, 2002). The expectation gap is considered one of the major issues 
confronting the accountancy profession. The expectation gap cannot be ignored as it is a key 
strategic risk for the audit firms, and claims that the expectations of the community are not 
objective, or that criticisms directed to the auditing profession are not fair, do not reduce the 
risk entailed (Jarbou, 2007). 
Based on reviewing and analyzing the literature, uncertainty about the external auditor's 
independence is considered the main reason for the expectations gap in Jordan. The literature 
showed that an independent and well-established audit committee enhances external auditor's 
independence and mitigates management pressure to issue a clean opinion, and shield the 
auditors from being dismissed after issuing a qualified or a going concern opinion. 
Insufficient internal control procedures, coupled with weak and unqualified internal auditors, 
compromise internal controls’ effectiveness in detecting fraud and errors and in preventing 
malpractice. The literature highlighted the importance of the audit committees in nominating 
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the internal auditors and reinforcing their effectiveness. The effectiveness of internal auditors 
could be enhanced by giving them direct access to the audit committees. The literature also 
showed that the audit committee should evaluate the work of auditors, the internal audit 
budget, and the observations of the internal auditors, and should work as a liaison between the 
external and internal auditors and between the auditors and the company management and 
board of directors.  
Adequate and timely disclosure of transparent information, in addition to sufficient corporate 
accountability systems, help direct the work of executive management, board of directors and 
company employees towards achieving the interests of the company's stakeholders, resulting in 
enhanced investor confidence in financial reports and, consequently, contributes to narrowing 
the audit expectation gap. 
The next chapter reviews the research methodology employed in the fieldwork for the thesis 
and outlined in the study model. The chapter also provides a justification for the chosen 
research strategy and provides a rationale for combining the qualitative and the quantitative 
methods. The chapter also identifies the population of the study and the utilized data collection 
techniques and justifies the chosen sample. The chapter also presents the limitations of the 











Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction and Chapter Overview 
This chapter discusses the study hypothesis and the research questions that are utilized to 
address the gap in knowledge regarding how the selected elements of the Jordanian corporate 
governance code affect the auditing profession in Jordan in terms of the reliability of the audit 
report and the level audit expectation gap as perceived by institutional investors. These 
elements of the JCGC selected for this study are external auditors’ independence, internal 
auditors’ effectiveness, disclosure & transparency, and corporate accountability.  
 The rationale for the adopted method (the mixed method approach) and the research design 
are addressed in this chapter. The research design includes a combination of two 
methodologies that integrate and complement each other to provide a thorough analysis of the 
research topic. In addition to the design of the methodology, this chapter also describes the 
unit of analysis, the data collection techniques and the research implementation.  
The postpositive approach is adopted in this study.  According to Creswell (2003, p. 7) 
“Postpositivism reflects a deterministic philosophy in which causes probably determine effects 
and outcomes. Thus, the problems studied by postpositivists reflect a need to examine causes 
that influence outcomes such as issues examined in experiments”.  
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 4.2 Research Method 
This section discusses the prevailing methods used in prior studies of corporate governance and 
the auditing profession in Jordan, in relation to the external auditor's report and the level of the 
audit expectation gap. This section also justifies the rationale for the mixed method approach 
and discusses the strengths of the combination of the experimental and interview methods.  
 
4.2.1 The Related Research Methods Previously Adopted 
Cooper & Schindler (2010) point out that good research should establish dependable data, 
based on professional and systematic processes, and provide reliable information for decision 
making. According to Veal (2005), there are many points to be taken into consideration while 
the researcher chooses an appropriate research methodology, such as the research questions 
or the study hypothesis, previous research and data availability. Veal (2005) point out that the 
research questions guide the researchers to the data sources, and previous research might 
provide the researcher with methods to be adopted, improved or replicated to achieve 
comparability between the new and prior research.  
This thesis adopted the mixed method approach to achieve the study objectives. This approach 
involves integration of qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis. The 
quantitative element was designed to investigate, through experiment, the relative and 
interactive weights of the influence of selected elements of the Jordanian corporate 
governance on (1) the perceived reliability of the audit report and (2) the level of the audit 
expectation gap as perceived by financial analysts. This thesis is the first study to adopt an 
experimental approach (i.e. the repeated measures design) in the field of corporate governance 
and auditing in Jordan. The design of the questionnaire for the factorial experiment of this 
thesis was prepared based on many previous research studies that adopted the same method 
(e.g. Hopkins, 2009; Wood & Ross, 2002).   
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Quantitative approaches, utilizing financial data or perceptual data, are in common use in 
Jordan, with quantitative research utilizing perceptual data being dominant, especially in 
studies related to corporate governance and the auditing profession. In fact, most non-
Jordanian studies that have investigated the audit expectation gap utilized questionnaires as an 
instrument for achieving their study objectives (McEnroe & Martens, 2001; Porter, 1993; García 
Benau, Humphrey Moizer, & Turley 1993; Gloeck & Jager, 1993; Humphrey et al, 1993; Al 
Husaini, 2000).      
The mixed method approach is rarely used in Jordan. This approach is more frequently adopted 
in academic PhD theses rather than other types of applied research34. The researcher noted 
that none of the previous Jordanian studies discussed earlier (in Chapter One and Three) 
adopted the experimental approach, although the use of experimental studies delivers great 
value by identifying causal correlations among the variables, according to Black (1986) who also 
added “experimental studies in economics and finance have value” (p. 537). Hence, the use of 
the experiment approach is common and is recommended for use in developed countries 
(Black, 1986; Baker & Nofsinger, 2002; Trotman, 1996).  Table 1 shows a list of some of the key 
related Jordanian studies in the fields of corporate governance and the auditing profession35, 
with a brief description of the methodology adopted in each case.   
Table 1: Jordanian Corporate Governance and Auditing Profession Studies, 
Highlighting the Methodology Adopted. 
 Research Title/ Author(s) & Year of Publication
36
 Brief description of the method 
1 Developing a System for Corporate Governance in 
Jordanian Stock Corporations to Reinforce the 
Independence of the Auditor/ Al-Hanini & 
Dahmash (2008) 
Mixed method: Questionnaires 
administered to external auditors, and 
interviews conducted with external auditors 
2 A Proposed Model for the Role of Audit 
Committees in the Jordanian Public Shareholding 
Companies, and their Influence on the 
Mixed method: Questionnaires and 
interviews conducted with Financial 
managers, external auditors, internal 
                                                          
34
 The first two studies in table 1 are Ph.D. theses. 
35
 All of these studies have been reviewed in chapters One and Three. 
36
 Full citation is presented in the References Section 
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Effectiveness and Independence of External Audit/ 
Swaiti (2006) 
auditors, chairpersons of the board of 
directors and audit committees.  
3 The Effect of ISA 700 (Revised) “The Independent 
Auditor’s Report on Narrowing the Audit 
Expectations Gap./ (Al-Khadash, et al, 2012). 
Quantitative: Questionnaires distributed to 
auditors, preparers of financial statements, 
investors and academicians.   
4 The Effectiveness of Audit Committees in 
Jordanian Public Shareholding Companies and 
Potential Characteristics Affecting It: Perceptions 
from Auditors in Jordan/ Abdullatif (2006) 
Quantitative: Questionnaires distributed to 
the external auditors 
5 Structure and Causes of the Audit Expectations 
Gap: Evidence From Jordan/ Al- Thuneibat (2003) 
Quantitative: Questionnaires distributed to 
external auditors and executive and 
financial managers of Jordanian listed 
companies 
6 Expectations gap and the responsibilities of 
auditors:  Jordanian Investors' perspective/ Hajir 
(2001) 
Quantitative: Questionnaires distributed to 
individual and institutional investors. 
7 The Effect of Modified Auditors Opinions on 
Shares Prices: Evidence from Amman Stock 
Exchange/ Zureigat (2010) 
Event Study: based on the data available 
for the Jordanian listed companies at ASE  
during the period from 2002 to 2007 
8 Accounting Information Qualitative Characteristics 
Gap: Evidence from Jordan/ Obaidat (2007) 
Quantitative: Questionnaires administered 
to a sample of external auditors and 
investors. 
9 Audit Committees' Responsibilities and Their 
Relevance to the Corporate Governance Process/ 
Abdullatif (2007) 
Quantitative: Questionnaires administered 
to a sample of external auditors 
10 Assessment of Corporate Governance in Jordan: 
An Empirical Study/ Shanikat & Abbadi (2011) 
Qualitative: 20 Interviews carried out with 
key employees of 10 listed companies 
11 The expectation gap between investors and 
auditors in Jordan/ Omari (2003) 
Quantitative: Questionnaires distributed to 
investors (individual investors, financial 
brokers, employees of banks' investment 
units) and external auditors 
12 The Capability of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
Enhancing the Independence of the Jordanian 
Certified Public Accountant and its Impact on 
Reducing the Audit Expectation Gap "An Empirical 
Investigation from the Perspectives of Auditors 
and Institutional Investors/ Al-Khadash & Al-
Sartawi (2010) 
Quantitative: Questionnaires were used to 
collect data from Jordanian Institutional 
Investors and external auditors 
13 Factors that Affect Decisions on Selecting and 
Changing Public Accountants in the Jordanian 
Public Companies from the Perspective of the 
Audit Committees/ Al-Saudi (2007) 
Quantitative : Questionnaires administered 
to chairpersons and members of audit 
committees in Jordan 
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14 External Auditors’ Assessment of the Internal 
Audit Function in the Light of Implementation of 
the International Standard on Auditing No. (610): 
Analytical Study from the Point of View of the 
External and Internal Auditors in Jordan/ Thnaibat 
& Shunnaq (2010) 
 
Quantitative: Questionnaires distributed to 
samples of external and internal auditors 
15 The Effect of Corporate Governance Guide Issued 
by the Central Bank of Jordan in Improving 
Internal Audit Quality in Jordanian Banks/ Zureigat 
(2011) 
Quantitative: Questionnaires distributed to 
internal audit staff in Jordanian banks. 
 
One of the major advantages of qualitative studies is that they provide a high level of 
understanding, but, at the same time, they lack empirical robustness, which consequently 
affects their generalizability and makes them questionable (Bryman, 1988). Quantitative 
methods offer stronger statistical evidence than qualitative methods do. However, quantitative 
studies that aim to capture attitudes (usually via survey instruments such as self-administered 
questionnaires) are subject to criticism regarding their objectivity, as they tend to be self-
completed, and usually suffer from low return rates (Buglear, 2012; Cohen & Manion, 2007; 
Mitchell & Jolley, 2012). On the other hand, quantitative research that depend on publicly 
available data (such as corporate annual reports and data available on stock exchange sites) 
enjoy an advantage in objectivity. 
The studies mentioned in Table 1 provided evidence about the existence and the nature of the 
audit expectation gap in Jordan, including suggestions on how to narrow the gap; they also 
explained the situation of corporate governance in the Jordanian environment. However, there 
are several points, inherent in their structure, that possibly limited their added value, such as 
they were mostly quantitative and questionnaire-driven studies with much focus on external 
auditors' independence and performance. This might lead researchers to miss or ignore some 
other factors given their focus on testing their study hypothesis rather than producing new 
theories (Johnson & Christensen, 2010). Whilst such studies can identify assumed relationships, 




As mentioned earlier, the JCGC has been implemented relatively recently in Jordan, becoming 
operational at the beginning of 2009. However, the Jordanian Securities Commission has 
mandated all listed companies to report, in a separate chapter of their 2010 Annual Reports, 
the extent of their compliance with the code37.  Due to the recentness of the implementation of 
the JCGC, publicly available data about the corporate governance of listed companies is still 
rare. Therefore, in order to answer the research questions of the study, which aimed to provide 
empirical evidence of the impact of the selected factors of JCGC and their potential interactive 
weights on both the perceived reliability of the audit report and the level of the audit 
expectation gap in Jordan, this thesis adopted the mixed method.  
 
4.2.2 The Rationale for the Mixed Methods Approach 
The research questions and objectives, set out in sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 respectively, are best 
addressed by adopting a mixed-method approach. This approach proffers a mix of contextual 
interpretive relevance and generalizability, in addition to providing deeper perceptions, closer 
insights and greater diversity of viewpoints than any single method alone (Borkan, 2004). 
Johnson & Onwuegbuzie (2004) defined mixed methods research as "the class of research 
where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, 
methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study" (p. 17). The Authors also added 
"A key feature of mixed methods research is its methodological pluralism or eclecticism, which 
frequently results in superior research" (p. 14). Therefore, the adoption of the mixed method 
has become common in business research (Collis & Hussey, 2003).  
                                                          
37
 See Circular Number: 12/1/4659. Dated  December 15, 2010. Issued by Jordanian Securities Commission.  





To conduct a mixed method study, several combinations of quantitative and qualitative 
techniques might be used. Smith (2003) suggested four general types of quantitative 
approaches for use in mixed methods: Experimental Method, Quasi-Experimental Method, 
Survey Method and Archival Method. Mason (1996) pointed out that qualitative studies are of 
three main types: Case Studies, Ethnographic Studies and Phenomenological Studies. The mixed 
method produces better, higher quality findings if it is conducted appropriately; this means 
selecting the best combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques and choosing the 
appropriate sequence that best achieves study objectives (Hurmerinta-Peltomäki & Nummela, 
2006; Bryman, 1992; Bryman, 2006; Bryman & Bell, 2007; Creswell, 2009; Onwuegbuzie & 
Leech, 2005; Collins, Onwuegbuzie, & Sutton 2006). Combining experimental research design 
with a qualitative method delivers better understanding of the research problem (Burns, 2000). 
There have been, during the 1970s and 1980s, arguments about the usefulness of using a mix of 
quantitative and qualitative techniques in a single study. However, the adoption of mixed 
methods is now commonplace and widely accepted by academicians and professionals alike 
(Torrance, 2012; Creswell, 2010; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003; Johnson et al, 2007; Clark & 
Creswell, 2007; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009; Bryman, 2006; Sale, Lohfeld, & Brazil 2002; Johnson 
& Onwuegbuzie, 2004). In the health care and clinical fields, it is common to conduct research 
that combines both qualitative and quantitative approaches to improve generalizability, 
reliability, validity and accuracy (Morgan, 2007; Borkan, 2004; Johnstone, 2004; Andrew & 
Halcomb, 2009). It is noteworthy to mention that some scholars classified the mixed method as 
a third paradigm in research (Cameron, 2011; Creswell, 2009; Howe, 1988; Datta, 1994; 
Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Scholars also pointed out that the adoption of the mixed 
method approach delivers potential complementarities for qualitative and quantitative 
research (Luyt, 2012; Yauch & Steudel, 2003; Bryman, 2006; Bryman, 2008; Sale et al, 2002). 
Reichardt & Cook (1979, p. 225) remarked that there existed no convincing reasons not to use 
the mixed method, after appropriately considering how to best use it to achieve the research 
objectives. Moreover, they suggested that there was no essential conflict in world view or 
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outcomes generated from the various components of the mixed method (Datta, 1994; Johnson 
& Onwuegbuzie, 2004).    
The quantitative part of this thesis delivers objective evidence and verification of the magnitude 
of influences and the relative weights of selected JCGC variables on the perceived reliability of 
the audit report and the level of the audit expectation gap. The qualitative part of this study 
lends additional depth of understanding of the judgment process. In this regard, this thesis 
adopts the recommendations of Reichardt & Cook (1979): “comprehensive evaluations should 
be process-oriented as well as outcome oriented, exploratory as well as confirmatory and valid 
as well as reliable” (p. 225). The use of the mixed method enhances the construct validity of the 
study findings since it enables discovery of (1) the level of confidence in the operational 
definitions of variables, (2) whether the relationships between the study variables logically 
reflect the true theoretical meaning of a phenomenon under investigation and (3) the extent to 
which the variables were actually measured (Zachary, McKenny, Short, & Payne 2011; Shadish et 
al, 2002; Keats, 1988; Wenger, 1999; Ariño, 2002).  
The adoption of the mixed method delivers many advantages, such as triangulation, 
complementarity, and expansion, as outlined by Greene, Caracelli, & Graham (1989). 
Triangulation refers to combining qualitative and quantitative research to get mutually 
corroborated conclusions and to demonstrate convergence (Bryman, 2006; Bryman, 2008; 
Greene et al, 1989; Yin, 2009). Complementarity research utilizes quantitative and qualitative 
methods to deliver, and support, robustness, clarification, enhancement, and interpretation of 
the findings of the adopted methods (DeCuir–Gunby, 2008; Brannen, 1992; Wenger, 1999; Yin, 
2009). Expansion is to use various approaches in order to “extend the breadth and range of the 




4.2.3 Judgment and Decision Making 
External auditors play a significant role, via their audit reports, in lending independent integrity 
to published financial statements, which are essential inputs in investment decisions made by 
financial analysts, shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders. However, investment 
decision-making is in the hands of individual human beings, which make them subject to their 
biases, partiality and prejudices (Statman, 2005). This thesis investigates the perceptions of 
financial analysts regarding the impact of the JCGC on the value of audit opinion, as measured 
by the reliability of the audit report and the size of the audit expectation gap; those financial 
analysts are also subject to normal biases and idiosyncratic errors in their judgments (Hunter & 
Coggin, 1988). 
Several authors have studied the importance of human information processing research in 
relation to the field of accounting and auditing (Libby & Lewis, 1982; Trotman, 1996; Maletta & 
Kida, Cohen & Paquette 1990; Hooper & Trotman, 1996; Solomon & Trotman, 2003) and the 
field of behavioral finance, which adopted techniques from the psychology literature (Snowball, 
1986; Kahneman, 2011; Andersen, 2008; Fama, 1998). In the context of financial decisions, 
human information processing and judgments are categorized as a field of study under 
behavioral finance as described by Pike & Neale (2006): "the study of how psychological and 
sociological factors influence financial decision making and financial markets” (p. 665). Al-
Khafaji, Aly, Gheyara, & Metawae (1993) provided a broader definition, arguing that, under 
conditions of uncertainty, decision makers need to use the ability to interpret information to 
reveal more information. When decision makers do not have direct access to information about 
a given event, they may need to interpret indirect signals or cues. These information cues could 
arrive simultaneously or over time and may, therefore, be missed since the decision maker may 
not be expecting them or may be unable to separate them from other cues.   
Payne (1982) argued that decision making is connected to information processing. He also 
pointed that individuals consider common characteristics when considering similarities, and 
distinguishing characteristics when considering different options of choices (See also Slovic & 
039 
 
MacPhillamy, 1974; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). Libby (1981) stated that causal data is thought 
to be more sufficient and has more influence on decision makers than diagnostic data does. 
Financial analysts appreciate the added value that external auditors integrate into financial 
statements; that added value depends on the corporate governance system and is believed to 
be influenced by many factors, such as external auditors’ independence, internal auditors’ 
effectiveness, disclosure & transparency, and corporate accountability, as outlined in the 
previous chapter. Financial analysts consider these factors in formulating their judgments, 
based upon multiple cues. They might assess that these cues interact in their influence 
(configurally) or impact independently (main effects). Information Processing & Judgment 
Decisions are discussed in the following section, followed by a review of the literature relevant 
to main effects and configurality, self-insight and decision confidence.  
 
4.2.3.1 Information Processing & Judgment Decisions  
When Individuals consider their judgment decisions, as human beings, they are subject to 
several factors that may lend potential bias into their decisions (For examples of potential 
influential factors see Hilbert, 2012; Merkle, 2009; Pronin, 2007; Tversky & Koehler, 1994; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). During the 1970s, Kahneman & Tversky affirmed the importance 
of the following influential factors: the representativeness heuristic, the availability heuristic, 
and the anchoring and adjustment heuristic.  
Kahneman & Tversky (1972) pointed out that the representativeness heuristic emerges when 
factor (A), for example, resembles another factor, (B), and so may lead to systematic biases. 
Kahneman (2011) added “when ‘A’ is highly representative of ‘B’, the probability that ‘A’ 
originates from ‘B’ is judged to be high. On the other hand, if ‘A’ is not similar to ‘B’, the 
probability that ‘A’ originates from ‘B’ is judged to be low” (p. 420). In other words, the 
041 
 
representativeness heuristic is likely to occur when incidents are described by their general 
characteristics. 
The availability heuristic refers to the assessment, by individuals, of the probability of an event 
by the ease with which relevant, frequent or recent events come to their mind. Steginga, 
Occhipinti, Gardiner, Yaxley, & Heathcote (2002) added "when a judgment or a decision is 
mediated through an instance that comes easily to mind, [it] may refer to an event with a 
positive or a negative outcome" (p. 6). According to Kahneman (2011), “availability is affected 
by factors other than frequency and probability. Consequently, the reliance on availability leads 
to predictable biases” (p. 425).  
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic emerges, for instance, when individuals underweight 
new information when adjusting past overweighting of another event or initial value (Libby, 
1981). According to Kahneman (2011), “the initial value, or starting point may, be suggested by 
the formulation of the problem, or it may be the result of a partial computation . . . . different 
starting points yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial values” (p. 427). 
In the accounting and auditing arena, judgment decision making has been employed in 
experiments (Solomon & Trotman, 2003; Schultz, Bierstaker, & O’Donnell 2010; Martinov-
Bennie, Cohen & Simnett 2011; Ng & Tan, 2003; Trotman, 1996), and it has been influenced by 
psychological research as noted by Gibbins & Swieringa (1995).  The experimental design is 
primarily based on statistical methods to measure treatment usage, and the ANOVA technique 
is the most widely used statistical analysis employed in judgment decision making (Solomon & 
Shields, 1995).  
The experimental research undertaken in this thesis involved presenting participants with a 
series of different treatments of independent variables (the four selected elements of the 
JCGC). In each treatment, participants’ judgment decisions regarding the value of the 
dependent variables (the perceived reliability of the audit report and the level of the audit 
expectation gap) are analyzed in order to establish relationships with combinations of cues or 
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even with a particular cue. Cues must be balanced in their quality and quantity; because a mix 
of less and more functional cues limits their performance (Libby, 1981).  
Human information processing is influenced by individual experience, age and time pressure. 
Individuals with less experience usually evaluate information based on how they were 
presented to them (the organization of the information), whereas more experienced people 
usually look for additional, and specific details within the, information (Bouwman et al, 1987). 
Taylor (1975) related age with longer decision making processes, seeking more information 
combined with an ability to evaluate this information. Time pressures mitigates efficiency in 
human information processing as individuals are more risk averse when they feel that they are 
under time pressure (Wright, 1974; Ben Zur & Breznitz, 1981). Finally, personality 
characteristics have not been seen to have a significant impact on human information 
processing (McGhee, Shields, & Birnberg 1978). 
 
4.2.3.2 Main Effects, Linearity and Configurality 
Brown & Solomon (1989) defined configural information processing as "cognition in which the 
pattern of stimuli is important to the subsequent judgment/decision” (p. 2). Judgment decision 
studies aim to investigate the impact of key cues and treatments on judgment decision making 
and whether they contribute to the findings of the study independently (main effects) or in 
combination with other effects (configuraly). Ganzach (1997) pointed out that in configural 
relationships, “the impact (weight) of a given attribute depends on the level of other attributes” 
(p. 954). 
In a linear model of judgment decision making, the relationship between cues and the 
dependent variables is consistent (monotonic relationship) regardless of the level of other cues; 
hence, the linear model delivers a good fit for some purposes of decision making (Einhorn, 
1970; Libby, 1981). Libby (1981) has also pointed out that a positive relationship occurs when 
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the increase in one variable leads to an increase in the size effect of another variable and vice 
versa.  
Configural cue processing is influenced by a number of factors, as evidenced by Ganzach (1997), 
Libby, Artman, & Willingham (1985), Payne (1982), Maletta & Kida (1993) and McGhee et al 
(1978). Firstly, experienced individuals are more configural in their judgments than less 
experienced individuals are. Secondly, judgment tasks are associated with less dimensional 
processing than choice tasks. Thirdly, individuals tend to shift from sophisticated tasks to 
simplified heuristic methods. Fourthly, environmental risk leads to the use of systematic and 
sophisticated configural decision processing.  
 
4.2.3.3 Self-Insight & Decision Confidence 
Self-insight refers to “an individual’s ability to express the relative emphasis he or she places on 
information cues when generating judgments” (Mear & Firth, 1987, p. 176). Self-insight is also 
defined as the extent of insight that individuals have in their judgment process (Trotman, 1996). 
Typically, the degree of self-insight has “been assessed as the correlation, over all cues, 
between a subject's cue usage and the importance rating subjectively attached to each cue (e.g. 
by allocating 100 points among the cues)" (Solomon & Shields, 1995, p. 151). In this study, self-
insight is investigated by correlating and matching the objective outcomes obtained from cue 
usage (the 16 scenarios of the factorial experimental questionnaire) against the subjective 
weightings which have also been gathered from the participants via the same instrument. It is 
important to perceive the level of self-insight because that helps improve understanding of the 
learning process (Libby, 1981) and improve the accuracy of judgment as noted by Hooper & 
Trotman (1996).  
Ganzach (1997) pointed out that experienced individuals do not, necessarily, demonstrate more 
accurate decisions than inexperienced individuals, although they are expected to demonstrate 
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a higher degree of self-insight (Feldman & Arnold, 1978). Large amounts of information do not 
guarantee greater accuracy (Slovic, 1972; Goldberg, 1968). The greatest increase in accuracy 
comes from obtaining data from two additional judges; any further increases in the number of 
judges contribute relatively little to accuracy (Libby & Blashfield, 1978). Hooper & Trotman 
(1996) showed that consensus between auditors who processed information configurally was 
higher than among auditors who did not process configurally. Consensus is often accepted as a 
reasonable and equitable replacement for accuracy (Libby, 1981; Ashton, 1985) which leads to 
establish an association between configural processing and improved performance since 
configural processing of cues decreases inconsistencies in decision making (Hooper & Trotman, 
1996).  
 
4.2.4 Experimental Method and Analysis 
This study adopted the mixed method approach whereby an experimental design was 
employed in the quantitative part of this research. Kerlinger (1986) defined the experiment in 
research as: “a scientific investigation in which an investigator manipulates and controls one or 
more independent variables and observes the dependent variable or variables for variation 
concomitant to the manipulation of the independent variables” (p. 293). Systematic 
experimental design was employed in this thesis In order to present judgment tasks and to infer 
cause-effect relationships (Libby, 1981; Keppel & Wickens, 2004). “Experimental studies allow 
causal relationships to be identified. The aim is to manipulate the independent variable (e.g. a 
reduction in price) in order to observe the effect on the dependent variable (e.g. sales levels of 
Sunday newspaper)” (Wilson, 2010, p. 110).  Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is utilized in the 
current study. Slovic (1969) pointed out that ANOVA delivers improved quantitative 
understanding of configural effects (of interactively combined factors) and non-configural 
effects (independent main effects of the factors) in the use of information in judgments.  
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A brief historical review of the use of ANOVA techniques shows that it has been applied since 
the 1960s, initially in the medical arena (Hoffman, Slovic, & Rorer 1968). Its application in 
finance was introduced by Slovic (1969) who pointed out “The ANOVA technique has 
considerable promise as a device for describing and furthering the understanding of complex 
judgment processes. It is likely that this technique can provide even the expert with new insight 
into his inferential processes” (p. 262). Slovic (1969) concluded his study saying “It is now clear 
that substantial configural processing of information does occur and can readily be detected by 
the ANOVA technique” (p. 263). Since then, ANOVA became common in the field of 
investigating auditors’ judgment decisions (e.g. Schneider, 2011; Teoh & Lim, 1996; Hooper & 
Trotman, 1996; Daniels & Booker, 2011; Trotman, 2005). Trotman (2005) argued that ANOVA 
has become the most commonly adopted technique in most prestigious research journals.  
In this thesis, analysis of variance was used to measure the impact of the selected JCGC factors 
on the reliability of the audit report and the level of the audit expectation gap. ANOVA is an 
appropriate statistical technique for experimental studies that aim to investigate both main 
effects and interactions between the study factors. "ANOVA tests are based on the partitioning 
of the variability in the dependent variable. Components of variability associated with the main 
effects of the factors and the joint effects of combinations of factors are obtained and 
compared with the component that reflects error variability" (Myers & Well, 1995, p. 6). The 
use of ANOVA has some advantages such as the elimination of multicollinearity which makes 
the interpretation of the main and interactive effect clear without ambiguity, furthermore, the 
demonstration of the relative weights of the significance of the cues is also considered one of 
the important advantages of ANOVA (Libby, 1981; Trotman, 1996).  
Slovic et al (1972) stated "the ANOVA technique is important because, by isolating the effects of 
interactions from those of main effects, it makes the empirical description of configural 
judgments feasible” (p. 290). They also added that two conditions have to be satisfied to 
conduct ANOVA analysis: (1) The levels of the variables should be categorical, i.e. not 
continuous; this condition can be met by designing a suitable survey instrument; (2) The 
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variables must be orthogonal; this can be satisfied by using a complete factorial design in which 
all possible combinations of the cues and variable levels are presented (Trotman, 1996).  
In this study, the reliability of the audit report and the level of the audit expectation gap were 
investigated as dependent variables, and an initial Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) 
test was used to test the significance of the study independent variables as a set. Using 
MANOVA helps reduce type one statistical errors when individual tests of ANOVA are measured 
with the same significance level (Coolican, 2009). Coolican (2009) also added "If MANOVA is 
significant it is legitimate to investigate further and take as significant any of the individual 
(univariate) ANOVA results which the MANOVA procedure has shown to be significant" (p. 494). 
Within-subject design, also called “repeated measures design" (Myers & Well, 2002, p. 210; 
Mitchell & Jolley, 2012, p. 560; Coolican, 2009, p. 69) is the technique employed for the 
experiment of this study. Coolican (2009) also pointed out that the technique investigates the 
differences within each subject or participant. Within-subject designs have been described as a 
“true experiment” (Heppner, Wampold, & Kivlighan 2008, p. 172). “The true experiment is the 
only research method that allows the researcher to confidently conclude that A caused B” 
(Trotman, 1996, p. 7) due to the random allocation of treatments combined with the 
manipulation of the study independent variables. This technique is widely employed for 
judgment decision-making studies and in analyzing problems associated with the use of cues 
(Libby et al, 1985; Trotman, 1996).  
Repeated measures design does not just make comparisons between the subjects; it compares 
each subject's score and assessment using a specific condition with the same subject's 
assessment using another (different) condition. The advantage of the repeated measures 
design is that the subjects involved in the study are used as their own controls (Gay & Diehl, 
1992; Cox & Reid, 2000; Ryan, 2011; Weathington et al, 2010) which helps in controlling 
confounding factors (Coolican, 2009; Trotman, 1996) and, consequently, detecting any 
systematic differences between the treatment conditions, if they appear, therefore increasing 
the power of the design (Keppel & Wickens, 2004; Heppner et al, 2008). However, allocating 
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the treatments randomly also allows for the control of systematic differences between 
subjects. 
Like all research designs, the within-subject design has some disadvantages to go with its 
advantages. The major drawbacks related to the application of repeated measures design are 
the treatment carryover effects and practice effects (Keppel & Wickens, 2004; Mitchell & Jolly, 
1992; Trotman, 1996). Treatment carryover effects have been described as "the effects or side 
effects of an earlier treatment on responses in later trials" (Mitchell & Jolly, 1992, p. 301). The 
practice effects refer to the subjects' capability to adjust their perceptions of specific scenarios 
when they feel that they are being presented, and restricted to, a series of similar scenarios. 
However, both of these disadvantages are addressed in this study by utilizing a fully crossed, 2 
level, factorial experimental design, based on the repeated measures technique, to test the 
impact of the selected four factors of the JCGC. One of four different patterns of the factorial 
questionnaire was presented to each subject, these patterns differing only in the order of cases, 
the order being selected randomly.     
“Experimental design is an area of enquiry wholly devoted to the removal of the irrelevant 
sources of variability for the increase of precision and, therefore, for the increase of the 
statistical power of tests of null hypotheses” (Cohen, 1988, p. 8). In repeated measures design, 
all possible levels of treatments are presented to each participant, thus leading Boniface (1995) 
to  say it was "in general a more powerful design than the independent group design" (P. 9). 
Keppel (1982, p. 58) stated “A quantitative index of the sensitivity of an experiment is its 
power”. Coolican (2009, p. 342) said “The power of any particular statistical test is the 
probability of detecting the effect, if it is there, and of not making type II error. It is, therefore, 
the value 1 – β”. Coolican (2009, p. 340) explained “Type II error occurs when the alternative 




Levels of power are acceptable if they are higher than 0.8, according to Cohen (1988) and 
Coolican (2009). They have also classified a level of power higher than 0.8 as a gold standard for 
power. 
"Sample size is indeed important-virtually any desired level of power can be attained in any 
design simply by making the samples large enough. . . For the range in which most treatment 
effect sizes fall, the sample size needed to attain high power of level is often much larger than 
what is customary, or perhaps even possible, under most circumstances of research" (Lipsey, 
1989, p. 137). Sample size might be increased to reach a desired high level of power, but doing 
so is "generally costly and time-consuming to the researcher" (Leong & Austin, 2005, p. 307). 
Coolican (2009) pointed out that in experimental studies, a sample size of 25 - 30 participants is 
a “good idea” (p. 393). Burns (2000), Weathington et al (2010) and Trotman (1996) considered 
the requirement of fewer subjects in within-subjects experimental studies as one of its practical 
advantages38.  
Within subject designs rely on the assumption of sphericity. Sphericity refers to the “condition 
where there is homogeneity of variance among treatment variables and the variances of their 
differences are also similar” (Coolican, 2009, p. 539). Violating the sphericity assumption raises 
the likelihood of making type II error and “missing real effects” (Coolican, 2009, p. 523). 
Statistically, power is measured by the effect of size. Leong & Austin (2005) described the effect 
of size as "a standardized indication of the impact of the treatment effects" (p. 307). Size effects 
could be estimated by the use of partial eta squared (η²) as suggested by Coolican (2009, p. 
530) and one of the most common method for estimating effect size, where:  
 
 
                                                          
38 Referring to 2 experimental studies that have utilized the repeated measures techniques revealed that: out of 72 
mailed questionnaires, 42 were returned and analysed (Wood, 2006), and out of 54 mailed questionnaires, 25 








Coolican (2009) categorized size effects with values between 0.01 and less than 0.06 as “small”, 
size effects between 0.06 and less than 0.14 as “medium”, and size effects of 0.14 or higher as 
“large”; this study uses these category definitions to categorize  effect sizes.  
This thesis also investigated the degree of self-insight among the subjects by "allocating 100 
points among the cues" (Solomon & Shields, 1995, p. 151). The scale of 100 points is considered 
the most common technique to gather subjective data (Cook & Stewart, 1975) due to its 
simplicity and understandability by the subjects (Wright, 1977), and it has been employed in 
studies about judgment decision making in finance (Hopkins, 2009; Wood & Ross, 2006; Mear & 
Firth, 1987). This method generates subjective measures by requesting the participants to 
allocate 100 points onto the four variables based on their relative importance on their decision-
making process. These subjective judgments are matched with the objective judgments 
obtained from the factorial experimental analysis in order to assess the level of self-insight 
among the subjects.  
In conclusion, the use of experimental design delivered evidence for the study hypothesis H1, 
and evidence on the impact of relative weights of the selected variables of the JCGC (external 
auditors' independence, internal auditors’ effectiveness, disclosure & transparency, and 
corporate accountability), as well as the variables' interactions, on the auditing profession in 
Jordan in respect to the reliability of the audit report and the level of the audit expectation gap 
 
                                  Sum of Squares 
                                                  effect 
          η² =   ----------------------------------------------------------- 
                         Sum of Squares + Sum of Squares  




(which addresses research questions 1  & 2) and on the financial analysts' self-insight 
(addresses research questions 3 & 4).  
 
4.2.5 Use of the Factorial Experiment  
“A factorial design is a strong experimental design in which two or more independent variables, 
at least one of which is manipulated, are simultaneously studied to determine their 
independent and interactive effects on the dependent variable” (Johnson & Christensen, 2010, 
p. 306). As stated in Chapter One, the factorial experimentation technique was utilized as the 
most appropriate approach to answer research questions 1 & 2; these research questions 
aimed to test the relative importance of the study’s independent variables on both the 
perceived reliability of the audit report and the level of the audit expectation gap in Jordan. This 
technique also allows the researcher to determine both the interactive and independent effects 
of the study variables. In the fully-crossed factorial experiment, where the researcher 
manipulates the factors, all possible combinations of the study variables are tested. 
  
Potential interactive effects are considered significant in this thesis. Interactive effects may 
suggest that the selected factors of the JCGC may work more effectively and appropriately in 
certain combination rather than independently.  
 
4.2.6 Interview Method and Analysis 
Qualitative methods can generate a great depth of knowledge and cover a wide range of 
perspectives in judgment decision making (Creswell, 2009; Nykiel, 2007). The qualitative 
method was described by Bryman (1988) as “an approach to the study of the social world which 
seeks to describe and analyze the culture and behavior of humans and their groups from the 
point of view of those being studied” (p. 46). One of the main methods of getting qualitative 
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data is qualitative interviews, also called in-depth interviews (Johnson & Christensen, 2010). 
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, Jackson, & Lowe (2008) pointed out that valuable information could be 
achieved by conducting in-depth interviews since "this approach aims to discover the views, 
perceptions and opinions" (p. 142) of participants. Johnson & Christensen (2010) also added 
that this approach aims to "obtain in-depth information about participants' thoughts, belief, 
knowledge, reasoning, motivations, and feelings about a topic” (p. 202). 
In this study, semi-structured interviews have been conducted to gain a depth of understanding 
of motives and reasoning from the financial analysts’ own perspective, and to help disclose 
potential data that might not be gained by structured interviews. This approach also allows the 
participants to elaborate and emphasize specific issues and raise particular themes, and gives 
the researcher greater flexibility to ask follow-up questions if any interesting points arose from 
participants’ answers (Johnson & Christensen, 2010; Bryman, 1988 & 2006; Fontana & Frey, 
2003; Wilson, 2010; Collis & Hussey, 2003 & 2009; Burns, 2000).  
The qualitative interviews of this thesis were conducted to obtain a depth of understanding of 
how financial analysts perceive and assess the influence of elements of the JCGC on the 
reliability of the audit report and the level of the audit expectation gap. Furthermore, 
interviewees were requested to provide justification and reasons for their conclusions39.  
Typical interviews "last anywhere from 30 minutes to more than one hour" (Johnson & 
Christensen, 2010, p. 202). Effective in-depth interviews require up to ten participants (Creswel, 
1998). In this study, 10 interviews were conducted, their durations ranging from 45 minutes to 
67 minutes.    
Creswell (1998) pointed out “Undoubtedly, no consensus exists for the analysis of the forms of 
qualitative data” (p. 140) while Wilson (2010) argued “there is no definitive series of steps 
applicable to qualitative data analysis” (p. 254). However, Wilson (2010) suggested four steps to 
overcome any confusion that may arise when dealing with qualitative data analysis; these steps 
                                                          
39
 See Appendix 3: The Interview Protocol 
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start by transcribing the data, followed by a comprehensive reading to code the data and 
generate themes, followed by interpretation of the outcomes and, finally, writing the report.  
This study’s interviews were conducted in Jordan. They were audio recorded and transcribed in 
Arabic. However, key terms were described in both languages (Arabic and its corresponding 
English term). Prior to carrying out the qualitative analysis, these transcripts were fully read to 
get a general view of the respondents’ opinions and perspectives (Warren & Karner, 2009), 
then the transcripts were carefully studied, focusing on themes derived from the respondents’ 
views and feedback. These themes were categorized in order to facilitate associating them with 
the main variables of the study. Additionally, cross-case synthesis was employed, developing 
“word tables” to display the data gathered from the participants, with focus on each study 
variable (Yin, 2009, p. 156). Finally, the tables were analyzed to draw conclusions on the 
differences and similarities in the cross-case patterns in order to probe the extent of variables’ 
effects on the financial analysts’ decision making (Yin, 2009 & 2011).   
 
4.2.7 Integrating Experimental and Qualitative Interview Methods 
The rationale for the mixed method has been discussed in section 4.2.2. The current section 
extends this discussion by presenting the benefits of integrating the experimental results with 
qualitative interviews.   
“Experimental studies allow causal relationship to be identified” (Wilson, 2010, p. 303). 
However, Shadish, Cook & Campbell (2002) go a step further by stating that “Causal inference, 
even in experiments, is fundamentally qualitative” (p. 6). Hence, integrating experimental 
technique with qualitative approach enhances the validity of the study.  
This thesis investigates a contemporary phenomenon that has financial and economic 
dimensions. This thesis analyzed the institutional investors’ perceptions of the JCGC’s impact on 
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the perceived reliability of the audit report and the level of the audit expectation gap. The JCGC 
became operational at the beginning of 2009 and, therefore, is still a relatively new factor in 
the Jordanian environment. The qualitative interview approach adopted in this study focuses 
on ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions to deliver rich insights into the dimensions of this phenomenon 
and to obtain richer conclusions and enhance the understanding of the experimental study (Yin, 
2009). Yin (2009) explained why ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions added value, saying “This is because 
such questions deal with operational links needing to be traced over time rather than mere 
frequencies or incidence” (p. 9). Furthermore, combining the experiment with the qualitative 
interview in a single study facilitates the analysis and the interpretation process of the 
experimental findings since the results of each component complements the other, and the 
qualitative interview results suggest potential explanations and reasons behind financial 
analysts’ objective judgments (Yin, 2009).    
Integrating experimental and qualitative studies increases both internal and external validity. 
Internal validity concerns satisfying the question: “Do the experimental treatments, in fact, 
make a difference in the specific experiments under scrutiny or can the differences be ascribed 
to other factors?” (Burns, 2000, p. 357). In other words, it refers to the validity of whether the 
influence observed on the study dependent variable(s) was the result of the manipulation and 
the variation of the study independent variable(s) rather than being caused by other factors 
(Shadish et al, 2002; Trotman, 1996). Repeated measure designs are associated with strong 
internal validity (Mitchell & Jolley, 2012; Collis & Hussey, 2003 & 2009; Coolican, 2009).  
External validity, generally referred to as generalizability, is concerned with satisfying the 
question “Given these demonstrable effects, to what populations or settings can they be 
generalized?” (Burns, 2000, p. 357). Although within-subject designs are described as the most 
powerful experimental design (Mitchell & Jolley, 2012), experimental studies usually suffer 
from poor external validity due to the restrictive conditions and controls placed to confirm 
causal relationships (Shadish et al, 2002). However, integrating the qualitative approach with 
the experiment approach contributes to enhancing external validity by delivering 
comprehensive interpretation of the identified relationships (Yin, 2009). Consequently, this 
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combination improves external validity by lending statistical generalizability, through the 
experiment, and analytical generalizability, through the qualitative interview (Yin, 2009; Shadish 
et al, 2002). Moreover, Yin (2009) pointed out that triangulation improves the construct validity 
of the study. He defined it as “establishing correct operational measures for the concept being 
studied” (p. 34). 
Finally, conducting an interview alone might open a door for criticisms of possible bias given 
that there are sometimes discrepancies between what people do and what they say, whether 
the differences are deliberate or unintentional. (Milne & Chan, 1999; Bouwman et al, 1987). 
That potential criticism could be addressed by reinforcing the qualitative findings with the 
objective and subjective findings of a well-designed factorial experiment. The experimental 
survey of this thesis consists of three main parts: Part (A) provides the objective analysis of 
weightings from the factorial experiment, Part (B) provides a subjective self-insight analysis40, 
and Part (C) is designed to gain some demographic information.  
 
4.3 The Unit of Analysis – Institutional Investors 
Investors are one of the main annual report user groups. Investors are considered one of the 
main parties involved in the audit expectation gap. Most studies conducted regarding the 
‘messages’ carried in audit reports and the audit expectation gap have taken into consideration 
investors’ perceptions and opinions. The in-depth understandings generated by these studies 
help address the question of how to enhance the message conveyed by the audit report and 
how to bridge the audit expectation gap (Porter, 1993; Kelly & Mohrweis, 1989; O'Reilly, 2009; 
Humphrey et al, 1992; Citron et al, 2008;; Al-Khadash & Al-Sartawi, 2010; Zureigat, 2010; Hajir, 
2001; Al-Khadash et al, 2012; Omari, 2003)41 
                                                          
40
 See Appendix 4: The Factorial Experiment Questionnaire 
41 The latter five studies have been conducted in Jordan 
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The unit of analysis of this study is the financial analysts whose main job involves reviewing 
financial statements and accounting reports as part of making investment decisions and 
recommendations. The study sample was derived from financial analysts who work in 
investment companies in Jordan. This study surveyed financial analysts from the following types 
of institutional investors: banks (the investment portfolio department), insurance companies, 
brokerage houses, investment companies and funds.  
 
4.4 Institutional and individual investors in the context of Jordan.  
Two main reasons are behind the choice to use institutional investors, rather than individual 
investors, as the unit of analysis for this study. The first reason is based on the review of related 
literature on Jordan, and the second reason is to satisfy the experimental method adopted in 
this study. 
The Jordanian literature reveals the necessity of surveying institutional investors rather than 
individual investors. Furthermore, Al-Khadash & Al-Sartawi (2010) surveyed institutional 
investors because of the difficulties of accessing individual investors in Jordan and because 
institutional investors are qualified, sophisticated and knowledgeable in comparison to 
individual investors. They argued, furthermore, that institutional investors are highly 
dependent on financial reports in making investment decisions. Their study revealed that the 
managers of investing and portfolio departments perceive the important role of the external 
auditors and rely on auditors’ independent opinions. Consistent with that opinion, Abu-Nassar 
& Al-Thnaibat (2005) surveyed institutional investors because they were seen to be more 
dependent than the individual investors on the audited financial statements and, due to their 
financial knowledge and experience, more capable of answering the survey questions. These 




Another reason for choosing institutional investors, rather than individual investors or any 
other group, is that not only can they be considered expert judges, but they also influence or 
control a substantial share of investment decisions and are, therefore, highly influential in 
Jordanian financial markets (Al-Khadash & Al-Sartawi, 2010). Institutional investors have, for 
several decades, been playing a significant role in fostering corporate governance best practices 
as a means of enhancing management performance, long-term value for stakeholders and 
better return on their investments (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2006). In studying the relationship between 
ownership structure and audit quality in Jordan, Zureigat (2011b) found that institutional 
investors in Jordan tend to nominate “high quality auditors” (p. 38). However, the study 
identified high quality auditors on the basis of the size of the audit firm. That study explained 
the tendency of institutional investors to hire high quality auditors, typically one of the ‘Big 4’ 
audit firms, saying that it was in order to increase the credibility of the audited financial 
statements for the purpose of decision making.  
Regarding the second reason for utilizing institutional investors in this study, respondents who 
understand what is being asked of them in the experiment can give informed responses. 
Professional groups and practitioners, such as professional accountants, auditors and financial 
analysts, have been recommended for the conduct of experimental studies (see, for instance, 
Teoh & Lim, 1996; O'Reilly, 2009). Teoh & Lim (1996) chose professional accountants in their 
study because they “represent a group of professionally qualified and trained individuals, 
capable of making informed judgments” about the effect of the independent variables on the 
external  auditors’ independence (p. 239). O'Reilly (2009) argued that expert subjects 
demonstrate a better understanding of experimental surveys. Financial analysts who work in 
institutional investment companies were chosen for that study’s experiment due to the 
sophisticated knowledge and experience they demonstrate as prudent investors, which allows 
them to answer and analyze the treatments and the different scenarios provided in the factorial 
experimentation questionnaire quickly and more accurately (O'Reilly, 2009). Therefore, 
surveying institutional investors obtains informed judgment decisions regarding the impact of 
the adoption of the Jordanian corporate governance code on their perceptions of the reliability 
of the audit report and size of the expectations gap. 
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4.5 Research Implementation Strategy 
The decision of adopting a relevant methodology for any study depends on the study objective 
and the research questions (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Miller & Crabtree, 1999). The mixed 
method approach is employed in this study to achieve the study goals. Creswell (2008) pointed 
out that the researchers “could collect quantitative and qualitative data separately in two 
phases so that data from one source could enhance or complement data from the other 
source” (p. 554). There are many types of mixed method research design; based on time 
orientation, they could be classified as concurrent or sequential (Johnson et al, 2007). The 
simultaneous mixed method technique was adopted in this thesis. This type of simultaneous 
triangulation method is described as “concurrent or parallel” (Creswell, 2008, p. 557). This 
implies that the data collection and analysis for both the qualitative and experimental 
quantitative methods were fulfilled in parallel, and the findings of the two methods integrated 
at the interpretation stage.  
The experimental instrument, interview protocol, information letter to participants and the 
consent forms were all translated to Arabic and then translated back (to English). These 
documents have been reviewed by academicians familiar with the area of study.   
Prior to conducting the fieldwork for this study, the researcher obtained the ethical approval 
letter from the Human Ethics Committee at The Australian Catholic University42. The data 
collection process was implemented based on the guidelines of the ethical approval, with 
formal prior consent from the subjects. Purposes, aims, and procedures of the field work have 
been outlined in the Information Letter to the Participant and were circulated by the Certified 
Financial Analysts Society in Jordan (CFA-Jordan). The figure below explains the implementation 
strategy. 
 
                                                          
















4.5.1 Experimental Treatments 
For the factorial experimental treatments, data was collected by distributing a self-
administered survey instrument. This was conducted via postal mail. The postal questionnaire 
survey method is a popular method for data collection, and it has many advantages relevant to 
this study, such as respondents arguably provide a “more honest reply” (Wilson, 2010, p. 157) 
to the scenarios and questions provided due to the absence of the interviewer. Another 
advantage of self-administered mailed questionnaires, according to Burns (2000), is that “The 
Interview protocol design Factorial experimental design 
Pretesting 
-Defining target population 
-Data collection (interviews) 
Finalizing interview protocol 
Qualitative data analysis 
Pretesting 
 
Finalizing experimental design 
-Defining target population 
-Data collection (Distributing 
& collecting questionnaires) 
Quantitative data analysis 
Translation to Arabic & back  Translation to Arabic & back  




respondents are free to answer in their own time and their own pace” (p. 581) Burns (2000) 
also added that this survey technique guarantees confidentiality. This characteristic satisfies 
part of the human ethics standards’ requirements as the respondents feel free to either 
disclose or conceal their identities.   
A well-established questionnaire is capable of producing accurate and reliable data, especially if 
the instrument is presented in a logical and clear manner (Wilson, 2010). The Arabic version of 
the questionnaire was distributed. The design of the front cover of the distributed 
questionnaire satisfied the five elements suggested by Creswell (2008) which are (1) the 
importance of the respondents to the study; explaining why this particular category of 
participants has been chosen, stating that this category is the most relevant and  capable to 
provide effective and accurate data, or by emphasizing the perceived added value of the 
respondents’ contribution so as to encourage them to fill in the questionnaire, (2) the purpose 
of the study, (3) the confidentiality, (4) the status of the sponsorship, such as the institution 
that supervises the research and using the university insignia and (5) the expected time needed 
to complete the questionnaire.  In addition to the above five points, the cover letter included 
the instructions for the questionnaire. The 16 experimental scenarios of the study are 
presented in the internal pages of the questionnaire while the last two pages were designed to 
gather the subjective weights of the four dimensions and to gain some demographic 
information, with space left for any additional comments by the respondents. 
The questionnaires were designed in four different variants, each differing in only one way: the 
random order of scenarios, the purpose of the randomization being to mitigate the carryover 
effects and practice effects (Keppel & Wickens, 2004; Mitchell & Jolly, 1992; Trotman, 1996). 
The survey instrument contained 16 different scenarios testing the influence of the selected 
elements of the JCGC on both the reliability of the audit report and the level of the audit 
expectation gap. Each scenario is made up of four dichotomous factors. The sixteen scenarios 
represent the fully crossed composition of the four independent variables at two levels, 
namely, higher and lower. A full factorial design for the four dichotomous factors requires a 
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total of sixteen scenarios, which is 2*2*2*2. The scenarios were presented in terms of 
(numbered cases) case one to case 16. 
The respondents were requested to consider each scenario, each being a different combination 
of the study’s independent variables, independently of other scenarios, and requested to 
provide their assessment of the influence of each scenario to the perceived level of the 
reliability of the audit report and the level of the audit expectation gap. Participants were 
requested to indicate the perceived level of influence on a scale with seven levels, ranging from 
‘Substantially Worse’ to ‘Substantially Better’. The questionnaire included a filled in 
(completed) example scenario to illustrate the appropriate use of the instrument as shown in 
Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Example of the Explanatory Scenario 
 
              Example - The response for your typical case would appear like this: 
 
                  Typical    External Auditor's Independence                       Typical    Disclosure and Transparency 
                  Typical   Internal Auditor Effectiveness                              Typical   Corporate Accountability 
 
                                                             Your Assessment on the Following (circle)  
 
                                                                     Substantially Worse                                                               Substantially Better 
                 Reliability of the Audit Report             -3             -2            -1                                      +1            +2                 +3 








4.5.1.1 Independent Variable Definitions 
Undoubtedly, the design of any survey instruments should maintain simplicity (Easterby-Smith 
et al, 2008; Burns, 2000; Cooper & Schindler, 2010). Slovic et al (1972, p. 286) pointed out that 
“the levels of the factors must be categorical” when designing an experimental survey. Only 
two levels for the independent variables are used in this study, the reason being to have a 
manageable number of treatments.  
Kida, Cohen & Paquette (1990) investigated whether categorical descriptions attached to cues 
affect decision making and found that cue importance was significantly influenced by the 
selection of categories. They also pointed out that categorical descriptions assigned to cues 
affect the importance of those cues and make it more motivating and stimulating than static 
descriptions. The design of cues should also maintain consistency and unambiguity whether 
individually and in combinations (Slovic, 1966). 
Each of the four corporate governance dimensions (the four independent variables) is assigned 
either a ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ rating. Higher refers to the level achieved by the top 1/3 of 
companies on that factor and Lower refers to a level of performance achieved by the 1/3 least 
successful companies on that factor. The definitions of the independent variables were 
provided in the front cover of the instrument and were as follows: 
 External Auditors' Independence: “Freedom from those pressures and other factors that 
compromise, or can reasonably be expected to compromise, an auditor’s ability to make 
unbiased audit decisions” (ISB, 2000, para. 4). 
 Internal Audit Effectiveness refers to the extent to which the designated internal audit 
objectives and functions are achieved properly, are unbiased, and are free from 
management pressure that may compromise the internal auditor's performance. Examples 
of those designated internal audit functions are safeguarding assets against loss and theft, 
providing reasonable assurances that the financial and operating information are accurate 
and reliable, and ensuring the entity's compliance with laws and regulations. 
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 Disclosure and Transparency: refers to the quality and reliability of information, whether 
financial or non-financial, provided by the company to the shareholders and the users of the 
financial reporting. 
 Corporate Accountability: refers to the ability of the shareholders and the stakeholders to 
hold the governing body of the company such as the executive management, the board of 
directors and the external auditors accountable and answerable to the laws, the regulations 
and the company's bylaws based on their power and responsibilities. 
 
4.5.1.2 Dependent Variable Definitions 
The two dependent variables of the study have been assessed separately based on different 
scenarios of the manipulated independent variables. The respondents were requested to 
consider each scenario in isolation. Figure 8 shows an example of one treatment taken from 
one of the survey’s four variants whilst figure 9 shows an example of one treatment taken from 
one of the Arabic versions of the factorial questionnaire.  
 
Figure 8: Example of Treatment- English Version 
 
Case 1 
  Lower    External Auditor's Independence                       Higher    Disclosure and Transparency 
  Lower    Internal Auditor Effectiveness                            Lower    Corporate Accountability 
                                           Your Assessment on the Following (circle)  
                                                 Substantially Worse                                                               Substantially Better 
  Reliability of the Audit Report                      -3               -2            -1         Same        +1            +2                +3 





Figure 9: Example of Treatment- Arabic Version 
 
 األولى الحالة             
-                                                                                                         
 الخارجي الحسابات مدقق ةاستقاللي أقل من مستوى               
 فعالية التدقيق الداخلي أقل من مستوى          
 والشفافية اإلفصاح من أعلى مستوى         
 الشركات في المساءلة  أقل من مستوى         
 :يلي ما للمستويات أعاله على النموذجي تقييمك حول دائرة وضع يرجى
 جوهري بشكل أفضل                                                      جوهري أسوأ بشكل                                                       
  3 2 1 محايد 1- 2- 3- االعتماد على تقرير مدقق  الحسابات          
 3 2 1 محايد 1- 2- 3-   التدقيق في التوقعات فجوة        
 
 
16 cases of different combinations of independent variables were presented in Part A of the 
questionnaire, and the respondents were asked to provide their assessment, in each scenario, 
on (1) the reliability of an audit report (in comparison with the reliability of a “typical” audit 
report, in the participant’s experience in Jordan) on a discrete scale with common intervals and 
(2) the size of the audit gap (in comparison with the “typical” gap, in the participant’s 
experience in Jordan) on a discrete scale with common intervals.  
The scale on which respondents have to indicate their assessments consisted of seven points, 
ranging from ‘-3’ through ‘same’ to ‘+3’, where ‘-3’ refers to substantially worse, ‘+3’ refers to 
substantially better and ‘same’ was positioned in the middle to allow respondents to 
demonstrate neutral assessment. The design of the treatments was simple, as suggested by 
Dillman (2006). For statistical analysis, using SPSS software version 19, these 7 levels were 
coded from 1 (Substantially Worse) to 7 (Substantially Better).  
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Part B of the questionnaire requested the respondents to provide their subjective assessment 
of the weighted influence of the four independent variables on (1) the reliability of the audit 
report and (2) the size of the audit gap, allowing comparison with the findings of their objective 
judgments.  
The definitions of the dependent variables were provided in the front cover of the instrument 
and were as follows: 
 The audit expectation gap: The audit expectation gap refers to the different perceptions 
between the auditors’ actual performance and to what report users believe the auditors should 
be performing and achieving as auditors.  
 
 Reliability of the audit report: refers to the extent to which the institutional investor can 
rely on the audit report to clearly convey significant instances of poor internal controls; 
accounting errors, biases, or omissions; and concerns regarding the application of the going 
concern assumption. 
 
4.5.2 In-depth Interviews 
It has been argued that quantitative studies do not answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions regarding 
the phenomenon under study while qualitative studies do (Silverman, 2009; Symon & Cassel, 
1998; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). ‘How’ and ‘why’ questions deliver in-depth understanding of the 
topic and provide exploratory tools that help to gain a clear and rich picture of the process 
(Symon & Cassel, 1998). “‘What’ questions, ‘who’ and ‘where’ questions  . . . are likely to favor 
survey methods . . . . In contrast ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are more explanatory and likely to 
lead to the use of case studies, histories and experiments as a preferred research method” (Yin, 
2009, p. 9).   
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The qualitative interview of this study was conducted according to the interview protocol43 
attached in Appendix 7. The design of the interview protocol has been developed based on the 
related literature review and the main theory employed in this study which is the agency 
theory. The interview protocol concentrated on ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions aiming at 
investigating how institutional investors’ assessment of the selected elements of the JCGC 
affects their perception of the reliability of the audit report and the level of the audit 
expectation gap. Subjects were requested to justify their conclusions by ‘why’ questions. 
 
4.5.3 Pretesting: Survey Instrument & Interview Protocol 
The design of any survey instrument needs to be pretested in order to ensure that ambiguities, 
vagueness, and grammatical errors have been avoided, and ensure that the language is 
understood and the layout of the experiment presented smoothly to the potential participants 
(Dillman, 2006). Collis & Hussey (2003) also say that pretesting experimental instruments is 
important.  
The experimental instrument of this study was pretested with the help of six financial analyst 
practitioners. Pretesting resulted in two amendments to the survey instrument. The first 
amendment was to split the last requirement of part C (which requests subjects to list any 
other related factors, other than the Jordanian Corporate Governance Codes, that they think 
would be relevant to their assessment) into two sections, one for each of the dependent 
variables, i.e. to state if there were any factors that would affect their perception of the 
reliability of the audit report and then any other JCGC factors that would affect their perception 
of the level of the expectation gap. The second amendment was the addition of a brief 
definition of the Jordanian corporate governance code. 
                                                          
43 Appendix 7 shows the interview protocol of this study. The protocol starts by briefing the contribution of the 
study. However, beside the request of unprompted impression of what does corporate governance means to the 
participants and the main 8 questions, there were some questions (follow up & prompt) raised during the 




Similarly, three preliminary interviews were conducted with financial analyst practitioners. The 
results of these preliminary meetings contributed to enhancing the definitions of one of the 
independent variables (internal auditor independence)44. Moreover, the participants suggested 
defining the key terms of the study in English as well as Arabic, a suggestion later implemented 
in the study.  
 
4.5.4 Data Collection process  
Prior to conducting the field work for this study, an Information letter to Participants45 was 
prepared and distributed to the potential participants, as per the Human Ethics Committee’s 
regulations at the Australian Catholic University (ACU). The information letter to Participants 
has a particular format designed by ACU, and it aims to communicate to the potential 
participants some basic information about the study, the research’s confidentiality and 
participants’ rights.  
The Information letters to Participants were advertised and circulated to the members of the 
Professional Association of Financial Analysts in Jordan (CFA-Jordan). The interviews were 
arranged with nine persons who telephoned to volunteer, and a tenth person was suggested by 
one of the interviewees. Interview times and locations were discussed during those Initial 
phone calls. All interviews were face-to-face and have been conducted in Amman (the capital 
city of Jordan). In Jordan, most large companies have their headquarters in Amman. Interviews 
were audio recorded and conducted at the participants’ offices, as per their requests.  
                                                          
44 Interestingly, one participant (in pretesting period) pointed out that the term ‘management pressure’ may 
confuse participants: it could mean pressure being put on the internal auditors to make them work harder and to 
their maximum capacity, or it could mean pressure that aims to jeopardize internal auditors’ effectiveness by 
affecting their reports. This led the researcher to reword the definition of internal auditors effectiveness to make it 
clear and consistent with the objectives of the study.  
45
 The form of the Information letters to participants has been downloaded from the Website of the Australian 




Addresses and Information about Institutional Investors, as for all types of companies in Jordan, 
are available for access through the website of the Companies Control Department (CCD) and 
the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). The CCD website provides data bases and statistical 
information about all the Jordanian companies, and the website allows individuals to make 
queries and search for any type of company using various search criteria such as company 
name, purposes, capital, etc, (CCD: Companies Inquiry, 2012; ASE: Broker Members, 2012).  
As mentioned earlier, experimental studies that use repeated measure techniques require few 
participants and deliver robust results (Coolican, 1994; Burns, 2000; Weathington et al, 2010; 
Trotman, 1996). Institutional investors in Jordan have been identified with the help of the CFA-
Jordan, CCD and ASE. 60 institutional investing companies were randomly drawn from the list of 
commercial banks46, insurance companies, brokerage houses, and investment funds and 
companies. Data collection packages containing the survey instrument, the information letter 
to participants, and a reply envelope with a stamp attached. The packages were distributed to 
the target sample. 47 usable survey instruments were received and included in the analysis. The 
response rate was thus 78%.  
 
4.6 Methodological Limitations 
There are inherent limitations accompanying the methodology adopted in this study due to the 
fact that the survey instrument were self-administered and were filled out in an uncontrolled 
environment. This means that instruments might not have been completed by the potential 
subjects, might not been completed by the subjects independently, or, in the absence of the 
researcher and his unavailability to answer questions, may not have been completely 
understood by the participants (Trotman, 1996). In regards to the latter problem (absence of 
the researcher), this study’s research implementation strategy included pretesting of the survey 
                                                          
46 Non-commercial banks were excluded from the study population and left as suggestions for future studies such 
as (Cities and Villages Development Bank, Industrial Development Bank, Islamic Banks.) 
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instrument, an approach that helped mitigate the potential for confusion,  although the 
researcher’s and the supervisors’ contacts (including e-mails and telephone) were presented in 
the last part of the survey instrument for any clarification that subjects may need. While the 
first issue (surveys completed by someone other than the selected participant) is unlikely to 
happen, it is, like in all studies that use self-administered surveys, a possible threat to the 
validity of this study. Finally,  
Another methodological issue is the time and cost restrictions. According to Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie (2004) conducting a mixed method research is costly and requires more time than what a 
single method needs. This is true especially when taking into consideration that the fieldwork study of 
this thesis was conducted in Jordan (which is another country where the researcher studies in Australia). 
However, the employment of the concurrent (simultaneous) mixed method strategy mitigated these 
difficulties.  
 
4.7 Chapter Summary 
The choice of the appropriate methodology that best addresses the study objective and the 
research questions is a very crucial decision when researchers plan their studies. This chapter 
provided an overview of methodology adopted in this thesis, which is the mixed method approach, 
and also provided the rationale and a justification for the selected method. The experimental 
survey design and the qualitative interview protocol were discussed in this chapter. The next two 
chapters discuss and analyze the data collected from both the experiment and the interview in 








Chapter 5: Results & Analysis 
 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the respondents, and presents separately the findings and analysis of the 
data obtained after conducting the fieldwork for both the experimental survey and the personal 
interviews.  The quantitative and qualitative data are then integrated in section 5.4.  
 
5.2 Experiment Results  
This section presents the findings of the quantitative stage of the study. The results of the 
experimental survey were analyzed using the SPSS package version 19. The quantitative 
findings relate to the three main parts of the factorial questionnaire which are considered part 
A (the objective judgments of the participants), part B (the subjective judgments and the check 
on the importance of the experimental variables) and part C (particulars on the relevant 
backgrounds of participants).   
 
5.2.1 Description of Response Rates and Respondents  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, 47 survey instruments were received and they  all were 
usable giving a 78% response rate. In reviewing recent Jordanian studies that investigated or 
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surveyed institutional investors such as Al-Khadash and Al-Sartawi (2010); Al-Khadash et al, 
2012; Ishhadat, & Abed Al-Jaleel (2012) the response rates of these studies were 63%, 68%, 
94% respectively, which suggest that response rate of this study is reasonable in relation to this 
sector.  
The following tables (2, 3 and 4) provide descriptive statistics about the institutional investors 
responding to the survey regarding their sectors, positions and experiences. The tables reveal 
that the four major types of institutional investors were adequately covered, and the positions 
of the financial analysts vary from the manager to the head of the section to the financial 
analyst. Two respondents chose the other category and indicated that they were an investment 
consultant and a credit officer respectively. The latter has been accepted for the study analysis 
since the main job of credit officers in Jordan is to evaluate the financial position and the audit 
reports of their clients when considering credit facility decisions (Al-Zebdieh & Al-Thuneibat, 
2012; Lutfi, 2001; Maswada, 1992). Finally, with 12 years of experience on an average and 11 
years being the median, and no one having less than 5 year experience, the subjects of this 
study could be considered as  experienced.  
 
Table 2: Respondents’ Distribution by Sectors 
Sector Frequency 
Bank 7 
Insurance Company 8 
Brokerage   House 9 





Table 3: Respondents’ Distribution by Positions 
Position Frequency 
 Manager - of the investment portfolio department 16 
Head of the investment portfolio section  12 
Financial analyst/officer                             16 
Credit Officer * 1 
Investment Consultant * 2 
Total 47 
 
* This position was not listed in the survey instrument and has been indicated by the subject as 
they were allowed to specify another job position if not mentioned. 
Table 4: Respondents’ Distribution by Experience 
Respondents’ Experience  Years 
Mean  12 
Median 11 







5.2.2 The Validity of the Survey Experiment  
Part B of the survey instrument aimed to test the validity of using the chosen JCGC factors as 
well to investigate whether they are considered as the major effective significant factors 
institutional investors’ perceptions of the reliability of the audit report , and the size of the 
audit expectation gap separately, or if there are some other factors that need to be included in 
the survey. Participants were requested to indicate on a 1 to 7 Liker scale their level of 
confidence that the four factors examined in this thesis capture the major determinants of the 
reliability of the audit report and the size of the audit expectation gap. Figure 10 below shows 
the questions asked, while the results of their answers are shown in Table 5. A subsequent 
question requested the respondents to list any other possible related variables from the JCGC 
they consider relevant to their assessment of the dependent variables separately. 
 
Figure 10: Level of Confidence that the Selected Variables of the JCGC Represent 








Please indicate by circling a number on the scale below how confident you feel that the four 
factors together represent the major determinant of your assessment of the: 
(1) Reliability of the audit report    Lower Confidence       1        2        3        4        5        6        7       Higher confidence 
(2) Audit expectation gap                Lower Confidence       1        2        3        4        5        6        7       Higher confidence 
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Table 5: Confidence Level of the Factors 
Dependent variable Mean Median Mode 
Reliability of the audit report 5.4 6 6 
Audit expectation gap 5.6 6 5 
The mean of the confidence level indicated by the 47 subjects’ assessments of the reliability of 
the audit report was 5.4, and 5.6 for the audit expectation gap, where the median for both of 
the dependent variables was 6. This level of confidence as indicated by the respondents 
suggests that the model of the study is reasonably strong in capturing the influence of the 
selected factors of the Jordanian corporate governance code on both the reliability of the audit 
report and the level of the audit expectation gap.    
Table 6 shows the additional variables from the JCGC suggested by the participants and the 
frequency for each dependent variable.     
Table 6: Frequency of Mention of other Factors Seen as Having an Important 
Impact on the Dependent Variables 
Factors Reliability of the audit report Audit expectation gap 
The role of the Jordanian 






Educating the users of the 
audit report 
------ 3 
Audit fees 4 1 
International standard on 
auditing (ISA) 
1 ------ 




The above table reveals that the factor that generated the highest number of mentions is the 
audit fees affecting the reliability of the audit report. It is acknowledged that the factors 
generating multiple citations for a dependent variable generally do contribute to narrowing the 
audit expectation gap and in increasing the reliability of the audit report as revealed in the prior 
literature (Ojo, 2009; Siddiqui et al, 2009; Dickins and Higgs, 2009; Rehana, 2010; Sikka et al, 
1992; Sidani and Olayan, 2007; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Fadzly & Ahmad, 2004; Pierce & 
Kilcommins, 1997; Wolf et al, 1999). Therefore, since they are not derived from the JCGC, they 
were mentioned in the limitations of the study as other factors that may affect institutional 
investors’ perception of the reliability of the audit report as well as the level of the audit 
expectation gap. 
With regards to the other mentioned factors above, it is worth mentioning that they have been 
reviewed in Chapter 3 as constituents of external auditor’s independence; the audit partner 
rotation issue was discussed in Section 3.7.4, while audit, fees and remuneration were 
discussed in Section 3.7.147. 
Finally, the assumption of sphericity was checked using the ‘Muachy’s test’. Field (2009) 
pointed out that the Muachly’s test, “tests the hypothesis that the variances of the differences 
between conditions are equal” (p. 460), while Coolican (2009) pointed out that the lack of 
sphericity results in increasing the likelihood of making a type II error.  Muachly’s test statistic 
was not significant suggesting the condition of the sphericity was met (Field, 2009).  
 
                                                          
47 A possible explanation of mentioning audit fees by the subjects could be attributed to the fact that the JCGC did 
not discuss clearly the role of the audit committee in setting external audit fees, it has generally stated the role of 
the audit committee of discussing matters related to the nomination of the external auditors. In regard to the 
audit rotation, it noteworthy to mention that audit rotation in Jordan is a Guideline Code (not imperative) 
according to the JCGC; listed companies must comply or provide explanations in case of inability to comply.  
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5.2.3 Factor Weightings  
An initial MANOVA test was conducted, and proved significant, thus the two dependent 
variables of the study were analyzed by using individual ANOVA tests (Meyers, Gamst, & 
Guarino, 2005; Coolican, 2009; Field, 2009).  
 
5.2.3.1 Factor Weightings on the Reliability of the Audit Report 
The analysis of the gathered data from the experiment provided evidence in addressing 







In answering this question, subjective and objective measures used to obtain evidence are:  
1- Self-reported weights, (the subjective measure) where each financial analyst was requested 
to allocate 100 points among the selected key dimensions of the JCGC. 
2- The effect size (the objective measure) was measured by calculating each of the selected key 
dimensions of the JCGC measure’s main effect and those interactions were found to be 
RQ. 1  
What are the relative main and interactive weights of:  
  External auditor independence; 
   Internal auditor effectiveness;  
   Disclosure and transparency, and    
   Corporate Accountability  
                in the perceived reliability of the audit report. 
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significant. Effect of size is measured through using partial eta-squared which in its turn shows 
that the proportion of variance explained by each of the four independent variables.  
The relative weights of the Jordanian corporate governance code’s related factors in 
contributing to the reliability of the audit report are presented in Table 7.  
 













     
Mean 40.14% 28.36% 15.05% 16.45% 100% 
SD 8.619 9.185 7.159 7.435  
Range 20%-60% 10%-45% 5%-30% 5%-30%  
n=47      
Rank 1 2 4 3  
 
Effect Size ‡      
Main Effects 22.71% 18.59% 15.70% 9.66% 66.66% 
Interactions ‡‡ 7.26%             9.19% 8.70%         8.19%               33.34%              
Combined 
Effects 
29.97%           27.78%          24.40%        17.85%             100.00
%                
n=47      
Rank 1 2 3  4  
 
‡ Effect of size is measured by using partial eta-squared 
‡‡ Interaction effects are allocated to each factor involved in the interaction equally. 
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The figure below shows the Comparisons of the subjective and objective (experimental 
scenarios) weights in relation to the reliability of the audit report.  
Figure 11: Weights of Factors’ Influence on the Reliability of the Audit Report 
 
The self-reported weights show a wider distribution between the four independent variables on 
their effects on the reliability of the audit report; the external auditor’s independence factor 
showed the highest effect followed by the internal auditor’s effectiveness, then the corporate 
accountability which slightly exceeded the disclosure and transparency factor.  
The objective measure (the effect size) has a tighter range with regard to the ranked order of 
importance of factors. The Effect Size suggests that the external auditor’s independence gained 
the highest rank among the other selected factors from the JCGC on the effects on the 
perceived reliability of the audit report followed by internal auditor’s effectiveness, while the 
corporate accountability had the least contribution. The results obtained from the two 
measures show that the major influential factors on the perceived reliability of the audit report 











Subjective Weights Effect Size 
External Auditor 
independence  
Internal Auditor Effectiveness  
Disclosure & Transparency  
Corporate Accountability  
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ranking order suggesting that Jordanian financial analysts demonstrated a relatively high 
degree of self-insight.  
The detailed Effect Size analysis (Table 8) shows large and statistically significant (at the 1% 
level) main effects for each of the four variables selected from the JCGC on their individual 
effect on the reliability of the audit report. The external auditor’s independence is the highest 
followed by the internal auditor’s effectiveness, disclosure and transparency, and corporate 
accountability respectively. The statistical power for all of the four variables is very high and 
classified as ‘gold’ standard for power, suggesting there is little likelihood of Type II errors 
(Cohen, 1988; Coolican, 2009). 
With regard to the interactions between the posited factors, the interactions between (External 
auditors independence * Internal auditors effectiveness) and (External auditors independence * 
Internal auditors effectiveness * Disclosure & Transparency) and between (Internal auditors 
effectiveness * Disclosure & Transparency * Corporate accountability) reveal large and 
statistically significant (at the 1% level) main effects and high statistical power. However, the 
interactions of (External auditors independence * Corporate accountability) and (External 
auditors independence * Disclosure & Transparency) and (Disclosure & Transparency * 
Corporate accountability) and (External auditors independence * Internal auditors effectiveness 
* Corporate accountability) and between (External auditors independence * Internal auditors 
effectiveness * Disclosure & Transparency * Corporate accountability) show significance at the 
5% level and have a strong power level, but failed to attain a magnitude sufficient to be 
satisfactorily classified as large, therefore classified as moderate according to Coolican (2009). 
The finding of the large, statistically significant main effect sizes for all of the four variables plus 
the findings of moderate and large, statistically significant interactions between the variables- 
mentioned above - under these controlled conditions supports and further confirms the validity 
of the study model and the presence of a causality relationship between the posited elements 




Table 8: Effect Sizes for the Reliability of the Audit Report 
Factor Effect Size ‡ P Value Power 
Main Effects    
External Auditor independence (Ext) 0.933** 0.00*                   1.00*** 
Internal Auditor Effectiveness (Int) 0.764**                     0.00*                   1.00*** 
Disclosure & Transparency (D & T) 0.645**                     0.00*                   1.00*** 
Corporate Accountability (Acc) 0.397**                     0.00*                   1.00*** 
Total Main Effects                                                  2.739      
 
Interactions    
Ext * Int                                                                  0 .178**                   0.003* 0.87*** 
Ext * D & T                                                             0.075                        0 .060                  0.47 
Ext * Acc                                                                 0.106                        0.024~                 0.62 
Int * D & T                                                              0.031                       0.235                    0.22                        
Int * Acc                                                                  0.011                       0.481                   0.11 
D & T * Acc                                                             0.129                       0.012~                 0.73 
Ext * Int * D & T                                                     0.170**                   0.004*                  0.85*** 
Ext * Int * Acc      0.091                       0.038~                 0.55 
Ext * D & T * Acc                                                    0.008                       0.549                   0.09 
Int * D & T * Acc     0.457**                   0.00*                   1.00*** 
Ext * Int * D & T * Acc                                            0.113                       0.020~                 0.66 
Total Significant Interactions at alpha 0.05 1.319  
Total Interactions  1.369 
Sum of the Effect Sizes   4.108 
* Significant at alpha = 0.01 
~ Significant at alpha = 0.05 
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** An effect size equals or exceeds 0.14 can be considered large according to (Coolican, 2009) 
‡ Effect size is measured by partial eta squared 
*** exceeds the 0.8 considered the ‘gold’ standard for power (Coolican, 2009; Cohen, 1988) 
The analysis of table 8 also shows that one-third of the overall effect size in relation to the 
perceived reliability of the audit report are attributed to interaction terms between the 
variables, this result also further confirms and supports Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 1 is further supported by the existence of the statistically large and significant 
interaction effect between (External auditors independence * Internal auditors effectiveness) 
and (External auditors independence * Internal auditors effectiveness * Disclosure & 
Transparency) and between (Internal auditors effectiveness * Disclosure & Transparency * 
Corporate accountability). 
In addition to evidencing configurable cue processing, these findings are particularly important 
because they indicated that the external auditor’s independence, when considered 
interactively with internal auditor's effectiveness is a relevant factor in affecting the reliability 
of the audit report. The findings also revealed that external auditor’s independence when 
considered interactive with disclosure and transparency as well as corporate accountability, are 
also considered relevant factors in influencing the reliability of the audit report.  
Interestingly, the largest interaction showed that even internal auditor’s effectiveness when 
considered interactively with both disclosure and transparency and corporate accountability 
are also relevant factors in influencing the reliability of the audit report. This finding is 
particularly noteworthy due to the fact that in this interaction, in which corporate 
accountability was involved, accounted for 0.457 of the effect size on the reliability of the audit 
reports is higher than corporate accountability in isolation (as noted at 0.394). However, this 
interaction implies that the Jordanian financial analysts perceive that internal auditor’s 
effectiveness, the level of the disclosure, and transparency and the nature corporate 
accountability system that applied on all governing bodies (including external auditors) 
establish a combined cue that might be termed as ‘internal procedures within companies’ since 
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this combination contributes significantly to the reliability of the audit reports. This could be 
further explained and possibly attributed, based on the interviews and the literature, to the 
reliance of the external auditors on the work performance and objectivity of internal auditors 
who were considered the main defense line against fraud, errors and malpractices. Moreover, 
the subjects pointed out that giving internal auditors direct access to report to an independent 
and well-established audit committee48 reinforces their effectiveness and, accordingly, 
increases the accuracy and the reliability of the financial reporting system (Pickett, 2010; 
Goodwin, 2003; Qin, 2007; Goodwin & Yeo, 2001; Thnaibat and Shunnaq, 2010).  Furthermore, 
the subjects, based on the interviews, added that a strong corporate accountability system 
makes all governing bodies (including external and internal auditors) work in the best interest 
of the company and produce reliable reports that enjoy high levels of disclosure and 
transparency. Another possible interpretation is that the consistent adoption of positive 
attributes of governance conveys genuine interest in good corporate governance. 
As a summary, the interactive effects may possibly indicate that the financial analysts look for 
clear messages namely unambiguous signs. The largest main effect they are looking for is to 
place more confidence in the audit report is a strong independent auditor.  The effectiveness of 
that external audit can primarily be supported by a quality internal audit section (hence the Ext 
* Int interaction being the second largest significant term), where both external, and internal 
audit may indicate that the high assurance of reliable, and adequate disclosure are provided to 
the outside investors (hence the Ext * Int * D & T being the second largest significant term). The 
other issue they might be considering would be the importance of the management places on 
governance internally. This would be more likely if the quality of the  internal audit, disclosure 
level, and corporate accountability appear to be uniformly strong and that would be picked up 
by the three way interaction of Int * D & T * Acc. This of course was the highest significant 
interaction term. 
                                                          
48 Strong audit committee is designed to achieve the appointment of an independent auditor and to increase the 
likelihood of the internal audit being effective. The current study restricted itself to external audit independence 
and internal audit effectiveness to achieve clarity of relationships. However given the success of the current 
experiment the relationship between audit committee independence and external and internal audit quality and 
performance could be a follow up study. 
080 
 
5.2.3.2 Factor Weightings on the Level of the Audit Expectation Gap 
The analysis of the gathered data from the experiment also provided evidence in addressing 






Likewise, the impact on the reliability of the audit report, as shown in the previous section, 
both subjective (Self-reported weights) and objective (effect size) measures were used to 
address research question 2.  
The relative weights of the Jordanian corporate governance code’s related factors in 






RQ. 2  
What are the relative main and interactive weights of:  
  External auditor independence; 
   Internal auditor effectiveness;  
   Disclosure and transparency, and    
   Corporate Accountability  
on the level of the audit expectation gap. 
082 
 















     
Mean 21.77% 13.78% 28.76% 35.69%          100% 
SD 8.089                6.763                   8.491             8.067    
Range 5%-40%            3%-30%             15%-53%        20%-55%  
n=47      
Rank 3 4 2 1  
 
Effect Size ‡      
Main Effects 16.03%           14.32%              22.94%          23.61%          76.90%                                                   
Interactions 
‡‡ 
4.24%            4.70%                 7.12%          7.04%            23.10%                    
Combined 
Effects 
20.27%         19.02%              30.06%          30.65%          100.00%                
n=47      
Rank 3 4 2 1  
 
 
‡ Effect of size is measured by using partial eta-squared 
‡‡ Interaction effects are allocated to each factor involved in the interaction equally. 
The figure below shows the Comparisons of the subjective and objective (experimental 








The self-reported weights show a wider distribution between the four independent variables on 
their effect on the level of the audit expectation gap as perceived by financial analysts. Both the 
corporate accountability and the disclosure, and transparency factors gained the highest 
influence on reducing the audit expectation gap followed by external auditor’s independence 
and the internal auditor’s effectiveness respectively. On the other hand, the objective measure 
(the effect size) showed a tighter distribution of the effects of the selected JCGC factors on 
reducing the audit expectation gap. The Effect Size suggests that the corporate accountability 
gained the highest rank among the other factors which slightly exceeded the disclosure and 
transparency factor which are then followed by external auditor’s independence and the 
internal auditor’s effectiveness respectively. The two sets of the measures are consistent in 
their ranked order of importance of selected key JCGC factors on the level of the audit 
















Disclosure & Transparency  
Corporate Accountability  
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The detailed Effect Size analysis (Table 10) shows large and statistically significant (at the 1% 
level) main effects for all of the four variables selected from the JCGC individually on their effect 
on the size of the audit expectation gap, where corporate accountability is the top followed by 
disclosure and transparency, external auditor’s independence and the internal auditor’s 
effectiveness respectively. The statistical power for all of the four variables is very high and 
classified as ‘gold’ standard of power, suggesting there is little likelihood of Type II errors 
(Cohen, 1988; Coolican, 2009). 
In regard to the interactions between the posited factors, interactions between (Corporate 
accountability * Disclosure & Transparency) and (External auditors independence * Internal 
auditors effectiveness) and between (External auditors independence * Disclosure & 
Transparency * Corporate accountability) reveal large and statistically significant (at the 1% 
level) main effects and high statistical power. However, the interactions of (Internal auditors 
effectiveness * Corporate accountability) and between (Internal auditors effectiveness * 
Disclosure & Transparency * Corporate accountability) show significance at the 5% level and 
have a strong power level but failed to attain a magnitude sufficient to be satisfactorily 
classified as large and therefore classified as moderate according to Coolican (2009). 
The finding of large, statistically significant main effect sizes for all of the four variables plus the 
findings of moderate and large statistically significant interactions as indicated between the 
variables, under these controlled conditions supports and further confirms the validity of the 
study model and the presence of a causality relationship between the posited JCGC variables 
and the level of the audit expectation gap.  
The analysis of Table 10 shows that approximately one-quarter of the overall effect size in 
relation to the level of the audit expectation gap are attributed to interaction terms between 




Table 10: Effect Sizes for the Audit Expectation Gap 
Factor Effect Size ‡ P Value Power 
Main Effects    
External Auditor independence (Ext) 0.608**                  0.00*                   1.00*** 
Internal Auditor Effectiveness (Int) 0.543**                  0.00*                   1.00*** 
Disclosure & Transparency (D & T) 0.870**                  0.00*                   1.00*** 
Corporate Accountability (Acc) 0.895**                 0.00*                   1.00*** 
Total Main Effects                                                  2.916   
 
Interactions    
Ext * Int                                                                  0 .143**                 0.008* 0.77 
Ext * D & T                                                             0.074                       0 .061             0.47 
Ext * Acc                                                                 0.001                      0.839              0.06 
Int * D & T                                                              0.040                      0.173                0.27                        
Int * Acc                                                                  0.105                      0.025~             0.62 
D & T * Acc                                                             0.262**                  0.000*             0.97*** 
Ext * Int * D & T                                                     0.000                      0.958               0.05 
Ext * Int * Acc      0.000                       0.972               0.05                                  
Ext * D & T * Acc                                                    0.143**                  0.008* 0.77            
Int * D & T * Acc     0.091                      0.037~             0.56 
Ext * Int * D & T * Acc                                            0.016                      0.395                0.13                                
Total Significant Interactions at alpha 0.05 0.744  
Total Interactions 0.875                                 
Sum of the Effect Sizes   3.791 
 
* Significant at alpha = 0.01 
~ Significant at alpha = 0.05 
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** An effect size equals or exceeds 0.14 can be considered large according to (Coolican, 2009) 
‡ Effect size is measured by partial eta squared 
*** exceeds the 0.8 considered the ‘gold’ standard for power (Coolican, 2009; Cohen, 1988) 
Hypothesis 1 of the study is further supported by the existence of the statistically large and 
significant interaction effect between (Corporate accountability * Disclosure & Transparency) 
and (External auditors independence * Internal auditors effectiveness) and between (External 
auditors independence * Disclosure & Transparency * Corporate accountability).  In addition to 
evidencing configurable cue processing, these findings are particularly important because they 
indicate that external auditor’s independence, when considered interactively with internal 
auditor's effectiveness, is a relevant factor in affecting the level of the audit expectation gap 
accounted for 0.143. Similarly and at an effect size of 0.143, the Jordanian financial analysts are 
combining external auditor’s independence, disclosure and transparency and corporate 
accountability to form a combined cue that is relevant to their perception on the effect on the 
level of the audit expectation gap.  
The largest interaction as measured by effect size was noted between corporate accountability 
and the level of disclosure and transparency, accounting for 0.262 of effect size on the audit 
expectation gap. The Jordanian financial analysts perceived that these two factors form a 
combined cue which might be termed ‘accountability for disclosing adequate information’. The 
analysis of the interviews suggests the importance of this decision cue. According to the 
interviews, lack of accountability encourages top executive management to act in their own 
personal interest, at the expense of the company’s overall interest. It may also lead corrupt 
staff to steal company assets and, consequently, may lead to company insolvency and collapse. 
The interviews revealed that the level of disclosure and transparency has an inverse 
relationship with the size of the audit expectation gap. Interviews suggested that more control 
procedures should be applied by the Jordanian securities commission to ensure that Jordanian 
listed companies implement the disclosure instructions in the best way possible.  
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In summary, if both corporate accountability and the level of disclosure and transparency are 
high then as a result it gives a greater confidence that the company management and the board 
of director accept their responsibilities to outside investors by disclosing transparent and 
adequate financial data which accordingly reduces the audit expectation gap. Additionally, in 
the absence of the management commitment to corporate governance there is a reliance on a 
strongly independent auditor to lower the audit expectation gap hence the common factor in 
the second and third statistically large and significant term was external auditor’s 
independence whether with the need for the external auditor to be supported by an effective 
internal audit or by ensuring the provision of adequate disclosure and transparency and the 
implementation of strong corporate accountability system.  
 
5.3 Interview Data  
This section presents the qualitative interview data obtained from the subjects. The section 
starts with describing the ten participants’ background and their unprompted impression of 
how they perceive corporate governance, and then that is followed by a cross case comparison 
section in which the main themes of the outcomes of the interview discussion are presented. 
Additionally, direct quotations49 by subjects are also presented to highlight the importance of 
some issues that where relevant.  
                                                          
49 According to Harvard APA bibliographic guide “When quoting (or paraphrasing) from a publication written in a 
language other than English, the quotation should be faithfully translated into the English language” See (ENQUIRE 
GUIDE TO HARVARD APA STYLE BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCING. P. 5) accessed on October, 2012 from: 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/shared/shared_enquire/PDFs/ENQUIREreferencingguide.pdf. To ensure that these 
quotations are presented faithfully, the quotations were translated to Arabic and then a back translation step (to 
English) also had been implemented by academics familiar with the area of the study.   
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5.3.1 Interview Summaries  
Interviews were conducted with the respondents based on the interview protocol. Prior to 
conducting the interviews, subjects were requested to indicate their experience, job title or 
position and the type of company in which they work in, similar to the demographic 
information of the survey instrument. This section provides a brief description of the 
respondents’ financial industry experience and presents their perceptions of what corporate 
governance means to them.  
Subject A 
Subject A was a financial analyst at an investment fund specializing in the Jordanian capital 
market and had been in this industry for around 18 years. Subject A started the discussion by 
referring to the emergence of corporate governance in the nineties of the last century and the 
several translations of this term to Arabic50. Corporate governance as a phenomenon became 
the focus of attention by financial markets worldwide due to the dramatic collapses and 
scandals that occurred in the world since the Asian financial crisis in the middle of the nineties 
of last century and the scandals of the big European, and American corporations. Most of these 
scandals occurred due to manipulation of the accounts, corruptions committed by insiders and 
due to the lack of adequate and fair disclosure and transparency. Therefore, there was a need 
for a tool that works to reduce those financial problems and guarantees that all parties involved 
in corporate governance work in the best interest of the company. Subject A affirmed that the 
most important benefits that effective corporate governance should deliver are adequate 
disclosure and transparency along with ensuring the applicability of corporate accountability. 
Subject A added that these two elements are essential to ensure equitable treatments amongst 
shareholders.  
                                                          
50
 All of the different translations of corporate governance to Arabic that were mentioned by Subject A were 
discussed in chapter 2 except for the translation to “Rational management”. However, when asked about the 




Corporate governance should distinguish the tasks, responsibilities and duties of the company 
management and the board of directors, and this identification and separation of roles is what 
needs to be activated in Jordan. “The role of the executive management is to administer the 
company while the role of the board of directors is to control and to ensure that executives are 
held accountable”. Accountability was described by Subject A as the shareholders and the 
stakeholders’ right of holding the company management accountable for their actions and 
decisions through the board of directors.  
Subject B 
Subject B’s position was a manager of an investment portfolio department. Almost 25 years of 
experience were in the investment field in different sectors where the last seven years were in 
an insurance company. Subject B pointed out that corporate governance gained growing 
interest recently in developed and developing countries alike. The presence of corporate 
governance best practices becomes an essential for any company to get facilities and to 
compete in the contemporary free market.  
Subject B believes that, “theoretically” the Jordanian corporate governance code is advanced 
and close to those codes adopted in developed countries, but the most crucial drawback of 
these codes is on its weak implementation by the shareholding companies. Subject B provided 
two examples of the weaknesses of the compliance with the JCGC, the first one is the multi-
membership by some of the listed companies’ board of directors, which should not exceed five 
memberships in different listed companies for each person. Moreover, there is weak 
compliance to one of the JCGC policies of the disclosure and transparency, that each listed 
company has to use its website to provide relevant, on-time and adequate disclosures.  
Subject C 
Subject C was head of a portfolio section in a Jordanian Bank, and worked in this area for 18 
years. Subject C perceived that corporate governance aims to ensure companies are directed in 
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the interest of its owners. “There are many studies associated with corporate governance best 
practices adopted in certain companies with the quality of the financial reporting for those 
companies since it becomes the main guidance for decision making”.  
Subject C pointed out that financial statements are prepared by the company management 
according to the International Financial Reporting Standards, although these standards aim to 
secure the financial reporting, ensure that the financial statements are free of errors and biases 
and that they faithfully presented, “these standards give the management some flexibility to 
choose between some alternative accounting methods” which might be used by executives to 
achieve personal interests at the expense of the shareholder and stakeholders interests,  which 
contributes to further corporate collapses, and that’s why the adoption of effective corporate 
governance is always important for any company. Subject C also affirmed the vital role that 
audit committees play to enhance the soundness of the company’s financial reporting, and 
asked to “strengthen corporate governance by reinforcing and empowering audit committees’ 
effectiveness” and to focus on its role as a supervisory committee. Moreover, Subject C added 
that independent and experienced audit committees are more capable of protecting 
companies’ financial accounts and to detect errors, frauds, and distorted reports.  
Subject D 
Subject D was also head of a portfolio section in a Jordanian company specializing in securities 
investment, and worked in that position for 14 years. Subject D added that the main company 
activity is to invest in securities in Jordan and real estates in Jordan, also the company’s 
investment in securities outside Jordan are mainly in the Arabian Gulf area market. Subject D 
highlighted the importance of corporate governance in enhancing disclosure and transparency 
and accountability in shareholding companies, since corporate governance aims to lend 
integrity and fairness into the financial reporting system and to maintain transparent policies 
and to establish bases to protect investors and stakeholders.  
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Subject D affirmed that lack of effective corporate governance code may lead to corporate 
failure, as the absence of these effective codes means weak disclosure, transparency policies, 
internal control systems and weak accountability which may encourage corruption and lead to 
corporate collapses such as the failures of WorldCom, Enron and Tyco in the U.S.A. Then, and in 
response to these corporate collapses many legislations and acts have been endorsed globally 
to limit and mitigate the effects of these corporate scandals.  
Subject E 
Subject E was a senior financial analyst in one of the Jordanian investment funds, he worked in 
this position for nine years and before that time he was a financial analyst in an insurance 
company for eight years. Subject E described corporate governance from a financial perspective 
as “the mechanism that provides shareholders (owners and funders) guarantees that they will 
receive returns on their investment”. Subject E also added that corporate governance provides 
an ideal approach that allows stakeholders to control and supervise their interests in the 
company, and this could be achieved by establishing an effective bylaw that encourages 
releasing transparent information to be disclosed to the shareholders equally and to ensure 
that the executive directors are controlled, and worked under a strong and effective 
accountability system, subsequently this leads to protection of the company assets.  
Subject E considered the definition of the OECD51 as the most comprehensive definition of 
corporate governance because it highlighted the supervisory and controlling task for the 
organizations on the one hand, and the definition identified, and distributed the tasks, roles 
and responsibilities of all parties and bodies involved with the organization, such as the board 
of directors, the company management, shareholders and stakeholders.   
Subject E pointed out that corporate governance best practices help organizing and 
coordinating activities between the company management, the board of directors and the 
audit committees, and it facilitates external auditors’ procedures; this leads to a decrease in the 
                                                          
51 The OECD definition was discussed in chapter one.  
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level of the potential risks of the company which contribute, accordingly, to increase the value 
of company shares in the capital market and to decrease financing costs (borrowing costs).  
Subject F 
Subject F was a manager and partner in a Jordanian brokerage company, and deals with 
evaluating and assessing securities, and also works as a financial consultant to the company’s 
clients. 20 years of experience in many Jordanian banks where the last five years were in the 
brokerage company.     
Subject F affirmed that the global attention to establish and adopt best practices of corporate 
governance emerged along with the financial crisis over the world such as the Asian crisis in 
1997 and international corporations especially the big American companies that manipulated 
their accounts to hide and to cover the losses and to embezzle owners’ equities whether those 
of shareholders or those of creditors. Corporate governance needs tools and mechanisms to 
ensure the best implementation, which includes the collaboration of the board of directors, the 
executive managers, audit committees, internal auditors and external auditors with the 
company’s bylaw and regulations as explained by Subject F.  
 “The most important element of corporate governance is the audit committee and is considered 
an essential part to lend confidence to the financial reports”. Subject F described the audit 
committee as a sub-committee from the board of directors with its main functions to supervise 
the whole financial reporting system of the company, to follow up and to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the internal control system and to follow up with the external auditors of the 
company. Therefore, “audit committee members should be independent, and possess relevant 
and adequate experience that enables them to do their duties effectively”, subject F also 
pointed out that many studies revealed that the existence of these characteristics with audit 
committee members enhances the soundness of the financial reporting system. Subject F 
pointed out that the Jordanian disclosure regulations required all listed companies to form 
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audit committees, but complained that not all of them required them to be independent 
members.  
Subject F also affirmed that the second important element of corporate governance is the 
board of directors, since the audit committees are formed by and authorized from the board of 
directors. Subject F criticized the current corporate law and the related regulations that there is 
no requirement to separate the positions of the CEO and chairperson of the board of directors, 
and while the JCGC stated that requirement, it was ineffective because the JCGC provisions are 
implemented on the basis of comply or explain. Subject F also added that the JCGC prohibited 
the external auditor from performing any additional services (non-audit services) which is 
inconsistent with many opinions, and comments of Jordanian professionals.  
Subject G 
Subject G was a manager of one of the Jordanian investment funds and has 27 years of 
experience in the finance and stock market arenas. Before being the manager of an investment 
fund subject G was working as a financial analyst then senior financial analyst in the same 
investment fund for about 8 years. Subject G holds a bachelor degree in accounting and a 
master’s degree in accounting and finance.  
Subject G provided two main reasons for the increased demand for adopting corporate 
governance; starting with the agency theory and the subsequent possibility of generating a 
conflict of interests between the company management from one side and the company 
shareholders and stakeholders from the other side, which increased the necessity of 
establishing effective guides and rules to organize the relations between all parties involved in 
corporate governance. The other main reason is the increasing occurrence of corporate 
scandals, insolvency and failures globally, the financial crisis that left some crucial effects on the 
capital markets led governments, institutions and experts to analyze the reasons behind 
managerial, and financial corruption.  
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Subject G perceived corporate governance as a set of legislative, administrative ,and 
economical requirements that govern organizations in a systematic way and would also interact 
with the internal control team, external auditors, the board of directors, the company executive 
management, the audit committees, professional associations and the governmental regulatory 
bodies to produce outputs that contribute to achieving the company goals which include 
maintaining the rights of the shareholders and the stakeholders alike, adequate and fair 
disclosure and transparency and produce reliable financial reports.  
Subject G pointed out that it was originally believed that there are deficiencies surrounding the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) which contributed to most of corporate 
scandals and companies’ failures, but later it was discovered that the deficiency was not with 
the IFRS, it was related to who implement the IFRS and their behaviors. Subject G explained the 
issue of Enron, and their auditors (Arthur Anderson) who had not followed the standards as an 
example. Therefore, there must be a mechanism to ensure the compliance with law and the 
corporate governance code. Subject G affirmed that the board of directors has the 
responsibility to ensure the implementation of effective corporate governance, and to make 
the company’s bylaw compatible with the corporate governance code. 
Subject H   
Subject H worked as a manager of one the Jordanian investing companies with the  major 
investments in securities, and real-estate spread over the Jordanian market, the Arabian gulf 
area, and internationally with concentrations in the U.S.A and U.K. Subject H has a total working 
experience of 22 years most of them in the investment and stock market area, where the first 
five years were in a Jordanian auditing firm.  
Subject H perceives corporate governance as the method that aims to achieve the maximum 
usage of the company resources and to protect shareholders and stakeholders rights due to the 
separation of the jobs between the company’s owners and the company management. Subject 
H added that it has gained a great deal of publicity after the unprecedented corporate failures, 
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and that has also led international organizations to help countries in establishing and 
implementing corporate governance best practices, and even academicians wrote and 
presented many articles about how to improve corporate governance. 
Subject H pointed out that corporate governance aims at increasing a company’s performance 
in a directed manner at enhancing the soundness, and the reliability of the financial reporting 
system. With regard to the definition of corporate governance, subject H pointed that there are 
many definitions of corporate governance because they involve many parties whether 
internally or externally such as the government, securities commission, professional 
associations, external auditors and even the society. However, most of the definitions 
concentrating on protecting shareholder’s rights by enhancing disclosure, and transparency, 
accountability and ensuring the reliability of the released financial reports and statements. 
Finally Subject H pointed out that corporate governance provides a mechanism against 
corruption, and malpractices especially the implementation of corporate governance 
supervised by the top management and the board of directors. 
Subject I 
Subject I was manager of a Jordanian investment company, and has a total of around 20 years 
of experience in the same field, he also held different positions in several investment 
companies. Subject I pointed out that corporate governance gained great interest recently as a 
result of a number of administrative malpractices and financial failures that occurred with many 
big companies all over the world. “An investigation of reasons that lead to administrative and 
financial failure revealed that the absence of effective corporate governance enabled those 
charged with the company’s governance to work for their own interests at the expense of 
shareholders and creditors interests”.  
Subject I pointed out that nowadays with the globalization and the free movements of the 
capital across the world have opened the doors toward investors and businessmen, and they 
seek to invest their wealth in institutions that adopted good corporate governance structure 
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that allows them to control and supervise their investment fairly and equally with other 
investors, and provide them with fair disclosure of information and the procedures of those 
institutions should enjoy high standards of transparency without misleading financial accounts 
and reports.  
“Corporate governance is a term based on a respect basis”; that is respecting the rights of the 
owners, creditors, employees, government and any related body. Corporate governance 
contribute in reducing agency theory problems as explained by Subject I, that is by mitigating 
the conflict of interests and reducing the risks associated with the separation between 
company’s ownership and the company’s management. Subject H added that good corporate 
governance practices attract investors and help in curbing financial corruption and increasing 
institution’s competitiveness.   
Subject I pointed out that corporate governance facilitates the job of the external auditors and 
helps external auditors in communicating with management and the internal auditors of the 
company. Furthermore, Subject I raised the point and the argument in the United States about 
the effectiveness of external auditors and the reliability of their reports especially after the 
subsequent corporate collapses in the beginning of the 21st century. On that, Subject I pointed 
that all blame was placed on the external auditors, beside the company directors, which 
jeopardize the public confidence in the auditing profession, and in the wake of these scandals, 
the U.S legislators passed new laws and regulations to retrieve the public confidence in the 
capital market and to the auditing profession by tightening controls on the executive financial 
management and the external auditors.  
Subject J 
Subject J was a senior financial analyst at one of the Jordanian investment funds, 15 years of 
experience in different investment companies, and funds, and also possess CMA and CFM 
professional certifications. Subject J pointed out that undoubtedly the recent highlight of the 
importance of corporate governance concept has shaped the foundation of corporate 
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management system in the world. Subject J pointed out that the recent corporate scandals, 
especially in the American market resulted in questioning of the roles of the board of directors, 
the roles of top management, external auditors’ performance and internal auditors’ functions. 
Subject J added that in order to meet these criticisms, strict laws and systems were legislated in 
the U.S followed by similar actions in many countries including Jordan where corporate 
governance codes were established by the Central Bank of Jordan, the Insurance commission 
and the Jordanian Securities Commission.  
“Corporate governance simply refers to institutionalization governance i.e. organization are not 
to be governed or administered by one person or one party allied with each other and works for 
their interests as their main priority”. Subject J also pointed that in order to achieve this goal 
organizations must be managed under a certain framework based on considering both the 
company's interest and the various parties’ interests. In the same context, Subject J added that 
effective corporate governance requires increasing the concept of independent members, 
whether the composition of the board of directors or the audit committees, furthermore, good 
corporate governance does not have any added value without full implementation by listed 
companies, therefore, organizations should establish strict bylaws to ensure the applicability of 
corporate governance and follow up its implementation and to ensure that non-compliance by 
individuals makes them liable before the law.  
 
5.3.2 Cross Case Comparison 
This section views the respondents’ viewpoints of how they assess the JCGC elements, and the 
manner and the reason why their assessments had affected their perceptions of the auditing 
profession in Jordan that is with regard to their perceptions of the reliability of the audit report 
and the level of the audit expectation gap. This section also shows the main core themes 
derived from the ten interviews.  
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Since four dimensions of the JCGC were investigated in this study, namely, external auditor’s 
independence, internal auditor’s effectiveness, disclosure and transparency, and corporate 
accountability, this section presents core themes derived from institutional investors’ 
perception on the effects of each of these dimensions on: firstly the reliability of the audit 
report, and secondly the level of the audit expectation gap separately. Further discussions of 
the respondents’ comments are reserved for Chapter 6. 
 
5.3.2.1 The Reliability of the Audit Report 
--- External auditor’s independence 
The main themes and key remarks that have been derived from the financial analysts of the 
influence of how and why the external auditor’s independence affected their perceptions of the 
reliability of the audit report are that there is a consensus among respondents that external 
auditor’s independence was perceived as the cornerstone of the auditing profession and that it 
enhances the integrity and the reliability of the audit report and consequently the audited 
financial reports and statements. The participants also viewed that the objectivity and 
neutrality lead external auditors to produce unbiased and reliable reports. Another issue raised 
by the subjects was the negative impact of management pressure placed on external auditor. 
Moreover, the subjects stressed the vital role of an independent audit committee in 
nominating, communicating and overseeing the external auditor’s work. 
 “It is considered the cornerstone of the audited financial reports”  
                                                                                                                                                     Subject A 
“Undoubtedly, external auditor’s independence plays a vital role in increasing the reliability of 
the audit report” 
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                                Subject B  
“External auditor’s independence is the backbone of the auditing profession, without this 
independence, there will be neither value nor meanings of the professional auditor’s report “ 
Subject C 
“Users of the of the financial statements seek the feeling of confidence in the soundness of the 
financial reports and they seek the reliability and confidence by appointing independent external 
auditors” 
Subject G 
“Independence is the ability to work objectively without bias . . . . . and is an indispensable 
necessity that would increase the credibility of the of the audited financial information” 
Subject E  
“The emergence of the need for an independent external auditor stems mainly from the 
existence of a conflict of interest and a gap between shareholders and the company 
management”  
Subject H 
External auditor’s independence is the cornerstone of the auditing profession . . . . . and 
furthermore, it has established a suitable climate to create the profession” 
Subject I 





Respondents also provided several viewpoints of their assessment of the external auditor’s 
independence; independence in appearance, independence in fact, the roles of the audit 
committees, the roles of the professional associations and ethics code of conduct, auditors’ 
rotation, non-audit services, and management pressure were raised and discussed by subjects. 
Subject A pointed out that the reliability of the audit report is enhanced when external auditors 
enjoy high standards of independence requirements whether those of the JACPA, or those 










Subject B referred to the importance of satisfying independence conditions of the international 
standards, however, the subject affirmed the role of the professional association in maintaining 
auditor’s performance.  
Subject A 
“External auditor cannot express an independent opinion unless being neutral and 
objective . . . and must be strong enough to avoid any possible management pressure” 
Interviewer: “could you please explain why independence is important and how to achieve 
that?”  
Subject: “Again I want to repeat that the priority of corporate governance is to generate 
confidence amongst investors and users of the audit report”. Subject A explained that in 
regard to “‘why’, that is because the absence of objectivity and neutrality increases the 
likelihood of investor’s doubt in the validity of the financial statements”; in regard to ‘how’ 
subject A answered that “by adopting effective corporate governance that describes and 
distributes responsibilities, tasks and the rights of each party including external auditors. 












Subject C also commented on the necessity of enjoying the highest levels of independence and 
its role of detecting frauds and errors. Subject C explained these levels of independency by 
referring to the international standards by the IFA and local regulations whether these are set 
by the JACPA or by companies’ law, in addition to independence in fact and independence in 
appearance, and finally the subject added “auditors are human beings, where some of them 
have a strong personality and others have a weak personality while for some others the 
religious morals play a significant role in their character”. 
“External auditor’s Independence and neutrality criteria raised many arguments between 
auditors and interested parties because it is associated with the attitude and mind of auditors” 
and that is why it is difficult to find an accurate definition of the independence as explained by 
subject E. However when asked how to reinforce external auditors independence, the subject 
replied, the auditors should be neutral, honest, and fair with all parties and provide opinions 
that are not biased or in favor of any specific body. Subject E argued that the most important 
 Subject B 
“The output of auditing profession which is the independent audit report depends 
on the external auditor’s independence and performance. Independence also 
reinforces their attitudes against executive management pressure.” 
Interviewer: “How could the independence of the external auditors be protected 
beside the compliance with ISAs?” 
Subject: “It is the role of the auditors’ professional associations to promote the 
profession and it should solve the audit fees dilemma, to help auditors not to 
compromise their duties as to what happened with the case of Enron and Arthur 
Anderson. Another important point is the nomination process of the external 
auditors must be carried out with full transparency and clarity, and it should be in 
the hand of the audit committee”. 
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issue or concern that might impair an auditor’s independence is management pressure. Subject 










Subject I is also consistent with Subject E in regard to management intervention and pressure 
by stating that “the company management has many reasons and motives to put pressure on 
auditors in order to appear to the public as one of best director teams, even if that leads the 
management to distribute unrealized profits”. Subject I added that the company management 
might intervene in selecting particular auditors who are willing to achieve their goals.  
 “The more the independence of the external auditor, the more the confidence of the 
shareholders and other users of the financial statements and in the work of the external 
auditors and their audited financial statements” 
Subject H 
 Subject E 
“The company management represents the greatest source of pressure on the 
auditor which is at the same time a source of non-confidence of users of financial 
statements” 
Interviewer: “What do you mean by management pressure on auditors and how do 
they practice it?” 
Subject: “management pressure and intervention might start with the beginning of 
auditor’s job in the company even by setting their fees and by making them 
concentrate on particular accounts, hindering and delaying in providing them with 
requested audit evidence and hinder the auditors from disclosing frauds and errors 
and even of some financial facts that are of interest to other parties. The 
management may also intervene in setting audit fees which negatively affect their 
independence. Finally, in order to ensure auditors’ independence they should not 
intervene in day-to-day operational and administrative procedures which are the 
duties of the executives”.  
213 
 
While subject J affirmed that in order to maintain the vital role of the auditing profession, the 
complete independence concept must be realized in its two sides; those are independence in 
mind and independence in appearance and they must not be separated but be in parallel with 
each other as the absence of one of them may weaken or eliminate the effect of the other one. 
Subject J added that – which is consistent with the point of views of I & E – bring independent 
in preparing an audit report and in gathering audit information and evidence, contribute greatly 
in lending much confidence to the audit report and consequently increasing the reliability of 
the audited financial statements.  
The subjects have also discussed many factors affecting external auditor’s independence and 
those factors which lead to increases in the credibility of the audit reports such as the roles of 
audit committees, audit fees and remuneration, auditor’s selection, auditor’s rotation, and the 
provision of non-audit services. 
There was consensus on the role of the audit committee in nominating external auditors, 
except one subject who preferred to reserve this role to shareholders in the general assembly, 
justifying that by: 
“The issue of selecting and dismissing external auditors should not be left in the hands of the 
body that manages and prepares the financial accounts, rather, it should be in the hands of the 
owners of the company” 
Subject J 
However, this point of view does not represent a matter of discrepancy, since the selection of 
the auditors is still in the hands of the shareholders at the general assembly meeting, but the 
JCGC stated the role of the audit committees in nominating the external auditors. 
Subject I pointed out that the issue of audit fees might be used by the company management to 
affect the work of the auditors. However, despite the fact that the JCGC stated that one of the 
audit committee’s duties is to discuss all matters related to the selection of the external 
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auditors and to follow up their compliance with independence criteria as stipulated in 
legislations in force, Subject C noted that it is common in some of  Jordanian listed companies 
that executive managers dominate and control the board of directors and “it seems to you that 
they are like one team” regardless of the supervisory duty of the board of directors. 
Subject I stated that “the company management may put direct and indirect pressure by using 
their influence of the nomination, re-nomination, dismissing and setting their fees . . . . . this 
caused developed countries to place this decision in the hand of an independent and 
experienced body which is the audit committee” 
Subject F also stated that “external auditor’s independence is affected by audit fees, nomination 
and dismissing”, this comment is also consistent with the viewpoints of Subject G and subject E 
who added that “to overcome this problem, the authority of appointing, remunerating and 
dismissing the auditors must be authorized by the audit committees” to avoid any possible 
factor that could be used by the company management. 
Subject D affirmed the vital roles of audit committees in reinforcing external auditor’s 
independence especially if it is composed of independent members: “in my opinion, the most 
important body that can ensure the neutrality and the independence of the external auditors is 
the audit committee . . . . . therefore the Jordanian Securities Commission should oversee the 
nomination process of the audit committee members . . . . . to sum up summary, truly 
independent audit committee may result in selecting effective auditors that the  users of the 
their reports can depend on for decision making”.  
Auditor rotation was perceived to enhance external auditor’s independence as the Jordanian 
literature revealed52. However this factor received little comments by the participants53.  
                                                          
52
 See section 3.7.4 




Subject C pointed out that there have been many debates about the impact of providing non-
audit services to author’s client where subject C stands for prohibiting these services. Subject C 
added that “the JACPA should play crucial roles in overseeing non-audit services”. While Subject 
G commented that “in some developed countries, non-audit services were prohibited to 
reinforce external auditor’s independence”. Subject E pointed out that “providing consultation 
and managerial services to the same company client considered one of the important factors 
that affect the independence standard and surrounds the audited financial statements with 
suspicion regarding its credibility”. 
Subject E concluded that “despite the different opinions of the impact of providing non-audit 
services I would prefer prohibiting it, however I appreciate that the JCGC limited the provision of 
non-audit services”. 
Audit partner’s rotation was described by Subject G as one of the factors that aims to reinforce 
external auditor’s independence “it decreases the financial interests that may arise between the 
external auditors and their clients and consequently increasing auditor’s independence”.  
--- Internal Auditor Effectiveness  
The participants appreciated the vital role of the internal auditors for the credibility of the audit 
report due to two main themes derived from their remarks. The first theme is that the 
integration between external and internal auditors and that they complement each other as 
both of them aims to ensure the soundness of the financial reporting. The second theme 
highlighted the importance of the role of the audit committee in reinforcing the internal 
auditor’s effectiveness, not just in facilitating communications with external auditors, but also 
in setting their budget and giving them authority to report to the audit committee.  
Subject J affirmed the crucial role that audit committees should play to ensure effectiveness of 
internal auditors: “the audit committee facilitates the communications between external and 
internal auditors” which reflected positively on the extent of the reliability of the audit report 
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and the audited financial statements since internal auditor’s performance increase when they 
report to the independent audit committee. “The search for an integrated framework to inspire 
confidence in the financial information provided to users depending on the degree of integration 
between the internal and external audit and the degree of harmony with the Audit Committee” 
Subject J 
“Internal audit is to be seen as one of the constituent and important mechanism of corporate 
governance . . . . . Both external and internal audit complements each other. Internal auditor’s 
independence, albeit hard to be perceived, but it is possible to be achieved taking into 
consideration that the JCGC authorized the audit committee to nominate and oversee the 
internal audit function, however, giving internal auditors the authority to report any discovered 
frauds and errors to the audit committee increases the credibility of the financial reporting 
system of that company”. 
Subject D 
“Definitely internal audit effectiveness affects the reliability of the audit report” as stated by 
subject B, who added that “As we know, external auditors in the early stages evaluate the 
effectiveness and the soundness of the internal audit function in order to determine the scope of 
the audit . . . . . therefore, based on their efficiency of detecting errors and frauds, external 
auditors design their audit plan” 
Subject I referred to generally accepted standards that “internal auditors should be independent 
of the company activity” and that independence could be achieved by providing the internal 
audit a special position in the organizational structure that allows and facilitates internal 
auditors to fulfill their job effectively, and by giving internal auditors sufficient power to 




“The internal audit function must be under the subordination of the board of directors or audit 
committee as well as the communication should be at this level”  
Subject I  
“The importance of the impact of effective internal audit on the reliability of the auditor's report 
derives from the close cooperation between the two functions” according to Subject C. 
However, subject C explained many ways that internal and external auditor may cooperate in, 
such as following up external auditors’ notes of their evaluation of the weaknesses of the 
internal control procedures, and correcting any deficiencies discovered by the external 
auditors.   
Subject C added that “in order to get financial statements with a high level of disclosure and 
transparency and credibility, the internal audit function should be activated properly . . . . . and 
this could be achieved by the existence of an effective and professional organization that 
ensures the best cooperation between the board of directors, internal auditors, and external 
auditors”.  
Subject E pointed out that “Effective internal control procedures are the biggest support for 
auditing; hence, external auditors evaluate the efficiency of the internal audit effectiveness to 
determine the audit scope and the extent of audit evidences”. However, Subject E’s viewpoint of 
assessing internal audit effectiveness was based on many criteria such as being independent of 
the company management, and to be associated with the audit committee that is composed of 
the board of directors, being competent and experienced which enables internal audit staff to 
investigate and analyze evidence and work objectively. “Therefore, obviously the internal audit 
function provides the external auditor great and valuable services which helps to increase the 




“The relationship between internal and external audit is not a new phenomenon, but it got a 
great deal of interest with the increasing instances of corporate failures and the calls for 
adopting corporate governance best practices worldwide”. 
Subject G 
 Subject G also added that internal audit effectiveness affect the scope, time, procedures and 
efforts of external auditors when assessing the risk of the company and when seeking audit 
evidence and when conducting their tests “that is external auditors pay much attention to 
understand internal control procedures of their clients”.  
“Indeed, there is a significant effect of the internal audit effectiveness and external auditors on 
the extent of the reliability of the audit report” as stated by subject A. However consistent with 
subject G who explained external auditor’s purposes of evaluating the effectiveness of internal 
audit function, Subject A added that “but the key point is that internal auditors are subject to 
the subordination of the top management and that they depend economically on the (salaries) 
provided by the company, furthermore, there is a possibility that the top management hire 
relatives or friends for the internal audit department”. 
“Adopting effective internal audit becomes a focal mechanism of strengthening corporate 
governance, therefore, reinforcing internal auditor’s effectiveness and strengthening the 
relationships between corporate governance elements is essential to ensure corporate viability 
and their ability to achieve their goals”. 
Subject F 
 Subject F added that the integration between internal and external auditors conveys benefits 
to both of them; it increases the experience and performance of the internal auditor as a result 
of the continuous contact with external bodies, especially when investigating new items and 
accounts that needs special techniques. On the other side it increases the confidence and the 
credibility of the audit report and the audited financial statements as that integration 
guarantees comprehensive auditing processes by external and internal auditors. Subject F also 
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referred to the vital role of the audit committees in following up the efficiency of the internal 
audit system by stating that “audit committees consult with external and internal auditors 
about the efficiency of internal audit and then it follows up their notes with the company 
management” 
Subject H highlighted the importance of effective and independent internal auditors. Subject C 
defined the independence of internal audit as “It does not mean that it is independent from the 
company, it means the ability of internal auditors to express an objective and neutral opinion of 
internal control systems, management risks, and corporate governance without bias or any 
influence from anybody in the company, this independence will not be realized if there are 
limitations on the work of internal auditors”.  
Subject H also referred to the importance of internal audit standards issued by the IIA, 
especially linking internal audit activity with the audit committee of the company. Subject H 
criticized the reality of the situation and level of the cooperation between audit committees 
and internal audit and requested the board of directors to pay more attention to reinforce 
internal auditor’s independence and performance. Subject H concluded that the harmonization 
between internal auditors, audit committees, and the executive management contribute to 
reinforcing corporate governance pillars and consequently increasing the quality of the financial 
reporting system.  
 
--- Disclosure and transparency 
Subjects perceived corporate governance as a tool to ensure that fair disclosure of transparent 
information has been released to the users of the audit report and audited financial 
statements. However, subjects were aware of the different types of disclosures such as full, 
adequate and fair disclosure and they also raised the importance of on-time disclosure that 
201 
 
investors rely on for making decisions. Additional issue raised by the subjects is disclosing the 
effectiveness of the internal audit function in the external auditor’s report.   
 “The level of effective disclosure of financial reports depends on defining the target users of 
these reports” and then the next step is to identify the nature of the required quantity and 
quality of disclosure as explained by Subject F. 
“Accounting disclosure create a climate of confidence amongst the users of the financial 
statements on the credibility of these statements”  
Subject H 
“Adequate disclosure of the financial statement is the role of the company management, where 
the role of the external auditors is to express their opinion indicating the extent that adequate 
disclosure assumption was followed and to tell the users of the audit reports that there is no 
significant information that has been hidden”. 
Subject J 
Subject G stated that “disclosure, and transparency generally mean ‘expose information’, while 
in accounting field it means that all of the financial statements should appear with full 
disclosure of all necessary information that helps the users in their decision making”. Subject I 
concentrated on explaining the characteristics of sufficient disclosure as that they should be on-
time, transparent, understandable and unbiased.  
In response to explaining the levels of disclosures and transparency, subject B stated that 
“weak level of disclosure and transparency means that there is some information that was 
hidden and not disclosed to the users of the financial statements, and vice versa”. Subject B 
added that companies that enjoy high levels of disclosure and transparency increase the 
credibility of the financial reports and helps its investors in taking right decisions.  
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 “Disclosure and transparency are considered one of the most important principles of corporate 
governance” 
Subject A 
“Accounting reports must disclose all the information necessary in order to be described as non-
misleading” 
Subject E 
Subject C pointed that corporate disclosure is a result of the separation of corporate ownership, 
and corporate management because this separation created a gap between shareholders 
(company owners) and the financial reporting that are prepared and released by the company 
management, therefore it was necessary to report the real financial position of the company 
for these shareholders by the independent external auditors. Subject C also added that a 
special report about the extent of the internal auditor’s effectiveness should be prepared and 
disclosed by the external auditors because having that report affects shareholders and 
investors’ perceptions in relation to the reliability of the audit report. This viewpoint is also in 
line with comments by subjects J, H and G.  
Subject D pointed out that because of the growing importance of accounting disclosure, 
international professional associations were careful about issuing special standards of 
disclosure principles. Subject D referred to the International Accounting Standards Committee 
(IASC) rules and guidance on information that must be disclosed in the financial statements. 
Subject D considered the external auditor as “the guarantor person of the integrity of the 
financial statements since financial statements are prepared according to the IFRS where full 





--- Corporate Accountability 
Corporate accountability was perceived by the subjects as the mechanism that holds all 
governing parties accountable for their decisions and makes them work under their roles, 
duties and responsibilities. There was a consensus that effective corporate accountability 
ensures the soundness of the financial reporting system. However, they raised the issue of 
ensuring the best implementation of the rules, regulations and legislations in force referring to 
the potential role that the JSC should play in this regard.  
“Corporate accountability is a vital element of corporate governance therefore every company 
should establish a strong corporate accountability system. Unfortunately, an accountability 
system could be weakened by the existence of corrupted staff and directors, and it also can be 
weakened when there is no specific identification of the roles, duties, powers and authorities for 
all parties working inside the company . . . . . again, the accountability affects the reliability of 
the audit report since the auditors when they feel that they work in a company under 
appropriately-organized systems and structures that ensures there are no interactions of 
powers and duties, and when they feel they are liable to answerability and accountability, then 
the auditors will practice professional due care and work under the auditing standard and local 
laws without deviations”.  
Subject D 
Subject C pointed out that the concept of accountability is a major dimension of corporate 
governance where companies should establish a strong organizational structure that includes 
defining and documenting the roles, duties and responsibilities of all staff regardless of their 
level in the organization. The subject added that the existence of such systems in the company 
makes it easier for the auditor tracking weaknesses and shortcomings and gaps that corrupted 
staff and directors might go through, thus, adopting an effective corporate accountability 
system contribute to an increase in the reliability of the auditor's report and provide more 
assurance that the presented financial statements are not prepared in favour of the company 
management and are not misleading. Interestingly, the subject called for more governmental 
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control and roles in fighting corporate corruption, and attributed the increasing number of the 
companies that have been sent to the court to the Arab uprising where ‘anti-corruption’ 











Similar to Subject C, Subjects B, H, and I also called on the government for more control over 
listed companies by the JSC, ASE, and CCD.  
Subject A pointed out that a clear definition of the functions, powers, and responsibilities of the 
company management, audit committees, internal auditors and external auditors helps in 
tracing those responsible for the errors and frauds and send them to the court. This opinion is 
close to that of subject G who added that “it increases the credibility of their reports especially 
when these parties feel that they are liable to an effective accountability system”. 
Subject C: 
“Governmental regulatory bodies in the capital market should not be lenient or tolerant 
with corrupted directors in Jordanian companies” 
Interviewer: “do you call for more governmental control of the market?” 
Subject: “In fact, in the past Jordanian governmental bodies were lenient in dealing with 
corrupted companies, but for about approximately one year we used to hear that many of 
the Jordanian corporations were sent to the court after discovering malpractices by the 
company management and staff. If you go back one year and view the newspaper you will 
realize the dramatically increasing number of companies that have been sent to the court 
due to committing corruption” 
Interviewer: “What is the reason for that from your point of view?” 
Subject: “I think the reason behind that could be attributed to the Arab Spring uprising, 
where anti-corruption, implementing accountability and ensuring transparent procedures 
become the slogan of many people in the demonstrations, and the reforms are required in 




“The robustness of accountability regulations depend on firstly, the support it got from top 
management to ensure that its implementation to all ranks and staff categories. Secondly, the 
existence of clear organizational structure in which there are no overlapping in duties and 
powers between company staff. These points – from my viewpoint - identify the levels of 
accountability whether strong, moderate or weak. Therefore external auditors who work in a 
company that has a clear organizational structure and all staff comply with its regulations will 
increase the reliability of their reports”.  
“It is the professional association’s responsibility to set strict guidelines to hold all auditors 
accountable . . . . . in order to produce reasonable assurance that the audited financial 
statements are free of error and fraud” 
Subject A 
“Accountability establishes for retribution, so auditors would fulfill their tasks honestly as they 
would not forget that they are liable for accountability. This explains why some auditors choose 
words carefully in their reports because they fear responsibility and consequences”. 
Subject F 
Subject I explained the three types of auditor’s responsibilities that govern auditors scope 
which include civil, criminal and disciplinary responsibility, the latter one belongs to the 
professional association. Subject I added that it is a crucial point to ensure accountability over 
the company management and the board of directors. “External auditors should not be left 
working alone as the only guarantor of the accuracy of financial accounts”, the securities 
commission should play its role on overseeing strict accountability over the companies’ 
management. 
Therefore, when management and internal auditors work altogether with external auditors 
under a clear division between the managerial roles and the control roles, that in turn, should 
help external auditors working effectively.  
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Reinforcing corporate accountability could be enhanced by an extra assurance provided by the 
external auditors about the entity’s compliance with the corporate governance code, albeit it 
increases an auditor’s tasks which may consequently imply a parallel demand for more audit 
fees. Subject I affirmed that the benefits of that assurance exceeds its costs, and interestingly, 















“Undoubtedly corporate accountability supports corporate governance and both top 
management and the board of directors should not just ensure the existence of the 
accountability system, they should also ensure the practical and actual implementation of the 
corporate accountability and corporate governance code”.  
Interviewer: “How do you increase corporate compliance with the corporate governance code”? 
Subject: “I believe that external auditors should check and follow up listed companies’ 
compliance with the corporate governance code i.e. it should be added to the auditors’ duties 
and included in their reports”. 
Interviewer: “What about the potential burdens whether costs or extra tasks that might occur, 
as you know auditors in Jordan consider low audit fees compromise their performance? 
Subject: “There will be consequential costs, but we also should look at the potential benefits. 
Reporting about the entity’s compliance with corporate governance increases external auditors’ 
responsibilities and awareness of issuing a factual audit report. In regard to the potential 
additional cost, I would like to mention here that it is the management’s duty to report about 
the company’s compliance with the corporate governance code which means the auditors’ role 
will be checking and auditing this report rather than preparing it. However, if we review 
corporate governance code we will find that many of its items are already essential parts of 
auditors’ responsibilities whether those stated in the companies’ law or the regulations of JACPA 






5.3.2.2 The Audit Expectation Gap 
--- External auditor’s independence 
The external auditors were perceived as one side of the audit expectation gap phenomenon, 
and the other side consists of the users of the financial reporting system whether as preparers 
of the financial statements, investors, lenders, and the respondents  also pointed out that it 
could be expanded to the whole of society. The key themes derived from the participants’ 
viewpoints is the corporate collapses and scandals are the major contributors to the widening 
of the audit expectation gap, and they also affirmed the crucial role of the signals that the audit 










“The audit expectation gap occurs when the users of the audit report feel that their expectation 
of the message of the audit report was not realized . . . . . and usually this phenomenon appears 
Subject B  
“External auditors are main part of the phenomena of the expectation gap, which reflects the 
differences in perceptions between the users of the audit report and the auditors themselves . . 
. .  I believe that external auditor’s job should not be just to express their opinions on the 
financial statements, it should exceed that to provide evidence of the viability of companies by 
evaluating their ability to continue as a going concern, since the phenomenon of expectation 
gap emerges with the beginning of corporate collapses” 
Interviewer: “How can the auditors ensure the best evaluation of viability of companies ‘going 
concern assumption’?” 
Subject: “this might not be achieved by only detecting frauds and errors, the auditors should 
work in the interest of the owners of the company who appointed them for this purpose. 
Auditors should report to the anti-corruption department, the Jordanian Securities Commission 
and the company control department when they discover serious violations and breaches 
committed by the company management before the effects of these breaches increase and 





along with the occurrence of corporate collapses especially after the issuance of an unqualified 
audit opinion. Therefore external auditors must be independent . . . . . the existence of qualified 
auditors does not mean anything unless they are being independent” 
Subject J 
 “If we seek to reduce the audit expectation gap, we should consider external auditor’s 
independence, otherwise, external auditors may work for their personal interest rather than 
shareholders, and they might cover errors and fraudulent which if discovered later, it will widen 
the audit expectation gap from the shareholders’ perception who believed that auditors were 
working for their benefit”.  
Subject E 
Subject A pointed out that the users of the audit report may not be aware of the nature of the 










“The gap results because of the difference of external auditor’s performance and the 
expectations of the users of the audit report. Auditors may not audit all transactions and may 
just audit samples of transactions, external auditors who fulfil their job independently and 
without management intervention helps in narrowing the gap because this enables the 
auditors to convey a more factual audit report that reflects the real financial position of the 
company”. 
Interviewer: “Why do you think users of audit report are not aware of the audit job, such as 
‘sampling in auditing’ – as you mentioned-, and how to make them more awareness of 
auditor’s duties and tasks?” 
Subject: “Most of investors and users of the audit report are not aware of the practical job of 
the external auditors. Therefore they should be educated by conducting seminars and 
workshops about external auditor’s functions and issuing booklets that explains external 
auditor’s fieldwork procedures and mechanisms, this helps in bridging those different views”. 
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Subject G pointed out that external auditor’s independence affects the level of the gap whether 
increasing or decreasing it, as the users of the audit report expect and consider external 
auditors to be neutral and honest. The subject added that if auditors are not independent they 
might be involved with management in committing frauds and the problem is that this collusion 
is hard to discover in the early stages, but when discovered later it creates the gap. 














“External auditor’s independence is an important pillar in the auditing profession, and the Jordanian 
legislator should limit any thing that compromises their independence, because non-independent 
auditors result in widening the audit expectation gap” 
Interviewer: “Could you please explain how does external auditor’s independence affect or contribute 
in widening the audit expectation gap?” 
Subject: “Because the audit expectation gap emerges with the occurrence of corporate scandals and 
collapses, and as we know external auditors are considered as the agent to protect the wealth of the 
shareholders who appointed them because they expect they have appointed independent and strong 
auditors who are able to send them a message about the viability of the company, while weak and 
non-independent auditors may succumb to the demands of the management of not disclosing frauds 
and errors if detected.” 
Interviewer: “How can you reinforce external auditor’s capability to confront management 
pressure?” 
Subject: “In my opinion the body that should help external auditors in confronting management 
pressure is the audit committee. An independent and strong audit committee is an essential element 




Subject H stated that “In my opinion the relationship between external auditor’s independence 
and the audit expectation gap depends on the auditor’s efficiency of reporting about the entity’s 
ability to continue as a going concern . . . . . when auditors express a qualified opinion, investors 
will re-consider their assessment of that company, and if that company collapsed, auditors 
would not be blamed and even would not be responsible for widening the audit expectation 
gap.”. In line with Subject’s H opinion, Subjects G and J have similar viewpoints. 
Subject F was not optimistic of the capability of the external auditor alone in bridging the gap, 
although he agreed with the importance of their independence in reducing the gap. “External 
auditors may not be able alone to audit and ensure financial control over company’s accounts, 
so, efforts of internal auditors and audit committees are needed to work with each other and 
with external auditors, because for a  long time the professional associations of auditors have 
always tried to reduce the audit expectation gap, but the gap emerges from time to time, 
therefore I believe that leaving the matter of reducing the audit expectation gap in the hands of 
auditors alone is a prejudice against the auditors and everybody who deals with the capital 
market” 
“External auditor’s independence whether in fact or in appearance are fundamental for their 
performance . . . . . and increases investor’s confidence of the real financial position of the 
company in order to make rightful decisions which accordingly helps in reducing the audit 
expectation gap . . . . . the reason behind selecting external auditors is that shareholders need 







--- Internal Auditor Effectiveness  
The subjects viewed internal auditors as a primary protector of the company assets. The key 
theme is that the internal audit function is fundamentally established in order to detect frauds, 
errors and malpractices which ensure the final reports, are transparent and unbiased leading to 
an increased likelihood of a company’s viability being discernible and thus reducing the audit 
expectations gap. Moreover, the subjects pointed out the important role of the audit 
committees in reinforcing internal auditor’s performance and working as a liaison between 
internal and external auditors.  
“The most important quality that characterized the job of the internal auditors is their 
involvement in day-to-day operations, which enables them to control the company activity . . . .  
Internal auditors dedicate the majority of their time to check the accuracy of the accounts of the 
company, more than the time spent by the external auditors . . . . . in regard to the expectation 
gap, although this term is associated with the external auditors, we should not forget the 
correlation and the cooperation between them as they integrate, and complement each other. 
Hence, internal auditor’s effectiveness helps and facilitates external auditors in detecting and 
preventing frauds, errors and breaches and it helps them to the best evaluation of the 
company’s ability to continue as a going concern.” 
Subject I 
Subject F stressed the importance of the role of an independent audit committee in nominating 
















Subject J pointed out that the success of internal audit depends on the support they get from 
the board of directors and from the audit committee in particular, as they are responsible for 
providing them with adequate powers, independence from the company management, and 
with any necessary requirements and provisions. Subject J suggested that internal auditors 
should be under the supervision of the audit committee as recommended by most of the 
initiatives in developed countries, “internal auditors draw their strength and power from the 
audit committee because the audit committee makes them more independent as a result of 
distancing them from the company management authority”. Subject J stressed that audit 
committee members should be non-executives and independent members in order to 
overcome executive management’s pressure on auditors. The audit committee should also 
providing direct lines of communication between internal auditors on the one hand and with 
Subject F 
“The aim of an internal audit function is to ensure the accuracy of the accounts and 
that they are free of errors and frauds, therefore, companies must pay attention to 
who they recruit in the internal audit department, they should be competent and 
possess a high level of related experience. . . . . . . Nowadays it is common to 
outsource internal auditors, notwithstanding, and from my experience, that staffs still 
work according to what the company management tells them to do, because they 
worry about their salary and about re-appointment. However, the JCGC gave the 
audit committees the right to nominate the internal auditor, and my opinion if this 
condition is implemented properly it will increase internal audit effectiveness in 
detecting frauds” 
Interviewer: “From your opinion how could we reach the best implementation of 
internal auditors’ appointment?” 
Subject: “The essential requirement is the audit committee members must be fully 
independent and have sufficient experience in accounting and auditing”  
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external auditors and the board of directors on the other hand. Subject J concluded that audit 
committees oversee the company management and, therefore “this integration helps internal 
and external auditors in hindering frauds, errors and corporate failures and consequently 
reducing the audit expectation gap”.   
Similar to this viewpoint, Subject B and D have the same opinion as to the vital role of the audit 
committees: 
 “It is very important to maintain the effective internal audit function; the company should 
appoint qualified internal auditors and this appointment must be in the hand of the audit 
committees as well as the appointment of external auditors and working as a liaison between 
them” 
Subject B 









“An internal audit function aims to detect frauds, errors and malpractices, therefore, 
they should be qualified to fulfil their duties and must be appointed by the 
independent audit committee as stipulated in the Jordanian corporate governance” 
Interviewer: “To what extent do you believe that the independence of the audit 
committee is important, taking into consideration that the JCGC stipulated that the 
independent audit committee members should not be less than two?” 
Subject: “In my opinion all of them must be independent; although there are many 
committees that could be formed by the board of directors, I believe that the audit 
committee is different and I consider the audit committee as a vital artery to ensure 
the soundness of the financial reporting system . . . . . they also should be qualified 
with experience in accounting and auditing” 
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Subjects G, H and A have the same viewpoints in regard to the internal auditor’s role of 
detecting frauds and errors and maintaining the viability of corporations and also to the 
importance of the integration with the external auditor. Subject G described that integration as 
“these two functions are considered as the faithful custodian of the company’s accounts”. 
However, Subjects H, C and I perceived that the audit expectation gap as a phenomenon 
primarily relates to the external audit profession; for instance Subject C pointed out that “in my 
opinion, it is the external auditor’s responsibility to reduce the audit expectation gap since this 
gap represents the gap between the auditors and the users of the audit report. Internal audit, 
albeit its significant roles, can be seen by external auditors as an assistant function . . . . and an 
effective external auditors may cover the deficiencies of internal auditors”  
 
--- Disclosure and transparency 
The participants stressed the importance of fair and on-time disclosure in reducing the audit 
expectation gap, they have also mentioned several sorts of financial facts the company 
management sometimes prefer to hide. The key theme is that the participants perceive the fair 
and on-time disclosure as the medium that tells the investors, shareholders, and stakeholders 
about the true position of the company and pointed out that providing these parties with 
transparent information makes them informed about the real financial position of the 
company, accordingly, making correct decisions.  
Subject B argued that “disclosure and transparency levels are much associated with the audit 
expectation gap whether weak, medium or strong. Disclosure and transparency have an 
inversely relationship with the audit expectation gap, that is the more the level of disclosure and 
transparency, the lower the level of the audit expectation gap, because based on that level of 
disclosure and transparency the users of the audited financial statements will be aware of what 
is going on inside the company". Subject B added that, regardless of the nature of the disclosure 
and transparency whether they are in favor of the company management or not (such as bad 
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news about unexpected losses and so on), the disclosure of these information will contribute in 
bridging the audit expectation gap, because informing investors and the users of the audit 
report about the facts surrounding the company will make them unsurprised when financial 
problem faces the company and even if these financial problems may cause the company to be 
insolvent or leads to corporate failure. 
Subject B provided an example of the importance of the disclosure and transparency in Jordan 
which is how the Jordanian Central Bank (JCB) dealt with the problem of ‘one Jordanian bank’ 
about 3 years ago [in the middle of 2008]: “The governor of the JCB himself immediately 
appeared in the media and TVs to justified the reasons behind dissolving the board of directors 
of that bank and explained that clearly and in transparent detail, from the dissolving step, 
appointing another board of directors instead of the previous one until the election of a new 
board. The bank now is working like any other bank. Just imagine if the procedures of the JCB 
were vague without transparency, how would the situation of that bank be and imagine how 
that widens the audit expectation gap.”  
“There are many ways of providing adequate disclosure to the investors which enables them to 
make their informed decisions and accordingly helps in reducing the audit expectation such as: 
disclosure within the context of the financial statements, using clear and understandable terms, 
explanations that might appear between brackets, footnotes and the accompanying appendices 
of notes, attaching explanatory tables and reports, the board of director’s report, and finally the 
external auditor’s report as well.” 
Subject G 
“Fair disclosure is the guarantor of reducing the audit expectation gap.  Fair disclosure is 
considered the most influential element on the audit expectation gap because it aims to provide 
information about the company activities and put them at the disposal of shareholders; thus 
this reduces the audit expectation gap”




Subject J pointed out that the accounting and auditing profession play a significant role in 
affecting decision making and that depends on the level of disclosure and transparency 
released to the public because of the fundamental goal of the disclosure and transparency 
concept is to tell the investors and shareholder the truth about the financial position of the 
companies.  
Subject J stressed that the provided information must be adequate, objective, on time, and 
away from speculations and rumors.  Subject J explained how the company executives and 
directors manipulate the disclosed information. The subject stated that companies may not 
comply with disclosure requirements whether intentionally, unintentionally or even due to the 
insufficient knowledge about the disclosure requirements set by the Jordanian Securities 
Commission, this may include hiding information about transactions with the related parties 
and insiders, inadequate disclosure in the annual reports and the board of director’s report, 
and it could be by manipulating the business results in newspapers before the official 
publication of the financial statements. 
Subjects E, F and A have similar viewpoints in regard to the association of corporate disclosure 
and transparency on the level of the audit expectation gap and the importance of making 
investors and shareholders informed of the real financial position of the company. However, 
Subjects I, D, and C criticized the role of JSC in maintaining and overseeing Jordanian listed 
companies’ compliance with the disclosure requirements: 
“When a company’s shares increase dramatically, the JSC uses it power by asking the company 
to justify that sudden increase of its shares, especially when there are no published reasons or 
causes for that increase such as published statements of a meeting with strategic partners. 
However the normal answers from those companies were: we do not have specific justification 
for that increase and it may relate to the market mechanism and the rules of supply and 
demand. However, we always hear that routine answer but we, as financial analysts, have 
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doubts that the insiders54 at the company know the real reasons behind that increase . . . . . such 
as this example about poor level of disclosure and transparency leads to widen the audit 
expectation gap” 
Subject C 
Subject I pointed out that strong disclosure and transparency measured by its capability of 
providing shareholders clear clues about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. The 
subject added that investors suppose that auditors and the JSC are doing their job sufficiently, 
otherwise, the JSC and ASE participate in widening the expectation gap. Interestingly, Subject I 
added other bodies that may participate in widening the audit expectation gap. Subject I also 
explained how the Jordanian ASE and JSC can play their roles in reducing the audit expectation 
gap by stating that: “[their role] is not just by demanding listed companies to comply with 
disclosure requirements, they also need to follow up the compliance with the disclosure 
instructions and ensure that the companies do not disclose vague information and to ensure 
that they are provided on the right time, furthermore, the JSC must give shareholders the right 
to obtain information from listed companies in a transparent manner, if they want to satisfy the 
corporate governance code of ensuring equitable treatments of shareholders”.   
 
 --- Corporate Accountability 
The participants perceived that the existence of an effective corporate accountability system 
increases the performance of the external auditors and reinforces the effectiveness of internal 
auditors in protecting the assets of the company and increases the likelihood of its ability to 
continue as a going concern. They also pointed out that increasing the awareness of the 
                                                          
54 The JCGC defined insider at the company as “A person who has access to internal information by virtue of his 
position or function within the company, including the chairman and members of the board of directors and the 
company's general manager, financial manager and internal auditor, the representative of the legal person, and 




directors that they work under a strict accountability system and are liable to be accountable 
reduces instances of management fraud. Another noteworthy issue raised by the participants is 
the large interest of accountability and anti-corruption in both private and public sectors as a 
result of the Arab Spring.  
“The matter of effective corporate accountability is a vital element and indicator of companies’ 
strength. Therefore, all staff and employees working in the company should recognize that they 
are liable to be held accountable and that the company is not as we say in slang language ’free 
money that anyone can steal’. However, I believe that the key thing is to ensure the 
implementation of the regulations that were essentially founded to maintain the company 
assets out of theft and loss”. 
Subject E 
Subject C stressed the importance of corporate accountability and pointed out that it plays the 
significant role of limiting the audit expectation gap, because “the company that enjoys strict 
and high level of accountability applicable on all levels of staff from the small position to the top 
management and the board of directors are directed properly according to regulations, bylaws 
and legislations in force”. Subject C also explained ‘why’ he reached that conclusion by pointing 
out that both external and internal auditors will report any serious breaches and malpractices 
committed by the executive management to the securities commission and even to the 
company shareholders to clear their responsibilities. However, Subject C affirmed again the 
importance of implementing strong corporate accountability over Jordanian listed companies 
and their directors, the subject added that now, there are many calls for anti-corruption in 
companies demanded by the public as we can see in the newspapers. Subject C highlighted the 
importance of the accountability and repeated again the unprecedented number of the 
Jordanian listed companies which have been sent to the court and attributed that to the 




Similar to the opinions subjects E and C, subject F added that “effective corporate accountability 
must be documented”, while Subject B argued that the absence of effective corporate 
accountability system makes all staff who works with the company believe that the company is 
’like what we say in slang language a house with low fences’ which leads to an increase in 
malpractices instances and therefore to corporate failure and accordingly, increases the audit 
expectation gap. Subject A pointed out that a strong accountability system makes staff hesitant 
and reluctant to commit frauds, accordingly, makes the users of the audit reports more 
convinced about the soundness of the outcomes of the financial reporting, and on the 
assessment of the ability of the entity to continue as a going concern. Subject D’s opinion is 
consistent with Subject F and stated that “Corporate accountability stands like a bulwark to 
preserve corporate governance” and called for more governmental intervention in the capital 
market.  
Subject J pointed out that the term audit expectation gap appears whenever corporate collapse 
occurs and due to the insufficient assurance provided by the company and by the auditors 
about the ability of the companies to continue as a going concern therefore, all those 
responsible for manipulating company’s accounts must be held accountable and sent to the 
court. Subject J argued that many of the causes of audit expectation gap relate to ‘business 
failure’ rather ‘auditing failure’ and added that the gap also emerges because the users of the 
audit report perceive the auditors as the guarantor of the integrity and the accuracy of the 
financial reporting system. 
Subject I stressed that there is misconception that when auditors express a clean opinion it 
means the financial statements and the financial position of the company are 100% free of 
errors and frauds, while the generally accepted auditing standards required auditors to practice 
the maximum levels of “due professional care”. The subject added that another aspect of 
widening the audit expectation gap is the auditor’s responsibility of reporting about the 
company’s ability to continue as a going concern and also pointed out that there are many 
cases in which the external auditors were sued because of negligence in fulfilling their job from 
a shareholder's perception. However, in their opinion the company management should be 
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accountable and liable for strict accountability regulations if they are corrupted or even if they 
do not cooperate with the external auditors. The subject also pointed out that audit 
committees help in narrowing the audit expectation gap since they are independent and non-
executive committees and because they aim to settle disputes and to reinforce external and 
internal audit performance. However, the subject concluded that the audit committees are the 
strongest party that is capable to ensure the right implementation of “the financial 
accountability” over the company.  
In regard to suing and sending corrupt staff, auditors, directors and managers to the court, 
Subject H affirmed the vital role that government bodies should play: “the Jordanian Securities 
Commission should help auditors to ensure the highest level of corporate accountability over the 
companies by adding more strict items to the current JCGC, and it should send all directors 
involved in corruption to the court”. While subject G pointed out that strict corporate 
accountability limits committing corruption, and added that “these days we are used to hearing 
about companies being sent to court and to the anti-corruption department which is a good 
indicator of implementing a high level of accountability, the accountability becomes a public 
demand these days as we can see the demonstrations”. Consistent with that, subject J added 
“large instances of sending corrupted directors to the court these days as we see from time to 
time in the media is an example of good implementation of the accountability”.   
 
5.4 Integration of the Mixed Methods Data  
The mixed method approach helps the researcher to gather quantitative and qualitative data 
from different sources. This allows the researcher to analyze these data and then integrate 
them to deliver a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon, as noted earlier in the 
previous chapter; adopting quantitative and qualitative methods complement each other and 
facilitate interpreting the results obtained from the other. This section shows the findings of the 
study to provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the JCGC on the value of the audit 
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opinions as basically measured by the reliability of the audit report and the level of the audit 
expectation gap. 
 
5.4.1 Context  
It is clear that institutional investors in Jordan do perceive the importance of the constituents of 
the Jordanian corporate governance code and its impact on the reliability of the audit report 
and the level of the audit expectation gap even if that evidence was often identified with the 
impact of failures to conform. The effect of the four variables whether individually or in 
combination (configurally) was obtained from both data sets, those were, the results of the 
experimental survey and the additional comments to the survey instrument, and the direct 
comments by interviewees. The findings of the survey method suggest the integrity of the study 
model and provided a degree of quantification and robustness. The qualitative interviews also 
supported the study model and provided in-depth understanding of how and why the model 
factors affect the value of the audit opinions as basically measured by the reliability of the audit 
report and the level of the audit expectation gap from the institutional investors’ perceptions. 
 
5.4.2 Self insight  
Both data sets suggest a relatively strong self-insight on the part of institutional investor’s 
assessment of the evaluation of the constituents of the JCGC on both the perceived reliability of 
the audit report and the level of the audit expectation gap. The experimental survey instrument 
revealed relatively consistent rankings between the objective (effect size) and subjective data 
for the factor’s influence on both the reliability of the audit report and the level of the audit 
expectation gap. On the other hand, the interview findings also showed relatively strong self-
insight of institutional investor’s assessment of the evaluation of the constituents of the JCGC 
on both the reliability of the audit report and in reducing the audit expectation gap. However, 
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one subject referred to the role of the board of directors and the shareholders in nominating 
external auditors and one subject referred to the role of the company management to appoint 
internal auditors ‘ignoring the role of the audit committee as stipulated in the JCGC’. 
These dispositions of some subjects’ comments, however, they  could be attributed to the 
recent implementation of the JCGC, and that the premises of the role of the board of directors 
and the shareholders in nominating external auditors still in their mind, as well as the role of 
the company management to appoint the internal auditors. Additionally, their comments 
possibly could also reflect a political reality that management or the dominant 
shareholder/directors still dominate. It is perhaps a reflection that cultures in the Jordanian 
companies are resistant to change. 
 
5.4.3 External Auditor’s Independence  
External auditor’s independence was shown to be a significant, positive factor in influencing the 
auditing profession in regard to increasing the perceived reliability of the audit report and in 
reducing the audit expectation gap as well as being the highest subjectively weighted factor in 
considering the reliability of the audit report. The experiment suggested that external auditor’s 
independence gained the highest rank of importance of its effect on the reliability of the audit 
report. This could be explained, based on the interviewees’ opinions, as there were 
consensuses in perceiving external auditor’s independence as the cornerstone of the profession 
and it leads to objectivity, credibility and then to the reliability of the audit report. However, 





5.4.4 Internal Auditor’s Effectiveness 
Internal auditor’s effectiveness was shown to be a significant, positive factor in influencing the 
auditing profession in regard to increasing the perceived reliability of the audit report and in 
reducing the audit expectation gap as the factor satisfied the standard statistical tests for that 
suggestion. The experiment suggested that internal auditor’s effectiveness gained the second 
rank of importance of its effect on the reliability of the audit report. This could be attributed, 
based on the interviewees’ opinions, to the crucial role of effective internal auditors in 
detecting and preventing frauds, errors, and malpractices because of the internal auditor’s wide 
knowledge of the detailed activities of the company, moreover, that also might be attributed to 
the subjects’ perceptions of the efficient integration of both internal and external functions in 
maintaining the soundness of the financial reporting system. However, Internal auditor’s 
effectiveness gained the last rank of the influence in the bridging the audit expectation gap. 
This perhaps could be explained by the fact that in viewing the expectation gap the institutional 
investors were judging on the integrity of management and the quality of the audit to 
determine whether the required standard has been reached. Failure to convince management 
to be honest and forthright could raise issues as to the effectiveness of the internal audit. In 
addition to that, two subjects have primarily associated the concept of the audit expectation 
gap with the external auditors55.  
 
5.4.5 Disclosure and Transparency 
Disclosure and transparency were shown to be significant, positive factors  in influencing the 
auditing profession in regard to increasing the perceived reliability of the audit report and in 
reducing the audit expectation gap as the factor satisfied the standard statistical tests for that 
suggestion. The experiment suggested that disclosure and transparency was a major factor in 
                                                          
55
 Traditionally the audit expectation gap has been attributed to the external auditors failing to show sufficient 
independence from management as indicated in the common reference of the auditors to management as their clients 
rather than seeing the shareholders and creditors  as the clients. 
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regard to the effect on the level of the audit expectation gap since the results showed that the 
disclosure and transparency gained the second rank of effect, slightly less than the corporate 
accountability factor, as the influential factor on the level of the audit expectation gap. This 
could be explained, based on the interviewees’ opinions, as that the more the level of 
disclosure and transparency, the lower the level of the audit expectation gap, because based on 
that level of disclosure and transparency the users of the audited financial statements will be 
aware of what is going inside the company. However, disclosure and transparency gained the 
third rank of the influence on the reliability of the audit report. 
 
5.4.6 Corporate Accountability 
Corporate accountability was shown to be a significant, positive factor in influencing the 
auditing profession with regard to increasing the perceived reliability of the audit report, and in 
reducing the audit expectation gap as the factor satisfied the standard statistical tests for that 
suggestion. The results of the experiment suggested that corporate accountability gained the 
first rank of (effect size) of importance on the level of the audit expectation gap. This could be 
explained, based on the interviewees’ opinions, as that when all parties involved in corporate 
governance such as the board of directors, the executive management, external auditors and 
internal auditors work with a company that has an effective accountability system and good 
organizational structures in which all responsibilities, powers, duties and roles are stipulated 
clearly, such points make those parties liable to the strict accountability system and make them 
work in the best interests of company rather than their personal interests, therefore, increasing 




5.4.7 Significant Interactions 
The objective measure revealed three large and statistically significant (at the 0.01% level) 
interactions and four moderate interactions related to influence of the perceived reliability of 
the audit report (the first dependent variable), the sum of these interactions accounted for 
approximately one-third of the total effect size. On the other hand, the objective measure has 
also revealed three large, and statistically significant (at the 0.01% level) interactions and two 
moderate interactions related to influence of the level of the audit expectation gap (the second 
dependent variable), and the total of the effect of these interactions accounted for 
approximately one quarter of the total effect size. These interactions have been discussed in 
the early section of this chapter. However, the analysis of data derived from the qualitative 
interviews sheds considerable light, and provided depth understanding on this phenomenon. 
The existence of these significant interactions supported hypothesis 1 which states 
[Institutional investors process decision making information configurally when considering the 
influence of the selected components of the Jordanian corporate governance code]. These 
indicated interaction terms along with the statistically significance (at the 0.01% level) main 
effects for all of the four variables individually, supported the model of this study, and the 
causality relationship between the four posited independent variables, and the dependent 
variables. Where these interactions have been discussed in the early sections of this chapter, 










Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter consists of eight main sections, not including this brief introduction. Section 6.2 
reviews the independent variables of this study. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 bring together the results 
of the quantitative and qualitative elements of this study and relate them back to the relevant 
literature. Theoretical and practical implications of the study are summarized in sections 6.5 
and 6.7, respectively. Section 6.6 presents the findings of the study in relation the original 
research questions. This chapter ends with a discussion of the limitations of the study (section 
6.8) and suggests a number of areas for further research (section 6.9). 
 
6.2 Discussion of the Independent Variables 
The audit expectation gap has plagued the auditing profession almost from inception. The 
profession struggles to mitigate this phenomenon (Epstein & Geiger, 1994) while confidence in 
audit reports and audited financial statements are undermined by dramatic instances of 
corporate failure arising without warning from external auditors. Examples of such failures 
include Enron, WorldCom and the recent global financial crisis.  
The literature reveals that the audit expectation gap exists in Jordan, and is partially affected by 
(1) the external auditor's performance and independence, according to some authorities (Al-
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Thuneibat, 2003; Asfoor, 2003 Omari, 2003; Al-Khadash & Al-Sartawi, 2010) and (2) the level of 
disclosure and transparency (Hajir, 2001). The literature also shows that inadequate evaluation 
of the going concern assumption (Al-Awaqleh, 2008) and management pressure on auditors 
(Omari, 2003; Bani-Ahmad, 2000; Matar, 1995; Al-Adeli, 1993; Malhas, 1992) reduces the 
reliance placed on the audit report. 
This section discusses the results of the study in respect of each of the four independent 
variables.  
 
6.2.1 External Auditors’ Independence  
The value of the assurance provided by the external auditors to shareholders and stakeholders 
relies on the auditor’s perceived ability to detect breaches, irregularities and errors in the 
financial reporting system, in addition to the auditor’s perceived ability to resist management 
pressure to hide some or all of those breaches (Pott et al, 2009). Based on the interviews 
conducted in this study, external auditors’ independence is seen as the cornerstone of the 
auditing profession and should lead to reliable and credible financial statements. The intent 
behind independent auditor opinion is to provide confidence, supposedly being a genuine and 
expert opinion about the likelihood of absence of material errors and fraud.  
This study adopted the definition of external auditor independence provided by the 
Independence Standard Board (ISB) as noted in Chapter One, section 1.7. The definition focuses 
on the strength of auditors’ attitudes and their performance in the face of any possible 
pressure that may compromise their effectiveness.  The ISB also states “Quality audits improve 
the reliability and enhance the credibility of the financial reporting process, thereby 
contributing to its usefulness and to the efficient functioning of the capital markets, which 
serves the public interest” (ISB, 2000, para. 3). Both this statement and the previously 
mentioned definition emphasize the key role of external auditors’ independence in the 
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perceived reliability of the audit report and the level of the audit expectation gap. The figure 
below shows two aspects of auditor’s independence, i.e. independence in fact and appearance, 
as well as the extent to which they are essential parts of maintaining the objectivity of an 
auditor’s performance (Strohm, 2006). This finding is in conformity with Fearnley & Beattie 
(2004) and Pott et al (2009) who argued that failure of the external auditor's independence is 
enough to undermine the audit process and leads to a loss of trust in the financial reports, thus 
destabilizing the capital market. Such failures in independence also raise questions about the 
role and objectivity of external auditors and contribute to a widening of the audit expectation 
gap.  





Unexpected collapse casts 
doubt on auditor 
independence
Evidence of auditor 
independence failure
=
independence in fact 
compromised 
Suspicion (belief) that 




Loss of confidence in audit 
Loss of confidence in financial reporting destabilizes market 
 
This figure is quoted from Strohm (2006, p. 19) 
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According to Duska, Duska, & Ragatz (2011), there is no “absolute [degree of] independence” or 
“total independence” (p. 127). They argued there will always be some interest and bias among 
auditors. While Mcgrath, Siegel, Dunfee, Glazer and Jaenicke (2001) argued that the ISB 
concept of auditor’s independence does not require external auditors to be totally free of all 
influences on their ability to express an unbiased audit report; it requires them to be free from 
influences significant enough to compromise that ability. The ISB provides guidance that 
enables external auditors to identify whether undue bias exists in specific circumstances and 
also suggests several safeguards for external auditor independence. 
The results of the objective measures (as captured by the experimental instrument) and the 
subjective measures (based on self-reporting by participant) revealed that external auditor 
independence is the most influential factor in the perceived reliability of the audit report, 
according to Jordanian financial analysts. This result is consistent with results in the existing 
literature highlighting the association between external auditor independence and the 
perceived reliability of audited financial statements (Gupta, 2004; Teoh, 1992). This perceived 
influence could be explained by the interviewees’ consensus that external auditors’ 
independence is the cornerstone of the profession and that it leads to objectivity, credibility 
and thus to the perceived reliability of the audit report.  
In regard to the audit expectation gap, the results of this study are not consistent with prior 
Jordanian literature, those earlier studies having revealed external auditors’ independence and 
performance to be major factors affecting the gap (Al-Thuneibat, 2003; Asfoor, 2003; Omari, 
2003; Al-Khadash & Al-Sartawi, 2010). The experiment and the subjective weights in this study 
indicated independence to be an important factor but not as significant as disclosure and 
transparency, and accountability. Based on the interviews of financial analysts in this study, this 
could possibly be attributed to the increasing Jordanian interest in accountability over the past 
two years56. Furthermore, the objective measure showed that the most significant interaction 
affecting the size of the audit expectation gap was the interaction between ‘corporate 
accountability’ and ‘disclosure and transparency’, implying that the institutional investors 
                                                          
56
 For more details, see section 6.2.4 
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consider the ability of shareholders and stakeholders to hold corporate governance bodies 
accountable for their level of disclosure to be a key factor affecting the level of the audit 
expectation gap in Jordan.   
 
6.2.2 Internal Auditors’ Effectiveness 
The results of this study showed that the internal auditor’s effectiveness was a significant 
positive factor in both the perceived reliability of the audit report and changes in the level of 
the audit expectation gap. The internal auditor’s effectiveness was the second most significant 
influence on the reliability of the audit report and accounted for 18.59% of the total effect 
sizes, and had the least, but nevertheless significant, influence on lowering the audit 
expectation gap as it accounted for 14.32% of the total effect sizes. These two different 
rankings of significance could also be clearly seen in the financial analysts’ subjective weighting 
of the independent variables. They weighted internal auditor’s effectiveness as the least 
significant factor affecting the size of the audit expectation gap and the second factor affecting 
the reliability of the audit report. This difference in ranking could be partially attributed, based 
on the interviews of Subjects H, C and I, to the perception that the audit expectation gap 
phenomena primarily relates to the external audit profession rather than the internal audit 
function, although the subjects were aware of the importance of the integration between 
external and internal audits. The difference in ranking may also be partially attributed to 
financial analysts’ perception of increasing interest in the effect of corporate accountability on 
the reduction of the audit expectation gap along with the importance of disclosure and 
transparency57. 
Based on the interviews, the audit committee was seen as a great supporter of the internal 
auditor's effectiveness. The interviewees pointed out that an effective audit committee 
reinforces internal auditors’ effectiveness in detecting frauds and errors. They also added that 
                                                          
57
 See the next two sections: 6.2.3 & 6.2.4 
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the internal auditors should have the authority to report directly to the audit committee in 
order to enhance their independence and performance. This is, in turn, increases the accuracy 
of the financial reporting system. Accordingly, due to the reliance of the external auditors on 
the work performance and objectivity of internal auditors, and due to the vital role of the audit 
committee in facilitating the communications between both external and internal auditors, this 
should increase the reliability of the audit report. These viewpoints of the subject are also 
consistent with the literature that affirmed the substantial roles of the audit committees in 
maintaining the effectiveness of the internal auditors (Zureigat, 2011a; Goodwin & Seow, 2000; 
Goodwin, 2003; Braiotta, 2004; Qin, 2007; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2007; Christopher et al, 
2009). 
 
6.2.3 Disclosure & Transparency 
The results of the study showed that ‘disclosure and transparency’ was a significant positive 
influence on both the perceived reliability of the audit report and the level of the audit 
expectation gap. The results showed that the main effect of disclosure and transparency on the 
change in the size of the audit expectation gap was higher than its effect on the reliability of the 
audit report (23% and 16% respectively).  
A possible explanation, derived from the interviews, is that disclosure and transparency are 
seen as having an inverse relationship with the level of the audit expectation gap; that is, the 
higher the level of disclosure and transparency, the lower the level of the audit expectation 
gap. This is because when information is disclosed appropriately, the users of the audited 
financial statements become aware of what is going on inside the company. Another possible 
explanation, again derived from the interviews, might be that there is considerable skepticism 
relating to the actions of management, particularly the obstruction of auditors’ (internal and 
external) efforts to increase transparency and accountability. With such obstruction, auditors 
may be perceived by investors as having insufficient access to information.   
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It could be argued that the results of this study, in regard to the impact of disclosure and 
transparency on the level of the audit expectation gap, are consistent with Hajir (2001). Hajir 
found that the level of the disclosure and transparency was one the main factors of influence 
on the size of the audit expectation gap between external auditors and institutional investors in 
Jordan. Similarly, the results of the experiment in this study showed that the level of disclosure 
and transparency was the second most significant factor reducing the level of the audit 
expectation gap, only slightly less significant than the first-ranked factor. Hajir (2001) explained 
this by stating “investors perceive that the level of disclosure is not adequate and that they 
then look for higher levels of disclosure from the auditors” (p. 51). Hajir also recommended that 
the Jordanian regulatory bodies and the JACPA provide audit firms with a mandate, going 
beyond the expression of opinions about going concern assumptions, to disclose significant 
facts and financial information, and all uncertainties surrounding the company as such actions 
would help reduce the audit expectation gap.   
 
6.2.4 Corporate Accountability 
The results of the study showed that corporate accountability is a significant positive influence 
on both the perceived reliability of the audit report and changes in the level of the audit 
expectation gap. However, the experiment findings showed that corporate accountability was 
the main influence on the changes in the size of the audit expectation gap, but the least 
significant factor influencing the perceived reliability of the audit report.  
It is noteworthy to recall that most related literature found the external auditor’s independence 
to be the most significant factor influencing the level of the audit expectation gap58. However, 
interestingly, this thesis evidenced that corporate accountability was the most influential factor 
on changes in the level of the audit expectation gap between the external auditors and financial 
analysts. The interviews suggest that this noteworthy result could be attributed to the 
                                                          
58 For more details, refer to section 3.5.4 of Chapter 3 
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increasing interest in the role of accountability in fighting corruption in Jordan. Such interest 
arises from the implication that weak corporate accountability suggests that the top 
management are not accountable and, if they are also major shareholders, they may consider it 
appropriate to view the company as theirs to do whatever they wished with. This implication 
has negatively affected trading in the shares of some companies. Similarly, poor corporate 
accountability has led to a perception by analysts that external auditors in Jordan are failing to 
accomplish their role as agents of shareholders59.  
In the past two years, the issue of corporate accountability has received more attention than 
normal in Jordan, in the light of a series of corporate scandals. "Corruption exceeded 
expectations, especially in public shareholding companies," said Samih Bino, the president of 
the Jordanian Anti-Corruption Commission (JACC) (Bino, 2013)60. The interviewees in the 
current study pointed out that subsequent to the Arab Spring, Jordan witnessed the largest 
number of demonstrations demanding both economic reforms and political reforms. Tunisia, 
the Arab country that arguably triggered the Arab Spring, established an accountability act, 
seeking to reinforce anti-corruption efforts and establish a national accountability board 
(Seghaier, 2013). 
In an effort to reinforce the principles of transparency and accountability, the Jordanian 
Transparency Center (JTC) was established in March 2011.  The JTC aims to increase public 
awareness of the importance of accountability and is also trying to increase public awareness of 
the efforts being made to stamp out corruption in both the private and public sectors. In the 
same context, Jordanian Partners Center launched a series of educational films aiming at 
spreading awareness within Jordanian society of their roles of advocating accountability and 
transparency practices (Ammon news, 2013). Calls for accountability and anti-corruption 
became a slogan raised in most of demonstrations in Jordan. According to some interviewees, 
Jordan witnessed numerous cases of companies and well-known directors and executives who 
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 For more details, see also Qadamani (2007) and Khaza'alah ( 2001). 
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have been sent to the Jordanian Anti-Corruption Commission and to the courts in the past two 
years. The interviewees pointed out that a review of Jordanian media in the past two years 
would reveal a dramatic number of companies being sent to the court. A review of the media at 
that time confirms the interviewees’ comments. For instance, in one headline, “48 listed 
companies were sent to the court”, according to information revealed by the general observer 
of the Jordanian Companies Control Department (CCD) (Al-Talhouni, 2012). “The Arab Spring 
should be a winter for corruption”, said the news reporter Akl (2013). Akl pointed out that 
public frustration with the dramatic instances of corruption was one of the major catalysts 
behind the Arab uprisings in the Middle East. 
 
6.3 Discussion of Analysts’ Decision-Making  
This study provided evidence on the decision-making processes of Jordanian financial analysts 
and the degree of their understanding of these processes. The two sections below discuss the 
configurality and the level of self-insight of Jordanian financial analysts in comparison with 
previous research.   
 
6.3.1 Configurality  
The research revealed that Jordanian financial analysts process cues configurally (in 
combination) when assessing the elements of the JCGC, namely external auditor’s 
independence, internal auditor’s effectiveness, disclosure & transparency, and corporate 
accountability. This finding is consistent with some studies that supported configural cue 
processing among financial analysts in other countries (e.g. Hopkins, 2009; Ebert & Kruse, 1978; 
Mear & Firth, 1987; Nguyen & Ross, 2006; Slovic, 1972; Wood, 2002; Teoh, 1996). 
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6.3.2 Self Insight 
This study is the first to establish the degree of self-insight among Jordanian financial analysts 
and it revealed relatively high degrees of self-insight into their decision-making processes. This 
conclusion is based on both quantitative and qualitative data. 
This degree of self-insight demonstrated by Jordanian financial analysts is not consistent with 
other prior studies of financial analyst decision-making, such as a study in which financial 
analysts in Australia demonstrated limited and poor self-insight. Those studies revealed that 
financial analysts tend to overestimate the importance of minor cues and underestimate the 
importance of major cues (Hopkins, 2009; Mear & Firth, 1987; Libby, 1981). On the other hand, 
studies using external auditors, accountants (Solomon & Shields, 1995; Savich, 1977) and 
professional managers (Wood, 2002; Gibbins & Swieringa, 1995) as subjects have shown 
relatively high degrees of self-insight. The high degree of self-insight among auditors was 
attributed to the implementation of professional standards on auditing and to regular training 
performed by the professional associations (Libby, 1981; Pike, Sharp & Kantor 1988). In 
contrast, the high degree of self-insight among professional managers was attributed to their 
professionalism and their high level of experience. 
It has been evidenced that the financial analysts with more work experience demonstrate 
moderate degrees of self-insight in the U.S and New Zealand (Feldman & Arnold, 1978; Mear & 
Firth, 1987; Slovic et al, 1972). In this thesis, the experience of the survey respondents who 
completed the experiment ranged between 5 to 27 years, with a mean of 12 years61. Those who 
were interviewed for the qualitative study had experiences which ranged between 14 and 27 
years.  This high level of subjects’ experience, along with their professionalism, might be a 
possible explanation for that relatively high degree of self-insight among the Jordanian financial 
analysts.  
                                                          
61 See Table 4: Respondents’ distribution by experience. 
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6.4 Perceptions of the Elements of the Corporate Governance Code in 
Jordan 
This section discusses the interviewee’s viewpoints in regard to the Jordanian corporate 
governance code. Prior to being presented with the eight core questions, as specified in the 
attached interview protocol62, the participants were requested to give unprompted impressions 
of what corporate governance means to them, thus revealing the extent of their understanding 
of the elements of the Jordanian corporate governance code. 
The financial analysts demonstrated a high level of awareness of the elements of the Jordanian 
corporate governance code and their importance. The prominent consensus among the 
participants was that they attributed the emergence, development and adoption of codes of 
best practice to the increasing number of large-scale financial scandals that have taken place 
worldwide. Most of the participants commenced their meeting by referring to these scandals, 
particularly the Asian financial crisis and the collapse of some large European and American 
corporations such as Enron and WorldCom as common examples. The participants pointed out 
that these recent corporate collapses resulted in a questioning of the roles of the board of 
directors and the external auditors alike. They added that, in response to these financial 
scandals, investors, stakeholders and all those interested in dealing with the capital markets 
demanded the adoption of corporate governance best practices in order to ensure better 
protection of their interests.  
Jordanian financial analysts perceived corporate governance, in general, as being important and 
pointed out that such systems ensure that corporations work in the best interests of their 
shareholders, employees, and society in general.  They added that these corporate governance 
systems aim to reduce agency theory problems by limiting any potential conflict of interest 
between the company management, shareholders and other stakeholders. Poor accountability 
encourages directors to achieve personal interests at the expense of the owners’ interests. 
Such corruption can lead to corporate collapses. The participants added that well-governed 
                                                          
62
 See Appendix 7: Data Collection – Interview 
246 
 
companies are those companies that have strong corporate accountability systems in which all 
governing bodies and staff comply with the company’s bylaws and regulations, and ensures 
that equitable rights of the shareholders, especially their rights to timely and adequate 
disclosure and transparent financial information, are provided for.  
The major concern of the Jordanian financial analysts was whether listed companies embraced 
the JCGC. Some analysts pointed out that the JCGC is similar to those codes adopted in 
developed countries, but the problem lies in compliance with the code and not with the code 
itself. The analysts called for a more effective role for government enforcement to achieve 
compliance.   
 
6.5 Theoretical Implications 
As mentioned earlier, several theoretical frameworks emerged to explain corporate 
governance. These theories differed slightly since they viewed corporate governance from 
different angles (Solomon, 2010). In regard to auditing, the information hypothesis, insurance 
hypothesis, and agency theory evolved to justify the use of auditing (Leung, Paul, & Cooper 
2011).   
Agency theory is commonly employed in corporate governance (Saunders et al, 2012; Dalton et 
al, 2003). The research model for the current study is primarily grounded in the agency theory. 
The associated conflict of interests between corporate governance mosaics (in particular, the 
board of directors, the executive managements, the external auditors and the owners of the 
company) that arose because of the separation of the entities and control of those entities 
could be mitigated by adopting effective corporate governance mechanisms. Since poor 
corporate governance contributes to financial crisis and corporate collapses, it is associated 
with a widening of the audit expectation gap. This gap partially exists due to the lack of 
perceived external auditor independence, weak internal auditor effectiveness, insufficient 
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disclosure and transparency, and poor corporate accountability systems, according to both the 
interviews and the literature review in chapter 3.  
Separation of ownership and control of entities means that outside (i.e. non-manager) owners 
need an independent body to provide assurance. The auditing profession was created in an 
effort to help resolve the agency theory problem, and is being further developed to ensure that 
shareholders and investors can rely, with confidence, on audit reports and audited financial 
statements. However, perceived reliance and confidence was compromised due to the 
instances of corporate failures that occurred without any warning signals in audit reports. 
In the Jordanian context, lack of perceived reliance on the audit report and the expansion of the 
audit expectation gap were partially attributed to the problems associated with the agency 
theory and conflict of interests that may arise because of the separation between different 
owners, executive directors and the appointed external auditors. One aspect of agency 
problems (i.e. compromised auditor independence) was attributed to management pressure on 
the auditors, weak corporate accountability, inadequate audit fees determined by company 
management rather than by an independent body (e.g. the audit committee), social and 
personal relationships between the auditors and the board of directors and the management, 
which has affected the integrity of external auditor selection. Moreover, the soundness of 
financial reporting has been negatively impacted by the lack of well-established audit 
committees, with insufficient roles and authorities, as well as a lack of communication with 
both external and internal auditors (Swaiti, 2006; Malkawi, 2008; Abdullatif, 2006; Abu-
Tapanjeh, 2006; Dahmash, 1989; Al-Basheer, 2003; Matar, 1995; Al-Saudi, 2007; Matar, 2000; 
Momany, 1994; Al-Awaqleh, 2008). 
The interviews also revealed that the conflict of interest can be seen when the external auditors 
appointed by the company owners (shareholders) depend on the company management for 
their fees. It is common in Jordan for executive management to, effectively, appoint the 
external auditors and, at the same time, set their fees. Those perceptions, however, are 
consistent with the Jordanian literature (Malkai, 2008; Matar, 1994). The subjects considered 
248 
 
company management intervention on the audit fees as a tool of management pressure on 
auditors. The subjects also stressed the necessity of handing the duties of selecting, dismissing 
and remunerating the external auditors to a body independent from the company 
management, which should be the audit committee.   
In summary, the research model appears theoretically robust. The four posited independent 
variables that are derived from the JCGC contributed to an increase in the perceived reliability 
of the audit report and in bridging the audit expectation gap. The posited four independent 
variables were found to be statistically significant in their influence. In addition to that, several 
statistically significant interactions were identified between the posited four independent 
variables in their influence on both the reliability of the audit report and on the reduction of the 
audit expectation gap. 
 
6.6 Conclusions from the Analysis and Discussion of Findings  
This study program allowed for in-depth understanding of the key selected elements of the 
JCGC, in so far they relate to auditing, and their relative main and interactive influence on the 
perceived reliability of the audit report and the level of the audit expectation gap, in the 
Jordanian context. The study program and the adopted mixed method technique addressed the 
research questions of the study. Next, the findings of the study will be summarized.  
 
6.6.1 The relative main and interactive weights of the JCGC Selected Dimensions  
6.6.1.1 The reliability of the audit report 
The research technique adopted in this study succeeded in identifying and assessing the 
relative main and interactive weights of the selected elements of the JCGC and their influence 
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on the auditing profession, as measured by the perceived reliability of the audit report and 
changes in the level of the audit expectation gap. The relative main and interactive weights of 
the four hypothesized independent factors on the perceived reliability of the audit report (the 
first research question) were measured using objective and subjective techniques. For the 
objective technique, the ‘Effect Size’ (Coolican, 2009), was utilized.   
The results of the objective measure revealed that perceived external auditor’s independence 
had the greatest effect on the perceived reliability of the audit report among the selected 
factors of the JCGC. It accounted for 30% of effect size, when interaction terms are allocated 
back to their parent factors. The second-most influential factor was the internal auditor’s 
effectiveness, which accounted for 27.80% of influence on the perceived reliability of the audit 
report. Disclosure & transparency was another statistically significant influence, measured at an 
effect size of 24.40%. Of the JCGC elements selected for investigation in this study, corporate 
accountability had the least influence on the perceived reliability of the audit report, with an 
effect size of 17.9%. Table 11 shows the percentage of influence for statistically significant 
Effect Sizes of the four selected dimensions of the Jordanian corporate governance code in 








Table 11: Effect Sizes as a Percentage of Total Effect Sizes- Reliability of the 
Audit Report 
Main Effects                                                                                                                 Percentage63 
External Auditor Independence (Ext)                                                                          22.71%           
Internal Auditor Effectiveness (Int)                                                                             18.59% 
Disclosure & Transparency (D & T)                                                                              15.70%      
Corporate Accountability (Acc)                                                                                     9.66% 
 
Interactions            
Significant (large*) effects and interactions at alpha 0.01    19.6% 
Other significant interactions at alpha 0.05                             10.70%               
Sum of non–significant effects and interactions                     3.04%                                     
Sum of effects of interaction                                                                                        33.34%                                    
                                                                                                                                            100% 
* According to Coolican (2009), an effect size equal to or greater than 0.14 is large.  
Table 11 shows that external auditor independence is notably the main effective factor on 
perceived reliability of the audit report, in the perception of institutional investors.  
This result is consistent with several studies (Strohm, 2006; Fearnley & Beattie, 2004; Pott, 
Mock, & Watrin, 2009) that pointed out that compromising the external auditor’s 
independence results in a loss of confidence in financial reporting and destabilizes the capital 
market. “Quality audits improve the reliability and enhance the credibility of the financial 
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reporting process, thereby contributing to its usefulness and to the efficient functioning of the 
capital markets, which serves the public interest” (ISB, 2000, para. 3). This result was supported 
by the comments of interview subjects in the current study as there was a consensus that the 
concept of external auditor’s independence is the cornerstone of auditing and the main 
guarantor of the auditor expressing an independent audit report.  
 
6.6.1.2 The audit expectation gap  
The model of this study was also successful in identifying and assessing the relative main and 
interactive weights of the selected elements of the JCGC and their influence on the size of the 
audit expectation gap whether reducing or widening the gap (the second research question). 
The relative main and interactive weights of the four hypothesized independent factors, as 
regards reducing the audit expectation gap, were measured using objective and subjective 
techniques.  
The results of the objective measure revealed that corporate accountability had the greatest 
effect on reducing the size of the audit expectation gap among the selected factors of the JCGC. 
Corporate accountability accounted for 30.65% of the effect size, when the interaction terms 
are allocated back to their parent factors. The second-most influential factor was disclosure & 
transparency, coming slightly behind corporate accountability in terms of overall influence. 
External auditor’s independence factor was another statistically significant underlying 
dimension, measured at 20.27 under the objective measure. The least influential factor 
affecting the level of the audit expectation gap was the internal auditor’s effectiveness, which 
accounted for 19.20% of effect size. Table 12 shows the percentage of influence for statistically 
significant Effect Sizes of the four selected dimensions of the Jordanian corporate governance 




Table 12: Effect Sizes as a Percentage of Total Effect Sizes- Audit Expectation 
Gap 
Main Effects                                                                                                                   Percentage64 
External Auditor Independence (Ext)                                                                          16.03%           
Internal Auditor Effectiveness (Int)                                                                             14.32% 
Disclosure & Transparency (D & T)                                                                              22.94%      
Corporate Accountability (Acc)                                                                                    23.61% 
 
Interactions            
Significant (large*) effects and interactions at alpha 0.01    14.46% 
Other significant interactions at alpha 0.05                             5.20%               
Sum of non–significant effects and interactions                     3.44%                                     
Sum of effects of interaction                                                                                        23.10%                                    
                                                                                                                                           100% 
* According to Coolican (2009), an effect size equal to or greater than 0.14 is large.  
Interestingly, the results of the study suggested that corporate accountability was the most 
influential factor on the size of the audit expectation gap. Much of the literature related to the 
audit expectations gap (Abdel-Qader, 2002; Hajir, 2001; Al-Thuneibat, 2003; Omari, 2003; Al-
Khadash & Al-Sartawi, 2010; Jarbou, 2004; Jarbou, 2007; Sidani & Olayan, 2007; Al-Qarni, 2004; 
Elmeligy, 2006; Al-Husaini, 2000; Humphrey et al, 1993; Koh & Woo, 1998; Dewing & Russell, 
2002; Salehi & Rostami, 2009; Gloeck & Jager, 1993; Gray & Manson, 2008; Lin & Chen, 2004)  
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have referred to the external auditor's perceived lack of independence as the main factor in 
widening the audit expectation gap. 
The interviews suggest that the perceived importance of cooperate accountability is related to 
the increasing public interest within Jordan regarding accountability and corruption. 
Accountability, political and economic reforms and anti-corruption actions in all Jordanian 
sectors have attracted a great deal of publicity in the past two years. The call for reform in 
Jordan was not an accident nor divorced from what was happening in neighboring countries. 
Indeed, the Arab uprising affected the situation in Jordan and accelerated the pace of reform. 
Some of the interviewees affirmed that these demonstrations succeeded in bringing about 
action against corruption in Jordan, as demonstrated by the dramatic number of directors and 
companies that have been sent to the Jordanian Anti-Corruption Commission and to the courts 
in the past two years.  
 
6.6.2 The Constituents of the JCGC and Cue Processing 
The hypothesis of the study suggests that the Jordanian financial analysts process information 
configurally when considering the selected dimensions of the Jordanian corporate governance 
code. Several significant interactions between the study variables have been identified on both 
the perceived reliability of the audit report and the level of the audit expectations gap. These 
interactions accounted for approximately one-third of the effect on the reliability of the audit 
report and approximately one-quarter of the effect on the level of the audit expectations gap. 
Furthermore, the existence of ‘large’ statistically significant interactions between the study 
variables further confirms and supports the hypothesis of the study.   
The existence of these significant interactions in the impact of the selected elements of the 
JCGC, based on the perceptions of Jordanian financial analysts, sends a clear message to the 
policy makers and Jordanian regulatory bodies, especially the JSC which is responsible for 
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issuing, revising and monitoring listed companies’ compliance with the JCGC. The message is 
that Jordanian financial analysts, during their judgment decisions, take into consideration the 
joint effects of these key factors, not just their individual effects. Therefore, the JSC must not 
just focus on the most decisive factor in their enforcement program, but must realize that the 
complete environment, in the form of the complementary factors, influence analyst decisions. 
The JSC must consider how these factors interact.   
 
6.6.3 A Note on Self-Insight 
Research questions three and four were aimed at investigating the degree of self-insight that 
institutional investors in Jordan demonstrate in their assessment of the impact of the selected 
elements of the Jordanian corporate governance code on both the perceived reliability of the 
audit report and changes in the size of the audit expectation gap. After completing the 16 
hypothetical scenarios (the objective measure), the financial analysts were asked to complete a 
self-reported weighting (the subjective measure) in which they allocate 100 points among the 
four selected elements of the JCGC. In conclusion, the comparison of these two measures plus 
the analysis of the qualitative in-depth interviews delivered further evidence of relatively high 
degrees of self-insight among Jordanian financial analysts into their decision making processes.  
 
6.6.4 In-depth interviews 
This section addresses this study’s fifth research question “How and why do institutional 
investors’ assessments of the elements of the JCGC affect their perception of the reliability of 
the audit report and changes in the level of the audit expectation gap?” Jordanian institutional 
investors were asked to explain why the selected elements of the JCGC influence their 
assessments. The analysis of the participants’ viewpoints regarding each of the independent 
variables, focusing on identifying recurring themes among the various viewpoints, contributed 
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to an in-depth understanding of the participants’ perceptions of the influence of the JCGC, 
facilitated the interpretation of relative main and interactive weights of the study factors, and 
contributed to ascertaining the degree of self-insight among the Jordanian financial analysts.  
The financial analysts demonstrated high levels of awareness of the importance of and the 
nature of the elements of the JCGC. The participants pointed out that recent corporate 
collapses resulted in a questioning of the roles of the directors, and the external and internal 
auditors, and enhanced the importance placed by financial analysts on good corporate 
governance, with particular focus on ensuring adequate disclosure and transparency and 
effective corporate accountability.  
 
6.7 Practical Implications 
The insights gained could be used as follows: 
a) Better targeting of enforcement actions by regulators of companies and auditors so as 
to have a positive impact on the stock market. 
b) The evidence would provide an important message for communicating to directors the 
impact that their governance decisions will have on institutional investors’ willingness to 
invest in their shares. 
c) To reorient academic research in this area to include interactional dimensions. 
d) To encourage a reorientation of governance research in other developing countries to 




6.8 The limitations of the Study 
As with all research, there are actual and potential limitations to the current study. This study’s 
limitations can be categorized into three types: limitations of design, limitations of scope, and 
limitations of application.  
 
6.8.1 Limitations of Design  
“Limitations of design are principally related to the limited contact between the researcher and 
respondents, which does not really allow the researcher to gain clarification of responses or 
additional information on points of interest” (Wood, 2002, p. 257).  
This thesis aims to identify the impact of the selected elements of the Jordanian corporate 
governance code in so far as they relate to the impact on the perceived reliability of the audit 
report and changes in the size of the audit expectations gap, according to institutional investors 
in Jordan. This thesis focuses on the external auditor’s independence, the internal auditor's 
effectiveness, disclosure & transparency, and corporate accountability. Through this 
investigation, this thesis endeavors to contribute to narrowing the expectation gap. Other 
studies (Ojo, 2009; Siddiqui et al, 2009; Dickins & Higgs, 2009; Rehana, 2010; Sikka et al, 1992; 
Sidani & Olayan, 2007; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Fadzly & Ahmad, 2004; Pierce & Kilcommins, 
1997; Wolf et al, 1999) have investigated and pointed out the importance of other factors such 
as the role of accounting professional associations, the code of professional ethical conduct in 
relation to auditing, and the role of audit education in narrowing the audit expectations gap. 
Some studies also highlighted the importance of auditors’ experience and integrity, alongside 
auditors’ independence, in regards to maximizing auditors’ objectivity and ultimately increasing 
the reliability of the audit report (Taylor et al, 2003). Other studies (Teoh et al, 1996; Gul, 1991) 
posited the impact of disclosing the extent of non-audit services, and/or restrictions on the 
provision of non-audit services to audit customers, on the perceived reliability of the audit 
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report. The repeated measures design, applied to four independent factors, yielded 16 
scenarios. Adding more variables, such as some of those outlined in other studies, would have 
increased the number of the scenarios to such an extent that they might have rendered the 
questionnaire impractical (i.e. participants could find it harder to complete), which 
consequently, could jeopardize the response rate.  
The questionnaire contained 16 hypothetical scenarios, any of which could have been difficult 
to conceptualize for some respondents. This potential difficulty contributed to the decision to 
confine the unit of analysis to institutional investors only. Individual investors were excluded in 
order to enhance the experimental design adopted in this study. Professional financial analysts 
are the better choice when conducting experimental studies because they demonstrate a 
better understanding of experimental surveys and have more skills with which to analyze the 
treatments provided in the questionnaire. Furthermore, they are more capable of making 
informed judgments about the causal relationship of the factors in the study (O'Reilly, 2009; 
Teoh & Lim, 1996). 
Another inherent limitation of the factorial experiment design employed in this study is the 
decision to limit scenario variations to two levels: lower and higher. Including additional levels 
would result in a dramatic increase in the number of scenarios and would have rendered the 
questionnaire unfeasible (for instance, the use of three levels instead of two, under the four 
posited independent variables, results in increasing the number of scenarios from 16 to 81). 
The use of two levels is common in research and has enabled various studies to achieve their 




6.8.2 Limitations of Scope 
There are three sets of corporate governance codes in Jordan; one for the banking sector, 
another for the insurance sector and a third one for publicly traded companies at the Amman 
Stock Exchange, the latter one being the code under investigation in this thesis.  
The audit expectation gap phenomenon emerges because of the difference in perceptions 
between auditors and non-auditors regarding the responsibilities of the auditors. Many parties 
rely on the message conveyed by the auditor’s report including the company managers, 
members of the board of directors, creditors and the credit staff at banks, and the preparers of 
the financial statements such as the company financial managers and accountants. These 
parties, in addition to the investors, are the principal parties impacted by the quality of the 
audit report, and they constitute the other side of the audit expectation gap (see for instance, 
Abdullatif, 2003; Al-Khadash et al, 2012; Jarbou, 2007; Al-Khadash & Al-Sartawi, 2010; Hajir, 
2001; Omari, 2003). However, the scope of this thesis is confined to a unit of analysis made up 
of institutional investors in Jordan, enabling this study to achieve precise and focused results. In 
regards to suggestions for future studies, research covering those groups of financial statement 
users excluded from this study may generate further insights and contribute to a more 
comprehensive understanding of how corporate governance codes impact the independence of 
auditors and the audit expectations gap.  
This study’s field work in Jordan was conducted during the ‘Arab Spring’. Based on the 
interviews, the participants highlighted the importance of accountability in both private and 
public sectors and asked for more governmental intervention in controlling and regulating the 
capital market. Slogans demanding strict implementation of accountability and the fighting of 
corruption became common in Jordanian demonstrations. This situation probably influenced 
the viewpoints of the interviewees, therefore, the findings of the study must be considered in 




6.8.3 Limitations in Applications  
This thesis was limited to testing the corporate governance code in so far as it relates to the 
auditing profession in Jordan. The general concepts and elements of corporate governance are 
likely to be comparable in developing and developed countries. However, some differences are 
likely because of specific legal and social contexts. Examples of such differences include the 
composition and the authority of the audit committees, and the regulations regarding auditors 
providing non-audit services. Furthermore, business culture may vary from country to country, 
with, for example, varying degrees of dominant shareholdings, crony capitalism, and the 
influence of religious values, which may limit the ability to generalize the study’s findings. 
Therefore, cautions must be taken in generalizing the findings of the study to other countries.  
 
6.9 Suggestions for Future Research 
The findings of this thesis provide useful insights into how the external auditor’s independence, 
the internal auditor’s effectiveness, disclosure & transparency, and corporate accountability 
affect institutional investors’ perception of the reliability of the audit report and the level of the 
audit expectation gap. The results also established a starting point for future research. 
While effective corporate governance was found to have a positive influence on the Jordanian 
auditing profession in regard to increasing the perceived reliability of the audit report and on 
narrowing the audit expectation gap, more empirical evidence is needed since the JCGC was 
implemented in 2009 and is thus relatively recent. Further research is suggested to investigate 
the potential roles of the JCGC on other issues such as the practice of earnings management 
and the characteristics of effective audit committee as a key pillar of corporate governance. 
Such studies might add a valuable contribution to understanding the importance of maintaining 
effective corporate governance systems. Moreover, the other (excluded) users of the financial 
statements, mentioned in the limitation of scope section, and the other factors mentioned in 
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the limitation of design section, including those elements of the JCGC not selected for this 
study, present opportunities for further studies to be undertaken in Jordan in order to identify a 
comprehensive approach to be adopted to minimize the audit expectation gap.   
Financial analysts, as expert judges, are expected to possess high degrees of self-insight since 
that reflects the extent of the accuracy, consistency and confidence in their judgement 
decision-making process (Libby, 1981; Hooper & Trotman, 1996). Libby (1981) and Hooper & 
Trotman, (1996) also pointed out that understanding the contributors to self-insight is an 
crucial issue in  the learning process, in training and education, and for maintaining consistency 
and accuracy in judgment decision making. Therefore, since both qualitative and quantitative 
methods suggested that Jordanian financial analysts possess a relatively high degree of self-
insight, more research is needed to investigate the causes and contributors to that degree of 
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There will also be random audits of a sample of projects considered to be of negligible risk and 
low risk on all campuses each year. 
 
Within one month of the conclusion of the project, researchers are required to complete a Final 
Report Form and submit it to the local Research Services Officer. 
 
If the project continues for more than one year, researchers are required to complete an Annual 
Progress Report Form and submit it to the local Research Services Officer within one month of 
the anniversary date of the ethics approval. 
 
                        
Signed:   Date: 06/12/2012 
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                                                                                                                           Level 10, 8-20 Napier Street, Tenison House 
                                                                                                                           North Sydney NSW 2060 Australia 
                                                                                                                           PO Box 968 North Sydney NSW 2059 
                                                                                                                           Telephone 612 9739 2361  
                                                                                                                           Facsimile 612 9739 2088                 
                                                                                                                            www.acu.edu.au                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 
INFORMATION LETTER TO PARTICIPANTS 
 
TITLE OF PROJECT:              Corporate Governance and the Auditing Profession 
PRINCIPAL SUPERVISOR:    Dr Waleed Abdel-Qader 
STUDENT RESEARCHER:      Mohammad Shbeilat 
PROGRAMME ENROLLED:    Doctor of Philosophy  
 
Dear Participant  
You are invited to participate in a study about The Jordanian Corporate Governance Code. This 
survey is part of a PhD study being undertaken by Mohammad Shbeilat of the faculty of business 
at the Australian Catholic University. You are invited due to your experience as a financial 
analyst. The primary objective of this thesis is to improve understanding of how the 
implementation of the newly adopted Jordanian corporate governance code has affected the 
perceived reliability of an independent audit opinion and the extent to which the code might 
help in narrowing the audit expectation gap. The audit expectation gap refers to the different 
perceptions between the auditors’ actual performance and to what report users believe the 
auditors should be performing and achieving as auditors.  If you participate in this study, you will 
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be invited to take part in a one-on-one interview with the researcher, in addition to the survey 
questionnaire.   
 As professional investors, the participants will share equally with other Jordanian investors the 
social benefits of improved knowledge of the influence of the Jordanian corporate governance 
code. We do not foresee any significant risk in participating in this study. The interview will not 
ask after details of your personal life, other private matters, or any organizational specific 
questions, but it will take on the form of a conversation about your experience of the Jordanian 
corporate governance and the auditing profession. 
The duration of the interview will be between 45-60 minutes, where the time needed to fill in 
the questionnaire is approximately 20 minutes. No preparation on your part is necessary. The 
interview will be held at your office, alternatively, you can request for the interview to be held in 
a different location and whether to be conducted during work hours or during the break. The 
interviews will be recorded using a mobile recording device. 
The purpose of this study is to fill the gap in knowledge surrounding institutional investors’ 
perception in evaluating the impact of the newly adopted Jordanian Corporate Governance Code 
on the auditing profession and to Increase knowledge of how the elements of the Jordanian 
corporate governance codes affects the reliability of the audit report. It is expected that the 
results and the potential recommendations will also be of the benefit of the Jordanian capital 
market regulatory bodies. 
Participation is voluntary and you are free to refuse consent or withdraw from project at any 
time without any penalty and without giving a reason. 
This study will ensure the confidentiality of your Participation. No identifying factors such as 
name or contact details will be disclosed to anyone but the researcher. When the study is 
published, your name and the name of your workplace (or any other identifying information) will 
be replaced with pseudonyms, and may appear like this: 
Katrina (pseudonym) worked at Organization A (pseudonym) , , ,   
Interview transcripts and recordings will be stored in the student laptop which has a security 
password while conducting the study in Jordan, and then in secure facilities at ACU, with no 
identifying information attached.  
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Please return the completed questionnaire in the envelope provided to: P.O.Box 410969 Jabal 
Al-Taj 11141 Amman – Jordan. Please indicate if you would like to receive a copy of a summary 
conclusions report on the published results at the end of the meeting or by answering question 4 
of Part C of the questionnaire. If you would like further information about this study, please 
contact the student researcher or the Principal Supervisor at any time.   
Principal Supervisor 
 
Dr Waleed Abdel-Qader 
Waleed.Abdel-Qader@acu.edu.au 
School of Business 
Australian Catholic University 
T: +61 2 9739 2307  F: +61 2 9739 2088 





School of Business/ Australian Catholic University 
T: +61 2 9739 2113  F: +61 2 9739 2088   
Level 10, 8-20 Tenison House. North Sydney NSW 2060 
 
Please be advised that this study has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee 
at Australian Catholic University. In the event you have any complaint or concern or if you have 
any query that the supervisor and Student Researcher have not been able to satisfy, you may 
write to the Chair of the Human Research Ethics Committee on the following address: 
 
NSW and ACT: Chair, HREC 
C/- Research Services 
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Australian Catholic University 
North Sydney Campus 
PO Box 968 
NORTH SYDNEY NSW 2059 
Tel: 02 9739 2105 
Fax: 02 9739 2870 
res.ethics@acu.edu.au  
 
Any complaint or concern will be treated in confidence and fully investigated. The participant will 
be informed of the outcome.  
If you agree to participate in this project, you should sign both copies of the Consent Form, 
retain one copy for your records and return the other copy to the Principal Supervisor or Student 
Researcher. 
 
Dr Waleed Abdel-Qader                            Mohammad Shbeilat 
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                                                                                                                                  Level 10, 8-20 Napier Street, Tenison House 
                                                                                                                                  North Sydney NSW 2060 Australia 
                                                                                                                                  PO Box 968 North Sydney NSW 2059 
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                                                                                                                                  www.acu.edu.au                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 
Letter to the Professional Association of Financial Analysts 
 
TITLE OF PROJECT:               Corporate Governance and the Auditing Profession 
 
PRINCIPAL SUPERVISOR):    Dr Waleed Abdel-Qader 
 
STUDENT RESEARCHER:     Mohammad Shbeilat 
  
PROGRAMME ENROLLED:    Doctor of Philosophy  
 
Dear Professional Association of the Financial Analysts in Jordan 
Mohammad Shbeilat is a student researcher at the faculty of business at the Australian Catholic 
University and conducting a study about The Jordanian Corporate Governance Code and its 
impact on the auditing profession in Jordan. Mohammad is seeking permission to advertise the 
attached file (Information Letter to Participants) amongst the members of Professional 
Association of Financial Analysts in Jordan. Please refer to the attached Information Letter to 
Participants for more details about the study aims, location, and duration.  
 
Dr Waleed Abdel-Qader                            Mohammad Shbeilat 











“After consulting with our board we can help in disseminating the information 
letter to participants and the questionnaire to the contact list that we have, with 
any replies going back directly to you.  
  
You would then have to manage any further correspondence on your own 
(interviews etc) directly based on the replies you get”. 
  
 
All the best, 









Appendix 5: Consent Form  
 
 
                                                                                                  North Sydney Campus (Mackillop) 
                                                                                                                                    Level 10, 8-20 Napier Street Tenison House 
                                                                                                                                    North Sydney NSW 2060 Australia 
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                                                                                                                                    Telephone 612 9739 2361  
                                                                                                                                     Facsimile 612 9739 2088                 
                                                                                                                                     www.acu.edu.au                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------- 
CONSENT FORM 
TITLE OF PROJECT: The Jordanian Corporate Governance Code: A study of Institutional Investors’ 
Perception of the Reliability on the Audit Report and the Audit Expectation Gap 
 PRINCIPAL SUPERVISOR:     Waleed Abdel-Qader 
STUDENT RESEARCHER:       Mohammad Shbeilat 
 
I ................................................. have read and understood the information provided in the 
Letter to Participants. Any questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree 
to participate in this approximately one hour audiotaped interview or in the questionnaire that 
takes about 20 minutes to complete, realising that I can withdraw my consent at any time 
without adverse consequences. I agree that research data collected for the study may be 
published or may be provided to other researchers in a form that does not identify me in any 
way.   
NAME OF PARTICIPANT:     
SIGNATURE.....................................................................                  DATE: ...................... 
 
 SIGNATURE OF PRINCIPAL SUPERVISOR: Waleed Abdel-Qader                             DATE: …………………… 
 




























This questionnaire is part of a PhD study being undertaken by Mohammad Shbeilat of the faculty of business at the 
Australian Catholic University into the institutional investors' perceptions of the reliability of the audit report and the audit 
expectations gap   
Your views will contribute greatly to the level and quality of information being gathered. Please complete all 3 
parts of the questionnaire yourself and without discussion with colleagues. 
Your responses and comments are strictly confidential. This questionnaire is anonymous unless you opt to 
provide contact details to receive a copy of the research report. No responses or comments will be individually 
attributed in any published report and any comments used will be de-identified. Participation in the study is 
entirely voluntary. The questionnaire should take less than 20 minutes to complete. 
Please return the completed questionnaire in the envelope provided to: 
P.O.Box 410969 Jabal Al-Taj 11141 Amman – Jordan 
OR You can send a soft copy to mohammad.shbeilat@acu.edu.au 
                                   
The Jordanian Corporate Governance Codes  
&  
The Auditing Profession Study 
COMPLETION INSTRUCTIONS – PART A 
Please read the following definitions in order to best visualize the scenarios presented.  
The Jordanian Corporate Governance Codes (JCGC): 
Refers to the JCGC that has been approved and issued by board of the commissioners of the Jordanian Securities 
Commission on the 29th of July 2008 for the publicly traded companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange and which 
has come into effect as of the first of January 2009. The JCGC contains five chapters as follows: Definitions, The Board 
of Directors of the Shareholding Company, General Assembly Meetings, Shareholders Rights, and the Disclosure and 
Transparency respectively. The latter chapter has also discussed the roles and duties of the audit committees, external 
auditors and the internal auditors.   
External Auditors' Independence: Freedom from those pressures and other factors that compromise, or can reasonably 
be expected to compromise, an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions (ISB, 2000). 
Internal Audit Effectiveness refers to the extent to which the designated internal audit objectives and functions are 
achieved properly, are unbiased, and are free from management pressure that may compromise the internal auditor's 
performance. Examples of those designated internal audit functions are safeguarding assets against loss and theft, 
providing reasonable assurances that the financial and operating information are accurate and reliable, and ensuring the 
entity's compliance with laws and regulations. 
Disclosure and Transparency: Refers to the quality and reliability of information, whether financial or non-financial, 
provided by the company to the shareholders and the users of the financial reporting. 
Corporate Accountability: Refers to the ability of the shareholders and the stakeholders to hold the governing body of 
the company such as the executive management, the board of directors and the external auditors accountable and 
answerable to the laws, the regulations and the company's bylaw based on their power and responsibilities. 
The audit expectation gap: The audit expectation gap refers to the different perceptions between the auditors’ actual 
performance and to what report users believe the auditors should be performing and achieving as auditors.  
Reliability of the audit report: refers to the extent to which the institutional investor can rely on the audit report to 
clearly convey significant instances of poor internal controls; accounting errors, biases, or omissions; and concerns 










PART A - The Exercise 
You are presented with 16 hypothetical investment scenarios. Each scenario is slightly different. 
Each investment scenario requires 2 responses. Please consider each in isolation relative to your 
Typical Assessment of each scenario on the reliability of an audit report and the typical size of the 
audit expectation gap and then score all the cases relative to those two typical scenarios. Each of 
the four corporate governance dimensions is assigned either a high or low rating. High refers to 
the  a level achieved by the top 1/3 of companies on that factor and Low refers to a level of 
performance achieved by the 1/3 least successful companies on that factor. 
 
Example - The response for your typical case would appear like this: 
 
Typical    External Auditor's Independence                       Typical    Disclosure and Transparency 
Typical   Internal Auditor Effectiveness                              Typical   Corporate Accountability 
 
                                         Your Assessment on the Following (circle)  
 
                                                       Substantially Worse                                                   Substantially Better 
Reliability of the Audit Report             -3             -2            -1                                      +1            +2                 +3 




  Lower    External Auditor's Independence                       Higher    Disclosure and Transparency 
  Higher    Internal Auditor Effectiveness                           Lower    Corporate Accountability 
                                           Your Assessment on the Following (circle)  
                                                                     Substantially Worse                                                   Substantially Better 
  Reliability of the Audit Report                      -3               -2            -1         Same        +1            +2                +3 











  Lower    External Auditor's Independence                       Lower    Disclosure and Transparency 
  Higher   Internal Auditor Effectiveness                           Lower    Corporate Accountability 
                                           Your Assessment on the Following (circle)  
 
                                                                     Substantially Worse                                                   Substantially Better 
  Reliability of the Audit Report                      -3               -2            -1         Same        +1            +2                +3 




  Higher    External Auditor's Independence                       Higher    Disclosure and Transparency 
  Higher    Internal Auditor Effectiveness                             Lower    Corporate Accountability 
                                           Your Assessment on the Following (circle)  
                                                                     Substantially Worse                                                   Substantially Better 
  Reliability of the Audit Report                      -3               -2            -1         Same        +1            +2                +3 




  Higher    External Auditor's Independence                       Lower    Disclosure and Transparency 
  Higher    Internal Auditor Effectiveness                             Higher    Corporate Accountability 
                                           Your Assessment on the Following (circle)  
                                                                     Substantially Worse                                                   Substantially Better 
  Reliability of the Audit Report                      -3               -2            -1         Same        +1            +2                +3 










  Higher    External Auditor's Independence                       Lower    Disclosure and Transparency 
 
  Lower    Internal Auditor Effectiveness                            Higher    Corporate Accountability 
 
                                           Your Assessment on the Following (circle)  
 
                                                                     Substantially Worse                                                   Substantially Better 
 
  Reliability of the Audit Report                      -3               -2            -1         Same        +1            +2                +3 
 




  Lower    External Auditor's Independence                       Higher    Disclosure and Transparency 
  Lower    Internal Auditor Effectiveness                           Higher     Corporate Accountability 
                                           Your Assessment on the Following (circle)  
                                                                     Substantially Worse                                                   Substantially Better 
  Reliability of the Audit Report                      -3               -2            -1         Same        +1            +2                +3 




  Higher    External Auditor's Independence                       Higher    Disclosure and Transparency 
  Higher    Internal Auditor Effectiveness                             Higher    Corporate Accountability 
                                           Your Assessment on the Following (circle)  
                                                                     Substantially Worse                                                   Substantially Better 
  Reliability of the Audit Report                      -3               -2            -1         Same        +1            +2                +3 









  Lower    External Auditor's Independence                       Higher    Disclosure and Transparency 
  Lower    Internal Auditor Effectiveness                           Lower     Corporate Accountability 
                                           Your Assessment on the Following (circle)  
                                                                     Substantially Worse                                                   Substantially Better 
  Reliability of the Audit Report                      -3               -2            -1         Same        +1            +2                +3 




  Higher    External Auditor's Independence                       Lower    Disclosure and Transparency 
  Higher    Internal Auditor Effectiveness                           Lower    Corporate Accountability 
                                           Your Assessment on the Following (circle)  
                                                                     Substantially Worse                                                   Substantially Better 
  Reliability of the Audit Report                      -3               -2            -1         Same        +1            +2                +3 
  Audit Expectation Gap                                    -3               -2            -1         Same        +1            +2                +3 
 
 
Case 10  
  Lower    External Auditor's Independence                       Lower    Disclosure and Transparency 
  Lower    Internal Auditor Effectiveness                           Lower    Corporate Accountability 
                                           Your Assessment on the Following (circle)  
                                                                     Substantially Worse                                                   Substantially Better 
  Reliability of the Audit Report                      -3               -2            -1         Same        +1            +2                +3 









  Higher    External Auditor's Independence                       Higher    Disclosure and Transparency 
  Lower    Internal Auditor Effectiveness                             Lower    Corporate Accountability 
                                           Your Assessment on the Following (circle)  
                                                                     Substantially Worse                                                   Substantially Better 
  Reliability of the Audit Report                      -3               -2            -1         Same        +1            +2                +3 





  Lower    External Auditor's Independence                       Lower    Disclosure and Transparency 
  Lower    Internal Auditor Effectiveness                           Higher    Corporate Accountability 
                                           Your Assessment on the Following (circle)  
                                                                     Substantially Worse                                                   Substantially Better 
  Reliability of the Audit Report                      -3               -2            -1         Same        +1            +2                +3 




  Higher    External Auditor's Independence                       Lower    Disclosure and Transparency 
  Lower    Internal Auditor Effectiveness                            Lower    Corporate Accountability 
                                           Your Assessment on the Following (circle)  
                                                                     Substantially Worse                                                   Substantially Better 
  Reliability of the Audit Report                      -3               -2            -1         Same        +1            +2                +3 








  Higher    External Auditor's Independence                       Higher    Disclosure and Transparency 
  Lower    Internal Auditor Effectiveness                            Higher    Corporate Accountability 
                                           Your Assessment on the Following (circle)  
                                                                     Substantially Worse                                                   Substantially Better 
  Reliability of the Audit Report                      -3               -2            -1         Same        +1            +2                +3 





  Lower    External Auditor's Independence                       Lower    Disclosure and Transparency 
  Higher    Internal Auditor Effectiveness                          Higher    Corporate Accountability 
                                           Your Assessment on the Following (circle)  
                                                                     Substantially Worse                                                   Substantially Better 
  Reliability of the Audit Report                      -3               -2            -1         Same        +1            +2                +3 




  Lower    External Auditor's Independence                       Higher    Disclosure and Transparency 
  Higher    Internal Auditor Effectiveness                          Higher    Corporate Accountability 
                                           Your Assessment on the Following (circle)  
                                                                     Substantially Worse                                                   Substantially Better 
  Reliability of the Audit Report                      -3               -2            -1         Same        +1            +2                +3 








Please indicate the relative importance each of the four variables had on your judgments by allocating 100 
points between them for each of the outcome measures (i.e. each column should total 100): 
 
                                                                  Reliability of the Audit Report      Audit Expectation Gap 
External Auditor's Independence                         ----------------                                          ----------------      
 Internal Auditor Effectiveness                              ----------------                                          --------------- 
Disclosure and Transparency                                -----------------                                          --------------- 
Corporate Accountability                                      -----------------                                          ---------------- 
 
Please indicate by circling a number on the scale below how confident you feel that the four factors 
together     represent the major determinant of your assessment of the:  
 
(1) Reliability of the audit report     Lower Confidence       1         2         3         4         5         6         7      Higher confidence 
(2) Audit expectation gap                Lower Confidence        1         2         3         4         5         6         7       Higher confidence 
 
Please list other related factors from the Jordanian Corporate Governance Codes that you think would be 
relevant to your assessment of your perceptions of: 
A greater reliability of the audit report 
 








































1- Please indicate the type of the company you are currently work in: 
    a- Bank    b- Insurance Company   c- Brokerage  company    d- Investment fund   
    e- Other, please specify ……………………….…… 
 
2- How many years have you worked as a financial analyst, Investment analyst/officer or investment 
manager?    _________  years 
 
3- Please indicate your position:  
     a. Manager (of the investment department)     b. Head of the investment section 
     c. Investment analyst/officer                            d. If others, please specify…………………………… 
 
4- Please indicate if you would like to receive a copy of a summary conclusions report.          Yes / No 
 If you have answered Yes to the above, please provide your contact details:  
 
Name   ______________________________    Position   ____________________________ 
Company ___________________________________________________________________ 
Telephone _________________________          email ________________________________ 
If you have any questions regarding this questionnaire please contact: 
 
       Mohammad Shbeilat       OR          Dr. Waleed Abdel-Qader       OR       Professor Donald Ross      OR     Professor Garry Tibbits  
 
              Tel: +962                                             Tel: +61 (02) 9739 2307                                  Tel: +61 (02) 9739 2356      
                                  
   Mohammad.shbeilat@acu.edu.au            Waleed.Abdel-Qader@acu.edu.au              Donald.Ross@acu.edu.au                   g.tibbits@uws.edu.au      
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 Explain the terms used in the study and deliver a brief introduction to study contribution 
 Hardcopy of the corporate governance code was available during the meetings  
 Request unprompted impressions of what does the corporate governance means to 
them. 
 
1- How does your assessment of the external auditor's independence affect your perception of 
the reliability of the audit report?  
Can you please tell me why? 
2- How does your assessment of the internal auditor's effectiveness affect your perception of the 
reliability of the audit report?  
- Can you please tell me why? 
3- How does your assessment of the level (poor, medium, strong) of the disclosure and 
transparency affect your perception of the reliability of the audit report?  
- Can you please tell me why? 
4- How does your assessment of the level (poor, medium, strong) of corporate accountability 
affect your perception of the reliability of the audit report?  
- Can you please tell me why? 
 
5- How does your assessment of the external auditor's independence affect your perception on 
the level of the audit expectation gap?  
- Can you please tell me why? 
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6- How does your assessment of the internal auditor's effectiveness affect your perception on 
the level of the audit expectation gap?  
- Can you please tell me why? 
7- How does your assessment of the level (poor, medium, strong) of the disclosure and 
transparency affect your perception on the level of the audit expectation gap?  
- Can you please tell me why? 
8- How does your assessment of the level (poor, medium, strong) of corporate accountability 
affect your perception on the level of the audit expectation gap?  
- Can you please tell me why? 
 




















Appendix 8: List of Abbreviations 
 
ACU Australian Catholic University 
AICPA American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
ASCA Arab Society of Certified Accountants 
ASE Amman Stock Exchange 
ASXCGC BP THE Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Council  
Best Practices 
BoD Board of Directors 
CBJ Central Bank of Jordan 
CCD Companies Control Department in Jordan 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CFA - Jordan Professional Association of Financial Analysts in Jordan 
CIPE Centre for International Private Enterprise 
CFM Certified Financial Management 
CMA Certified Managerial Accounting 
CPA Certified Public Accountant 
FRC The Financial Reporting Council in the UK 
FASB Financial Accounting Standard Board 
GAAS Generally accepted auditing standard 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
IASC International Accounting Standards Committee 
IFAC International Federation of Accountants 
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards 
IIA Institute of Internal Auditors 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IRC Insurance Commission: in Jordan 
ISA International Standards on auditing 
JACC Jordanian Anti-Corruption Commission  
JACG The Jordanian Association of Corporate Governance 
JACPA Jordanian Association for Certified Public Accountants 
 
JCGC 
Jordanian Corporate Governance Code for the publicly-traded 
companies which have been approved by the JSC board of the 
commissioners on the 29th of July 2008 and came into effect as 
of the first of January 2009 
JSC The Jordanian Securities Commission 
JTC Jordanian Transparency Center  
MENA Middle East and North Africa 
NYSE New York Stock Exchange 
NASDAQ National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations 
NAS Non-audit services 
OECD The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
ROSC Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
SDC Securities Depository Center – for Jordan 
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SEC Securities and Exchange Commission in American 
SOX Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
SPSS Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
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